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Fine-Grained Access Control for HTML5-Based Mobile Applications in Android

  • Xing JinEmail author
  • Lusha Wang
  • Tongbo Luo
  • Wenliang Du
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7807)

Abstract

HTML5-based mobile applications are becoming more and more popular because they can run on different platforms. Several newly introduced mobile OS natively support HTML5-based applications. For those that do not provide native support, such as Android, iOS, and Windows Phone, developers can develop HTML5-based applications using middlewares, such as PhoneGap. In these platforms, programs are loaded into a web component, called WebView, which can render HTML5 pages and execute JavaScript code. In order for the program to access the system resources, which are isolated from the content inside WebView due to its sandbox, bridges need to be built between JavaScript and the native code (e.g. Java code in Android). Unfortunately, such bridges break the existing protection that was originally built into WebView. In this paper, we study the potential risks of HTML5-based applications, and investigate how the existing mobile systems’ access control supports these applications. We focus on Android and the PhoneGap middleware. However, our ideas can be applied to other platforms. Our studies indicate that Android does not provide an adequate access control for this kind of applications. We propose a fine-grained access control mechanism for the bridge in Android system. We have implemented our scheme in Android and have evaluated its effectiveness and performance.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Syracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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