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Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights

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Abstract

In the following, the term “transactional resolutions” covers settlement processes, leniency, transactions, commitments, and other types of transactional resolution.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    BWB Z-1511, Berglandmilch eGen und Stainzer Milch, Steirische Molkerei eGen.

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., “Telekom”, BWB, M-222 “ÖSV”, Decision of the Cartel Court, court reference 26 Kt 42/06; “OMV/Jet Fuel”, cf., press release BWB 04/2008.

  3. 3.

    Brauunion, Stiegl, and Ottakringer.

  4. 4.

    EUR 20 m.

  5. 5.

    E.g., Rieder Beer and Schloss Eggenberg.

  6. 6.

    E.g., Bergland Milch, Kärtnermilch, Emmi.

  7. 7.

    Philips was fined with EUR 2.9 m.

  8. 8.

    See European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on Austria’s 2014 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on Austria’s 2014 stability programme of 2 June 2014, SWD(2014) 421 final: Despite increases in the budget of the Austrian Federal Competition Authority, it remains significantly understaffed in comparison to the authorities of other Member States of a similar or smaller size.

  9. 9.

    A. Xeniadis and N. Harsdorf, Anmerkungen zum Bierkartell, OZK 2012/2, p. 64 ff.

  10. 10.

    See, e.g., the (currently draft) guidelines with regard to vertical agreements, which have been elaborated by the BWB in connection with numerous settlement proceedings concerning vertical agreements.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., OGH 11 Os 77/04 and OGH 13 Os 1/10 m.

  12. 12.

    E. Solé, Das Verfahren vor dem Kartellgericht, Wien 2006, marginal no 271, P. Thyri, Kartellrechtsvollzug in Österreich, Wien 2007, pt 439.

  13. 13.

    See R. Polley and S. Heinz, Settlements bei der Europäischen Kommission und beim Bundeskartellamt, Ein Vergleich, WuW 2012, 14.

  14. 14.

    G. Kodek, Vergleichsabschluss im Kartellverfahren durch die Amtsparteien in Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Jahrbuch Kartellrecht 2011, pp. 27 ff.

  15. 15.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 83.

  16. 16.

    G. Kodek, Absprachen im Kartellverfahren, ÖJZ 2014/443, 448.

  17. 17.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012, 83, p. 92.

  18. 18.

    In principle, settlements may take place without the official parties initiating proceedings at the Cartel Court. E.g., an undertaking could agree in commitments, while the official parties refrain from initiating proceedings at the Cartel Court. However, if the settlements include also a certain amount of fine or binding commitments, proceedings must be always initiated at the Cartel Court, as the latter is the only authority which is entitled to decide on a case and, in particular, impose a fine.

  19. 19.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 92.

  20. 20.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 91.

  21. 21.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 92.

  22. 22.

    However, it is doubted whether in this case settlements should be even possible; cf A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 92.

  23. 23.

    S. Krenn, Verpflichtungszusagen und Transparenz, Eine Replik auf ÖZI 2012, 206, OZK 2013/2, p. 58, 60.

  24. 24.

    G. Kodek, Absprachen im Kartellverfahren, ÖJZ 2014/443, 449.

  25. 25.

    G. Kodek, Absprachen im Kartellverfahren, ÖJZ 2014/443, 450.

  26. 26.

    Cf. 16Ok14/13, decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 27 January 2014.

  27. 27.

    www.edikte.justiz.gv.at.

  28. 28.

    Cf. 16Ok14/13, decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 27 January 2014.

  29. 29.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 90.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Section 36 (5) Cartel Act.

  31. 31.

    Cf., e.g., A. Reidlinger and I. Hartung, Das österreichische Kartellrecht, p. 219.

  32. 32.

    Cartel Court, reference no 25 Kt 41/06, 15 July 2009.

  33. 33.

    See OMV’s commitment concerning its share in FSH, a company in charge of aviation-refueling at the Vienna airport.

  34. 34.

    Cartel Court, reference no 26 Kt 42/06, 18 February 2008.

  35. 35.

    See, e.g., the proceedings against the Austrian Skiing Federation, available at http://www.bwb.gv.at/aktuell/archiv2008/documents/orf_oesvverpflichtungszusagen.pdf#page=3&zoom=auto,-202,50.

  36. 36.

    Cartel Court 9.5.2011, 26 Kr 2/08, Konstantin Film.

  37. 37.

    Handbuch der Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde zur Anwendung des Section 11 Abs 3 bis 6 WettbG (Kronzeugenregelung), April 2014, www.bwb.gv.at/SiteCollectionDocuments/Leniency%20Handbuch%202014.pdf.

  38. 38.

    Commission notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, pt 14.

  39. 39.

    Handbuch der Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde zur Anwendung des Section 11 Abs 3 bis 6 WettbG, Kronzeugenregelung, April 2014, (“Leniency Handbook”) pt 38.

  40. 40.

    Leniency Handbook, pt 25: 30–50 % for the first company that fulfills the conditions of Section 11 para. 4 (iii) and (iv) of the Austrian Competition Act, 20–30 % for the second company, up to 20 % for every further company. Provided that the significant value of supplementary information is exceptionally strong, the BWB may grant further reductions of the fine in individual cases.

  41. 41.

    Leniency Handbook, para. 30.

  42. 42.

    Brauunion was leniency applicant and party of the settlement in the Austrian Beer/Cash&Carry Cartel (see, e.g., http://www.nachrichten.at/nachrichten/wirtschaft/Bierkartell-Kronzeuge-Brau-Union-kooperiert-mit-Wettbewerbshuetern; art. 15, 657878).

  43. 43.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3.

  44. 44.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 91.

  45. 45.

    G. Kodek, Absprachen im Kartellverfahren, ÖJZ 2014/443, 450.

  46. 46.

    Following the BWB’s feedback to this article.

  47. 47.

    Cf. 13 and Section 16 Austrian Non-Contentious Proceedings Act.

  48. 48.

    Cf E. Sole, Das Verfahren vor dem Kartellgericht, para. 128.

  49. 49.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 17 October 2005, 16 Ok 44/05.

  50. 50.

    Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, JO 2006 C 210, p. 2.

  51. 51.

    See the Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 8 October 2008, 16 Ok 5/08.

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., 16 Ok 5/10.

  53. 53.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 12 September 2007, 16 Ok 4/07.

  54. 54.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Ermittlungsverfahren vor der Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde – Vernehmung von Beteiligten und Zeugen durch die BWB, ÖZK 2011/5, page 174; VfSlg 15.600/1999.

  55. 55.

    See, e.g., 16 Ok 5/10.

  56. 56.

    See, e.g., Art 6 para 2 ECMR with regard to its principle of presumption of innocence; 5 Ob 154/07v.

  57. 57.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 11 October 2006, 16Ok7/06.

  58. 58.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 89.

  59. 59.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 93.

  60. 60.

    F. Laina and E. Laurinen, The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status and Challenges, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, p. 9.

  61. 61.

    W. Brugger, Kein rechtliches Gehör vor einem Geldbußenantrag der BWB?, ecolex 2008, 648.

  62. 62.

    Concerning dawn raids, the company will get knowledge of the case against them based on the search warrant and after examination of the documents.

  63. 63.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 90.

  64. 64.

    B. Raschauer, Die Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde und Art 6 EMRK, ÖZW 2008, 30.

  65. 65.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 92.

  66. 66.

    See with regard to the European settlement: Scordamaglia, The new Commission settlement procedure for cartels: A critical assessment, Global Antitrust Review, 2009/2, pp. 61–91.

  67. 67.

    ECJ, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland A/S, Irish Cement Ltd, Ciments français SA, Italcementi, Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, Buzzi Unicem SpA, Cementir, Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v European Commission, REC 2004 I-123, pt 338.

  68. 68.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 12 September 2007, 16Ok4/07.

  69. 69.

    See, with regard to the European level, van Bockel, The ne bis in idem principle in EU law, Wolters Kluwer 2010, p. 109.

  70. 70.

    T. Carmeliet, How lenient is the European leniency system? An overview of current (dis)incentives to blow the whistle, Jura Falconis Jg. 48, 2011–2012, No 3, page 502; T. Eilmansberger and A. Reidlinger in T. Thanner/R. Soyer/T. Hölzel [Hrsg], Kronzeugenprogramme [2009], page 80.

  71. 71.

    Provided that leniency applications are successful, Section 209b Code of Criminal Procedure obliges the FCP to inform the prosecutor that leniency undertakings itself and their natural persons cannot be held liable on the basis of criminal law.

  72. 72.

    H. Kühnert and A. Xeniadis, Verpflichtungszusagen im System der Instrumente zur Verfahrensbeendigung —Eine Izeplik auf ÖZK 2013, 92, 93.

  73. 73.

    A. Xeniadis and H. Kühnert, Einvernehmliche Verfahrensbeendigung in Kartellverfahren, ÖZK 2012/3, p. 87.

  74. 74.

    ECJ, case C-536/11, Donau Chemie AG, Donauchem GmbH, DC Druck-Chemie Süd GmbH & Co KG, Brenntag Austria Holding GmbH, Brenntag CEE GmbH, ASK Chemicals GmbH, formerly Ashland-Südchemie-Kernfest GmbH, ASK Chemicals Austria GmbH, v Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (not yet published).

  75. 75.

    ECJ, case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, REC 2011 I-5161.

  76. 76.

    ECJ of 6 June 2013, case C 536/11, Donau Chemie AG, Donauchem GmbH, DC Druck-Chemie Süd GmbH & Co KG, Brenntag Austria Holding GmbH, Brenntag CEE GmbH, ASK Chemicals GmbH, formerly Ashland-Südchemie-Kernfest GmbH, ASK Chemicals Austria GmbH, formerly Ashland Südchemie Hantos GmbH v Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, pt 34, 48; ECJ of 14 June 2011, case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt ECR 2011 I-5161, pt 31.

  77. 77.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 22 June 2010, 16 Ok 3/10.

  78. 78.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 8 October 2008, 16Ok 5/08.

  79. 79.

    Decision of the Higher Regional Court of Vienna, 20 Bs 381/11t.

  80. 80.

    Decision of the Higher Regional Court of Vienna of 10 June 2009, 8 Ra 38/09f.

  81. 81.

    Concerning the BWB’s duty to publish legally binding decisions of the Cartel Court based on Section 37 Cartel Act, reference is made to Sect. 3.2.2.4 above.

  82. 82.

    Section 12(3) Cartel Act.

  83. 83.

    Cf. A. Reildinger, I. Hartung, Das neue österreichische Kartellrecht, 2005, p. 179.

  84. 84.

    Section 17(2) Cartel Act.

  85. 85.

    Cf. BWB, Tätigkeitsbericht 2010, http://www.bwb.gv.at/Fachinformationen/Taetigkeitsberichte/Documents/1530_BWB_TB_2010_HOMEPAGE.pdf, viewed on 27 March 2014; cf. as well A. Reildinger, I. Hartung, Das neue österreichische Kartellrecht, 2005, p. 196.

  86. 86.

    See, e.g., BWB Z-1511, Berglandmilch eGen und Stainzer Milch, Steirische Molkerei eGen.

  87. 87.

    http://www.en.bwb.gv.at/MERGERCONTROL/Seiten/default.aspx, viewed on 27 March 2014.

  88. 88.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 17 December 2001, 16Ok9/01.

  89. 89.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 15 December 1998, 16Ok15/98.

  90. 90.

    Cf. P. Thyri, Kartellrechtsvollzug in Österreich, 2007, p. 165: Section 11(2) WettbG, which indicates applicable provisions of the general procedural law for administrative procedures (the “AVG”). According to the author, the missing reference to the pertinent provision covering right of access to the file can only be interpreted as the will of the legislator not to provide for such right in the merger control procedure.

  91. 91.

    Section 38 Cartel Act. read jointly with Section 15 and 22 AußStrG.

  92. 92.

    Section 14 Cartel Act.

  93. 93.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 23 June 1997, 16Ok12/97.

  94. 94.

    Cf., Section 10 para 4 Cartel Act.

  95. 95.

    At least following the BWB’s recommended practice, www.bwb.gv.at/Zusammenschluesse/Seiten/default.aspx#RechteDritter.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Section 10(4) and 11(3) KartG, J.P. Gruber, Österreichisches Kartellrecht, 2008, p. 264 and http://www.en.bwb.gv.at/MERGERCONTROL/Seiten/default.aspx, viewed on 27.03.2014.

  97. 97.

    Section 10(4) Cartel Act.

  98. 98.

    Section 11(2) Cartel Act.

  99. 99.

    Section 15 Cartel Act.

  100. 100.

    Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court of 1 July 2002, 16Ok2/02.

  101. 101.

    Labour and management representations in the form of non-territorial self-governing bodies.

  102. 102.

    Section 45 and 46 Cartel Act.

  103. 103.

    Section 26 Cartel Act.

  104. 104.

    Cf. P. Thyri, Kartellrechtsvollzug in Österreich, 2007, p. 121.

  105. 105.

    Section 36 (4) Cartel Act.

  106. 106.

    Section 35 (1) lit. a und Section 36 (2) Cartel Act.

  107. 107.

    Section S29 clause 1 lit. a Cartel Act.

  108. 108.

    Section 36 (2) Cartel Act.

  109. 109.

    Section 16 Cartel Act.

  110. 110.

    Section 36 (2) Cartel Act.

  111. 111.

    Cf. J.P. Gruber, Österreichisches Kartellrecht, 2008, p. 294.

  112. 112.

    Section 29 para 1 lit b and 35(1) lit a Cartel Act.

  113. 113.

    Article 8(6) and (7) of the Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1.

  114. 114.

    Cf. A: Petsche, F. Urlesberger, C. Vartian, Kartellgesetz 2005, 2007, p. 334.

  115. 115.

    Section 37a (1) read jointly with Section 29 para 1 (a) Cartel Act.

  116. 116.

    Cf. A. Reidlinger, I. Hartung, Das neue österreichische Kartellrecht, 2005, p. 216 f.

  117. 117.

    Section 26 Cartel Act in connection with Section 36 para 4 (4) Cartel Act.

  118. 118.

    See A. Reidlinger, I. Hartung, Das neue österreichische Kartellrecht, 2005, p. 198.

Acknowledgement

With special thanks to my colleagues Mag Christine Pauer, Mag Valentina Schaumburger LL.M., and Mag Isabella Wladar for their extensive support. Additionally, the author is very grateful that he received feedback from the Austrian Federal Competition Authority (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde) and my colleague Dr Astrid Ablasser-Neuhuber.

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  1. bpv Hügel Rechtsanwälte OG, Vienna, Austria

    Gerhard Fussenegger

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  1. Addleshaw Goddard LLP, London, United Kingdom

    Bruce Kilpatrick

  2. de Weck, Zoells & Kobel, Geneva, Switzerland

    Pierre Kobel

  3. Këllezi Legal, Geneva, Switzerland

    Pranvera Këllezi

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Fussenegger, G. (2016). Austria. In: Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P., Këllezi, P. (eds) Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27158-3_3

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