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“Causa sui”: Awareness and Choice in the Constitution of the Self

  • Calvin NormoreEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 16)

Abstract

This paper argues that the conception of the self as constituted by its act of awareness of itself emerges from the confluence of three medieval ideas: Augustine’s concept of endogenous attention, Avicenna’s concept of primitive self-awareness, and Olivi’s concept of reflexivity as a necessary feature of personhood. It is Descartes who by his rejection of a distinction between a substance and its principal attribute and his weaving together of these three strands of thought who creates a conception of the self which still plays a central role in contemporary discussions.

Keywords

Prime Mover Intentiones Intentiones Individual Existence Thinking Thing Platonic Tradition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McGill UniversityMontrealCanada
  2. 2.University of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia

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