Skip to main content

A Secure and Efficient Method for Scalar Multiplication on Supersingular Elliptic Curves over Binary Fields

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7807))

  • 750 Accesses

Abstract

We present a secure and efficient scalar multiplication method for supersingular elliptic curves over binary fields based on Montgomery’s ladder algorithm. Our approach uses only the x-coordinate of elliptic curve points to perform scalar multiplication, requires no precomputation and executes the same number of operations over the binary field in every iteration. When applied to projective coordinates, our method is faster than the other typical scalar multiplication methods in practical situations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Cohen, H., Frey, G. (eds.): Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  2. López, J., Dahab, R.: Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over \(GF\)(2\(^{\rm m}\)) without precomputation. In: Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 1999. LNCS, vol. 1717, pp. 316–327. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Okeya, K., Sakurai, K.: Efficient elliptic curve cryptosystems from a scalar multiplication algorithm with recovery of the \(y\)-coordinate on a montgomery-form elliptic curve. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, p. 126. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Fischer, W., Giraud, C., Knudsen, E., Seifert, J.: Parallel Scalar Multiplication on General Elliptic Curves over \(F_p\) hedged against Non-Differential Side Channel Attacks. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2002/007 (2002). http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/fischer02parallel.html

  5. Joye, M.: Highly regular right-to-left algorithms for scalar multiplication. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 135–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Saeki, M.: Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. Master Thesis. McGill University, Montreal (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Montgomery, P.L.: Speeding the Pollard and elliptic curve methods of factorization. Math. Comput. 48(177), 243–264 (1987)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Hankerson, D., Menezes, A.J., Vanstone, S.: Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Springer-Verlag New York Inc., Secaucus (2003)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marco Aurélio Amaral Henriques .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

A Appendix: Montgomery’s Ladder Invariant

A Appendix: Montgomery’s Ladder Invariant

Lemma 1

Every iteration in Montgomery’s ladder algorithm to compute \(kP_0\), where \(k = (k_{n-1}, k_{n-2}, \ldots , k_0)_2\), keeps the difference \(S - R = P_0\).

Proof

Before the first iteration, we have \(R = P_0\) and \(S = 2P_0\), and thus \(Q_2 - Q_1 = P_0\). Now let’s assume that during an iteration \(0 \le i \le l-2\) we have \(R = nP_0\) and \(S = (n+1)P_0\), where \(1 \le n\le k\). The difference \(S - R = P_0\) holds. To prove that in iteration \(i+1\) the invariant \(S - R = P_0\) is held, we must consider two cases:

  • if \(k_i = 0\): the values of R and S are updated such that \(R = 2nP_0\) and \(S = (n + n + 1)P_0 = (2n+1)P_0\). We can see that the difference \(S - R = P_0\) holds in this case.

  • if \(k_i = 1\): the values of R and S are updated such that \(R = (n + n + 1)P_0 = (2n+1)P_0\) and \(S = 2(k+1)P_0 = (2k+2)P_0\). We can see that the difference \(S - R = P_0\) holds in this case too.

By the end of iterations, we have \(i = 0\) and \(Q_2 - Q_1 = P_0\) is mantained.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

de Oliveira, M.F., Henriques, M.A.A. (2015). A Secure and Efficient Method for Scalar Multiplication on Supersingular Elliptic Curves over Binary Fields. In: Desmedt, Y. (eds) Information Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7807. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_29

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_29

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27658-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27659-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics