A Dangerous Mix: Large-Scale Analysis of Mixed-Content Websites

  • Ping ChenEmail author
  • Nick Nikiforakis
  • Christophe Huygens
  • Lieven Desmet
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7807)


In this paper, we investigate the current state of practice about mixed-content websites, websites that are accessed using the HTTPS protocol, yet include some additional resources using HTTP. Through a large-scale experiment, we show that about half of the Internet’s most popular websites are currently using this practice and are thus vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, including the stealing of cookies and the injection of malicious JavaScript in the context of the vulnerable websites. Additionally, we investigate the default behavior of browsers on mobile devices and show that most of them, by default, allow the rendering of mixed content, which demonstrates that hundreds of thousands of mobile users are currently vulnerable to MITM attacks.


Content Provider Resource Provider Internet Explorer Mixed Content MITM Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This research is partially funded by the Research Fund KU Leuven, iMinds, IWT, and by the EU FP7 projects WebSand, NESSoS and STREWS. With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union (B-CCENTRE).


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ping Chen
    • 1
    Email author
  • Nick Nikiforakis
    • 1
  • Christophe Huygens
    • 1
  • Lieven Desmet
    • 1
  1. 1.iMinds-DistriNetKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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