Abstract
Transactional resolutions are becoming an increasingly important part of antitrust proceedings. Contributions from 16 jurisdictions confirm such a trend.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The following national groups submitted a contribution on this topic: Australia (B. Jedličková, J. Clarke, and S. Bhojani), Austria (G. Fussenegger), Belgium (J. Auwerx), Brazil (J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker), Czech Republic (J. Kindl and M. Petr), France (D. Bosco), Germany (E. Bueren), Hungary (A. Keller), Italy (A. Camusso), Japan (I. Hayashi, report not published), Poland (A. Stawicki, B. Turno, T. Feliszewski, K. Kanton, and K. Karasiewicz), Serbia (D. Ognjenovic), Spain (J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro), Sweden (H. Andersson), Switzerland (D. Emch, D. Neuenschwander, and A. Burkhard), the United States of America (E. E. Varanini).
- 2.
Settlements of private actions are outside the scope of this study.
- 3.
See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.1.
- 4.
In some countries, negotiated merger remedies have preceded settlements in the field of agreements and abuse of dominant positions; see A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.2.
- 5.
In some jurisdictions, the majority of proceedings are resolved following a transactional mechanism. In Germany, in the period between 2007 and 2011, around 80 % of proceedings were resolved through settlements (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.4). In Austria, all cartel cases since 2012 have been concluded by settlements (G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.1). In France, around 30 % of all decisions are resolved through commitment (D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.2). See, however, D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.1.1, where transactional resolutions are not used often.
- 6.
- 7.
Transactional resolution of antitrust proceedings has not, however, reduced the length of proceedings in Belgium (J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.4). In other countries such as Brazil, transactional resolutions have considerably reduced the length of the proceedings (see J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1).
- 8.
- 9.
See D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.1.
- 10.
See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.1.
- 11.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.1.
- 12.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.5.
- 13.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.3.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.2.
- 20.
See, for instance, M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.4.3.
- 21.
See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.4.3.
- 22.
- 23.
See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.
- 24.
See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.
- 25.
See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.
- 26.
- 27.
See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.4.
- 28.
See, for instance, B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.7.
- 29.
- 30.
See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1.
- 31.
See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3.
- 32.
See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.1.
- 33.
See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.4.2.6.
- 34.
See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 35.
A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.5.
- 36.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.5.
- 37.
See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 38.
See D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.3.1.
- 39.
J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.
- 40.
See H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.3.
- 41.
D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.
- 42.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2: when submitting undertakings, companies acknowledge simply the potential risk of breaching competition law.
- 43.
See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.4.
- 44.
J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.1.
- 45.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.5: plea bargains are “negotiated agreement[s] between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of other charges.”
- 46.
See D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.1. Only hardcore horizontal and vertical cartels and abuse of dominant positions are subject to fines in Switzerland; agreements restricting competition by their effect are subject to sanctions in case of non-compliance with an existing prohibition decision.
- 47.
See, for instance, D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.2.
- 48.
In Europe, known as independent administrative authorities.
- 49.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.
- 50.
- 51.
See Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, right to good administration.
- 52.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.1.2.
- 53.
See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.3.
- 54.
- 55.
See E. Bueren, Germany, section “Rights of Defence and Procedural Rights”.
- 56.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.6.
- 57.
Art. 90(2) of the Austrian Constitutional Law.
- 58.
With regard to the principle of presumption of innocence: Austria (5 Ob 154/07v).
- 59.
In Serbia, abuse of dominant position is a criminal offence provided for in the criminal code.
- 60.
- 61.
See, for instance, J. Suderow and A. A. Garzaro, Spain, Sect. 13.3.3 (leniency applications).
- 62.
See the discussion in Germany concerning leniency applicants, E. Bueren, section “Rights of Defence and Procedural Rights”.
- 63.
See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.3.1.
- 64.
See the discussion in Germany regarding leniency applications, E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.1.
- 65.
See also in Germany, this is not covered by the prohibition of granting advantages not envisaged by statute; see E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.3.2. See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.4, for whom the more companies benefit from the cooperation, the less relevant the right against self-incrimination becomes.
- 66.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 67.
See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.
- 68.
See J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.4.
- 69.
See in Italy, A. Camusso, Sect. 10.2.3.1.
- 70.
See A Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.1.
- 71.
- 72.
D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.1.1.
- 73.
See M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.1 (case Robert Wiseman Dairies).
- 74.
See D. Bosco, France.
- 75.
- 76.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 77.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.2.1.
- 78.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sects. 4.2.2.1 et seq.
- 79.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.
- 80.
See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2.
- 81.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.
- 82.
See D. Bosco, France.
- 83.
See D. Bosco, France.
- 84.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.2.
- 85.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.2.
- 86.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.
- 87.
D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.1.
- 88.
See E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.4, reporting that cooperation allegedly has influenced the trend by increasing the basic amount of the fine and not by reducing the actual level of fine paid by companies.
- 89.
See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2.
- 90.
See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2; see also Article 29 of the Swiss Competition Act: “If the Secretariat considers that a restraint of competition is unlawful, it may propose an amicable settlement to the undertakings involved concerning ways to eliminate the restraint” (emphasis added).
- 91.
See D. Bosco, France.
- 92.
This is the case, for instance, in Belgium and in Germany.
- 93.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2 regarding settlements.
- 94.
In Belgium, it is not clear whether the parties will have access to full file.
- 95.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.6.2 regarding settlements.
- 96.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.1, Article 24 of the Italian Constitution.
- 97.
D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.5.
- 98.
H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.4.3.
- 99.
D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.2.1.
- 100.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.11.
- 101.
See, for instance, A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.3.
- 102.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.2.
- 103.
See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2; D. Emch et al., Switzerland.
- 104.
D. Bosco, France.
- 105.
J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 106.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.6.
- 107.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.8.
- 108.
See J. Auwerx, Belgium, Sect. 4.2.1.1.
- 109.
J. Kindl and M. Petr, Czech Republic, Sect. 6.2.1.2.
- 110.
D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.2.3.
- 111.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.
- 112.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.
- 113.
A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.1.
- 114.
See the case of France. By contrast, in the EU, companies are allowed to offer commitments at any stage of the procedure, even after having received a statement of objections.
- 115.
See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.3, citing a court judgment in U.S. (SEC) v. Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup Global Markets II), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2nd Cir. 2014).
- 116.
See, for instance, the requirement regarding settlements in Germany, where admission should be backed by sufficient other evidence, inspired by criminal procedural principal (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5).
- 117.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.3.
- 118.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.
- 119.
See, for instance, B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2.3, where there is a perception that transactional resolutions do not alter the burden and standard of proof.
- 120.
- 121.
For instance, Belgium, Serbia, and Hungary. This was the case in Germany; however, it seems that currently it is considered that admission of infringement may not be used (e.g., as evidence) if such statement is withdrawn, this for both criminal and administrative procedures (E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5, footnote 59).
- 122.
See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.5.1. Other measures are taken on a case-by-case basis.
- 123.
See, for instance, France.
- 124.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.4.
- 125.
See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.3.
- 126.
ATF 139 I 72, Publigroupe.
- 127.
D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.3.
- 128.
On the importance of confidentiality, see E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.4.
- 129.
- 130.
E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.4.2.5.
- 131.
D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.1.3.
- 132.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 5.2.1.2.
- 133.
D. Ognjenovic, Serbia, Sect. 12.3.5.
- 134.
See in Germany, E. Bueren, Sect. 8.4.2.5.
- 135.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.
- 136.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.3.
- 137.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.
- 138.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.
- 139.
Ibidem.
- 140.
D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.1.3, A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.2.5.
- 141.
A. Keller, Hungary, Sect. 9.2.5.
- 142.
See Germany regarding settlement procedures, E. Bueren, Germany, Sect. 8.2.5.
- 143.
See J. C. M. Berardo and B. B. Becker, Brazil, Sect. 5.2.5.6.
- 144.
- 145.
A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.2.2.5.
- 146.
D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.4.7.
- 147.
See G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.3.
- 148.
See E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.
- 149.
Not all settlements are subject to court review. The FTC may conduct civil antitrust settlements (consent decrees), which do not require an approval from the Court (see E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.7).
- 150.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.
- 151.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.6.
- 152.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.6.
- 153.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.8.
- 154.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.8.
- 155.
See, in general, E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.2.
- 156.
In Austria, the Cartel Court may freely reject the request of the authority for a settlement. Under general procedural rules, statements of the company on facts and the acknowledgment of the infringement are subject to the free appraisal of the evidence by the Cartel Court, which results in uncertainty for companies under investigation.
- 157.
G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.2.2.3.
- 158.
G. Fussenegger, Austria, Sect. 3.4.5.
- 159.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.1.
- 160.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.1.2.
- 161.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.1.2.
- 162.
- 163.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.2.
- 164.
H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.1.
- 165.
H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.2.
- 166.
D. Bosco, France.
- 167.
D. Bosco, France.
- 168.
D. Bosco, France, Sect. 7.2.3.7.
- 169.
D. Emch et al., Switzerland, Sect. 15.2.3.
- 170.
ATF 139 I 72, Publigroupe.
- 171.
H. Andersson, Sweden, Sect. 14.2.4.3.
- 172.
See, for instance, A. Camusso, Italy, 10.2.2.1.
- 173.
See A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.2.1.
- 174.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.2.1.
- 175.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.5.7.
- 176.
See, for instance, United States of America, Sweden, Switzerland, and Serbia.
- 177.
E. E. Varanini, United States of America, Sect. 17.5.
- 178.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.3.7.
- 179.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.3.
- 180.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.3.
- 181.
See A. Stawicki et al., Poland, Sect. 11.4, for examples of over-intervention.
- 182.
A. Camusso, Italy, Sect. 10.2.1.1.
- 183.
D. Bosco, France.
- 184.
M. Israel, United Kingdom, Sect. 16.2.2.
- 185.
B. Jedličková et al., Australia, Sect. 2.2.1.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Këllezi, P. (2016). International Report. In: Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P., Këllezi, P. (eds) Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27158-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27158-3_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27157-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27158-3
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)