Skip to main content

DNA Analysis and Criminal Proceedings: The Greek Legal Paradigm

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover E-Democracy – Citizen Rights in the World of the New Computing Paradigms (e-Democracy 2015)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 570))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 554 Accesses

Abstract

With the advent of DNA technology and the revolutionization it entails for the administration of criminal justice, the forensic use of DNA analysis as a key crime-fighting tool has gained a prominent role in the enforcement of penal repression, both domestically as well as transnationally; albeit amidst escalating concerns from a fundamental rights standpoint. The present contribution focuses on the (reformed) Greek DNA sampling and databasing penal policy as codified in article 200A CPC, adumbrates its general outline, offers a critical overview of its problematic parameters, highlights the ensuing rule of law deficiencies and forwards de lege ferenda ameliorative suggestions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    On the unique features of genetic data and their ability to reveal what has been aptly named as an individual’s “genetic diary” [cf. Market M., Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protections in DNA Databanks, Suffolk U. L. Rev., vol.30, 185ff. (1996)], see Opinion 2/2009 of the Hellenic DPA (HDPA) on DNA Analysis and the Creation of a Database of DNA Profiles, 29.7.2009, item 2.1., and Shapiro D./Weinberg M., DNA Data Banking: The Dangerous Erosion of Privacy, Clev. St. L. Rev., vol.38, 455 ff. (469ff.) (1990). On the relative probative value of DNA analysis, see Decisions of the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), The Operation of Video Cameras in Public Places and the Sound or Image Recording, the DNA Analysis during Criminal Proceedings and the Files of Genetic Prints (Art.12 par.3 L.3783 /2009), 18.2.2010, p.7 and of the National Bioethics Commission (NBC) on the Use of Genetic Prints in Criminal Proceedings, 23.3.2001, pt. 3.

  2. 2.

    Said provision was added by art.5 L.2928/2001, Government Gazette (GG) 141A’/27.6.2001 and was modified also in 2004 (art.42 par.3 L.3251/2004, GG 129A’/9.7.2004) and in 2008 (art.6 par.3 L.3728/2008, GG 257A’/18.12.2008) prior to the amendments analyzed in text. For a presentation of the legal issues associated with art.200A CPC in its previous form, see among others Mallios E., The Use of DNA in Criminal Proceedings, Nomiko Vima, 1749–1772, (2001), Siaperas G., The Consent of the Individual to the Taking of his Genetic Material (DNA), Poiniki Dikaiosyni, 1451ff., (2005), Symeonidou-Kastanidou E., Law 2928/ 2001 on the “Protection of the Citizen from Illicit Acts and Offences by Criminal Organizations”-Basic Features and a First Interpretative Approach, Poiniki Dikaiosyni, 694–699(696), (2001).

  3. 3.

    Subsequent to the latest normative revise (see art.19 L.4322/2015, GG 42 A’/27.4.2015), this possibility is now ruled out as it is explicitly stipulated in art.200A par.1b’ CPC that the removal of genetic material can only be authorized by the competent Public Prosecutor or the Investigating Judge.

  4. 4.

    GG 138A/7.8.2009.

  5. 5.

    OJ L 210/1, 6.8.2008. On the Prüm Decision and the homonym Treaty whose content was thereby integrated into the European institutional framework, see generally UK Parliament, House of Lords (HoL), Prüm: An Effective Weapon Against Terrorism and Crime?, 18th Report of Session 2006–07, Stationary Office Ltd.: London (2007) and specifically Kierkegaard S., Security and DNA Transfer Within the EU. The Prüm Decision- An Uncontrolled Fishing Expedition in “Big Brother” Europe, CLSR, vol.24, 243–252, (2008), McCartney C. et als, Transnational Exchange of Forensic DNA: Viability, Legitimacy and Acceptability, Eur. J. Crim. Policy Res, vol.17, 305–322, (2011). For an overview of the EU security-enhancing legislative initiatives propelled by the introduction of the availability principle, see Lachana K.-Ch., Recent Developments in the Transnational Information Exchange Between Law-enforcement Authorities in the EU: The Introduction and Implementation of the Principle of Availability, in Bottis M. et als. (eds.), Values and Freedoms in Modern Information Law and Ethics, pp. 1175–1179, Nomiki Bibliothiki, (2012).

  6. 6.

    On the conceptual disparities between the notions of genetic material (=cellular sample) and DNA profile (=genetic print), see instead of others the definitions provided in ECtHR, S. and Marper v. UK, nos.30562/04 and 30566/04, 4.12.2008, paras. 70 et seq., and, from the theory, Lachana K.-Ch., Genetic Material, in Androulakis N./Margaritis L./Farsedakis I.(eds.), Dictionary of Legal Terminology, III, Criminal Law and Criminology, Nomiki Bibliothiki, forthcoming. Hereinafter the first, broader term is employed to denote any material of a biological origin, e.g. blood, saliva, sperm etc., whose analysis enables access to the human DNA, namely the, replete with valuable genetic information, chemical substance contained in the 23 chromosomes of every bodily cell, while the second term refers to the outcome of the analysis of the non-nuclear (=non-codified) DNA sequences. Genetic data signifies “all data, of whatever type, concerning the characteristics of an individual which are inherited or acquired during early prenatal development”, see likewise arts. 4(10), COM (2012)11 final, 25.1.2012, and 3(10), COM (2012)10 final, 25.1.2012, respectively.

  7. 7.

    GG 50A/10.4.1997 (as amended).

  8. 8.

    See art.3 par.2 point b) of L.2472/1997, added by art.8 par.1 of L.3625/2007, GG 290A/ 24.12.2007.

  9. 9.

    I.e. the principles of necessity, necessary proportion, prohibition of excessiveness and of unfavorable treatment. On their function, see Androulakis N., The Limits of Investigative Action and the Principle of Necessity, Poinika Chronika, 3–15, (1975), Dalakouras Th., Criminal Procedural Law, pp. 99ff., Law & Economy, P.N. Sakkoulas, (2012).

  10. 10.

    Arts.8 ECHR, 8 ECFR, 16 TFEU, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 350/60, 30.12.2008), CoE Convention 108 and its Additional Protocol, as well as Recommendations No. R (87)15 and No. R (92)1.

  11. 11.

    On the deficiencies of the European legislation, see esp. Symeonidou-Kastanidou E., DNA Analysis and Criminal Proceedings: The European Institutional Framework, EJCCLCJ, 139–160, (2011), (=Poinika Chronika, 3–12, 2011). On CoE Recommendation No. R. (92)1, which is of direct relevance, see Spinelli K., The Recommendation No. R. (92)1 for the Use of DNA Analysis Within the System of Criminal Justice- Uses Without Abuses, Poinika Chronika, 287 et seq., (2001).

  12. 12.

    As a result, the sample’s obtainment is only authorized for investigative purposes (i.e. for solving the crime for which the alleged perpetrator was arrested) and not for database ends (i.e. with the sole intention of including it in the DNA databank). On this distinction see e.g. Taylor N., Privacy and the DNA Database, EHRLR, vol.4, 373–392 (375ff.) (2005). It bears reminding that the execution of DNA analysis on convicts for offences “of a certain gravity” for purely preventive crime-fighting ends has been ruled compatible with art.8 ECHR by the Strasbourg judicature, see ECtHR, Van der Velden v. The Netherlands, no. 29514/05, 7.12.2006, par. 2, ECtHR, W. v. The Netherlands, no. 20689/08, 20.1.2009, ECtHR, S. and Marper v. UK, ibid, par.104.

  13. 13.

    At any rate, with or without these terms, the accused’s right to request the performance of DNA analysis in his/her defense is co-recognized along with his/her power to petition the former’s iteration from the same sample and appoint, optionally, a technical advisor of his choosing (see art.200A par.1 c’ and par.2 a’, b’ CPC).

  14. 14.

    Having recently replaced the former three-month one, see art.19 par.1 L.4322/2015.

  15. 15.

    Cf. HDPA, Opinion 15/2001- Analysis of Genetic Material for the Purposes of Crime Detection and Penal Pursuit, 15.2.2001, item. 8, NBC, Decision of 23.3.2001, op. cit., pt. 6, proposing, in the ancien régime, the measure’s constriction to “particularly serious crimes”.

  16. 16.

    GG 121A/20.7.1994.

  17. 17.

    GG 74A/20.3.2013.

  18. 18.

    The notional clarification of “particular or distinguishable gravity” is usually specified through a designating catalogue of the offences covered (France, Belgium, Spain) and/or a minimum delimitation of the threatened criminal sanctions (Luxembourg, Italy, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium etc.).

  19. 19.

    Cf. Aggelis S., The Filing of Genetic Prints for the Investigation of Crimes in Accordance with Art.12 par.3 L.3783/2009, Poinika Chronika, 945–948 (947), (2009), HDPA, Opinion 2/2009, op. cit., item.3.1, NCHR, Decision of 18.2.2010, ibid, p.20.

  20. 20.

    Familial genetic searching as well as mass DNA screenings are standardized inter alia in the Dutch and the British legal orders, see Vervaele J.A.E. et als., The Dutch Focus on DNA in the Criminal Justice System: Net-Widening of Judicial Data, IRDP, vol.83, 459ff.(465) (2012) and Maquire C.N. et als., Familial Searching: A Specialist Forensic DNA Profiling Service Utilising the National DNA Database to Identify Unknown Offenders via Their Relatives- the U.K. Experience, Forensic Sci. Int. Genet., vol. 8, n.1, 1–9, (2014), respectively.

  21. 21.

    On said principle, see e.g. Dalakouras Th., The Principle of Suitable Degree of Suspicions or Power of Indices, Poinikos Logos, 1793 ff.(2003) (=Essays in Honor of Androulakis N., pp. 851ff., Ant.Sakkoulas, 2003).

  22. 22.

    For a similar criticism against said downgrade cf. HDPA, Opinion 2/2009, op. cit, item 3.2., Kotsalis L., DNA Bank, Security and Human Rights, Nomiko Vima, 1881ff. (1882), (2009), NCHR, Decision of 18.2.2010, op. cit, pp.9–10.

  23. 23.

    Cf. likewise Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit, 146.

  24. 24.

    Stipulating the imperative principle for controlling judicial power, namely that all court rulings, indictments, prosecutorial orders, decisions etc. must be fully justified. Proponents of the suggestion put forth in text include HDPA, Opinion 2/2009, ibid, item 3.2., and Kotsalis, op.cit.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Conclusive Report of the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Second Instance of Thessaloniki (Seferidis I.) of 14th.10.2013, Poiniki Dikaiosyni, 903ff. (2013), (espousing a correspondent in result construal).

  26. 26.

    According to the most correct opinion, see infra in text.

  27. 27.

    Pursuant to the principle of free evaluation of evidence enshrined in art.177 CPC. See esp. the Minutes of the Greek Parliament, 5.6.2001, p.9064, where, during the parliamentary discussion of the draft law (2928/2001), the acting at the time Minister of Justice stressed precisely the distinction between the, governed by the statute, “mandatory DNA retrieval” and “the exercise of violence upon the human body”, which is “something different”. Cf. also Manoledakis I., Security and Freedom: Interpretation of L.2928/2001 on Organized Crime and Relative Texts, pp.157-158, Sakkoulas publ. (2002).

  28. 28.

    Cf. Recommendation No. R (92)1, Principle 4, as well as Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 11.11.1997, art.9 and CoE Oviedo Convention of 4.4.1997, art.26.

  29. 29.

    For a detailed presentation of the various stances voiced, see Siaperas, op.cit., 1454ff.

  30. 30.

    ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany, no. 54810/00, 11.7.2006, par.72 with further references. Cf. also ECtHR, Tirado Ortiz and Lozano Martin v. Spain, no.43486/98, 22.6.1999, par.1.

  31. 31.

    Op. cit., item 3.1.

  32. 32.

    Poiniki Dikaiosyni, 1299 (2011) = Poinika Chronika, 68 (2012) = Nomiko Vima, 703 (2012).

  33. 33.

    See Lachana K.-Ch., Compulsoriness and Coercion for the Extraction of DNA Sample in the Framework of the Revised Provision of Art.200A of the Greek Criminal Procedure Code (Occasioned by the Opinion n.15/2011 of the Hellenic Supreme Court’s Prosecution Office), Poiniki Dikaiosyni, 1168–1179, (2012).

  34. 34.

    See art.200A par.1 b’ CPC as amended by art.19 par.1 L.4322/2015.

  35. 35.

    On the criteria see e.g. ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany, op.cit, par.117, ECtHR, O’Halloran and Francis v. UK, nos.15809/02, 25624/02, 29.6.2007, paras.55ff. As regards the normative interrelation between arts.8 and 3 ECHR, whereas the Strasbourg Court used to distinguish the two provisions’ scope of application on the basis of the physical assault’s intensity, stressing art. 8 ECHR’s wider yet subsidiary protective role which was to be activated in cases the bodily maltreatment failed to attain the “minimum level of severity” required under art.3 ECHR (: “the first point of reference”), the recent jurisprudential trend leans towards the joint examination of their applicability terms, cf. ECtHR, Costello-Roberts v. UK, no. 13134/87, 25.3.1993, paras. 34, 36 and ECtHR, M.C. v. Bulgaria no. 39272/98, 4.12.2003, par.166, respectively. On the said jurisprudential turnaround, see Karavias M., Article 8, in Sicilianos L.-A.(ed.), ECHR- Article By Article Interpretation, at 318, Nomiki Bibliothiki, (2013).

  36. 36.

    Generally speaking, as it has been noted, “in Southern European countries, when an individual refuses to submit to DNA testing, the taking of a sample by force is not permitted, while in North European countries the sample cannot be withheld”, see Guillén M. et als, Ethical-legal Problems of DNA Databases in Criminal Investigation, J. Med. Ethics, vol.26, 266–271 (266), (2000).

  37. 37.

    Save in exceptional cases rendering their preservation necessary for the solving of other offences laid down in art.200A par.1 CPC, upon the issuance of a written and well-reasoned indictment by the Judicial Council of the Court of Second Instance. The immediate destruction rule does apply however with respect to the cell sample, according to art.200A par.2 d’ CPC, as it was previously pointed out.

  38. 38.

    Said restraining sameness of the offences covered was reinstated by art.19 par.3 L.4322/2015.

  39. 39.

    GG 209A’/5.12.1994.

  40. 40.

    As opposed to the restricted ones, see on this distinction Santos et als., Forensic DNA Databases in European Countries: Is Size Linked to Performance?, Life Sciences, Society and Policy, vol.9, n.12, (2013), http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/9/1/12 For an interesting compilation of national legal essays, see Hindmarsh R./ Prainsack B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects- Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2010).

  41. 41.

    The rationale underlying the preservation of “negative” DNA profiles is attributed by the Explanatory Report of L.4274/2014 to the need to contrast them with other data banked unidentified/ orphan profiles with a view to ascertaining the suspect’s involvement in unsolved offences.

  42. 42.

    Apart from the authors mentioned in the previous references, see additionally Voultsos P. et als, Launching the Greek Forensic DNA Database- The Legal Framework and Arising Ethical Issues, Forensic Sci. Int. Genet., vol.5, n.5, 407–410, (2011).

  43. 43.

    Hence, the measure’s subjective ambit covers the same pool of people who are subjected to DNA sampling.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit., 150ff.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Santos et als, ibid.

  46. 46.

    Such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (20.11.1989), art.40, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“Beijing Rules”- 29.11.1985), or the CoE European Convention on the exercise of Children’s Rights (25.1.1996), arts.1 and 3–9. On the last two points described in text, cf. also critically HDPA, Opinion 2/2009, op. cit, item 3.1, NCHR, Decision of 18.2.2010, ibid, p.16, Aggelis, ibid, 947, Symeonidou-Kastanidou, op. cit, 155–156.

  47. 47.

    So as to prevent the so-called “function creep”, see Dahl J.-Y./ Sætnan A. R.(2009), “It All Happened so Slowly”- On Controlling Function Creep in Forensic DNA Databases, Int. J. Law, Crime & Justice, vol.37, n.3, 83–103, (2009).

  48. 48.

    Given that “every usage of DNA information- every search run against a DNA record- is an intrusive act”, said prerequisites should be met each time a citizen’s DNA profile is accessed in order to ascertain that the “benefits outweigh the intrusion”, see Mayer-Schönberger V., Strands of Privacy: DNA Databases and Informational Privacy and the OECD Guidelines, in Lazer D.(ed.), DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice, 225–246 (233), Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press, (2004).

  49. 49.

    Despite the ambivalent interpretation advanced hereupon by HDPA (Opinion 2/2009, ibid, item 3.2.), an exclusive competence is standardized –illegitimately as it is correctly pointed out by NCHR, Decision of 18.2.2010, ibid, p.18-19, Kotsalis, ibid and Symeonidou-Kastanidou, ibid, 158, on the basis of a reasoning akin to the one elaborated in text. Contra Aggelis, op.cit, 947, subscribing to the current normative exclusion. In the same direction Tsiftsoglou A., Public Security and Privacy, pp.151ff, 153, 155, Sakkoulas publ., (2015), arguing in favor of the Public Prosecution Office’s custodial role as an adequate institutional guarantee.

  50. 50.

    Legge 30 giugno 2009, nº 85, istituzione della banca dati nazionale del DNA e del laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale del DNA. Adesione della Repubblica italiana al Trattato concluso il 27 maggio 2005 relativo all'approfondimento della cooperazione transfrontaliera, in particolare allo scopo di contrastare il terrorismo, la criminalità transfrontaliera e la migrazione illegale (Trattato di Prum), GU n.160 del 13 luglio 2009 - Supplemento ordinario n. 108.

  51. 51.

    Ley Orgànica 10/2007, de 8 de octubre, reguladora de la base de datos policial sobre identificadores obtenidos a partir del AND, BOE núm. 242, 9.10.2007, p.40969.

  52. 52.

    Lov om oprettelse af et centralt dna-profilregister, n.434 af 31.5.2000, as amended.

  53. 53.

    DNS nacionālās datu bāzes izveidošanas un izmantošanas likums 17.6.2004, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 106 (3054), 7.7.2004., Ziņotājs, 14, 29.7.2004, as modified.

  54. 54.

    Loi du 25 août 2006 relative aux procédures d’identification par empreintes génétiques en matière pénale et portant modification du Code d’instruction criminelle, ΜΕΜ-Α Νο.163, 8.9.2006, p.2984.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Konstantia-Christine Lachana .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Lachana, KC. (2015). DNA Analysis and Criminal Proceedings: The Greek Legal Paradigm. In: Katsikas, S., Sideridis, A. (eds) E-Democracy – Citizen Rights in the World of the New Computing Paradigms. e-Democracy 2015. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 570. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27164-4_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27164-4_13

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27163-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27164-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics