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Avicenna on Non-conceptual Content and Self-Awareness in Non-human Animals

  • Luis Xavier López-FarjeatEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 16)

Abstract

Avicenna’s contributions to what might be called animal cognition are not confined to a novel understanding of Aristotle’s psychology, but they raise an issue that is still a matter of discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind: whether non-human animals have consciousness and intentional states that constitute a structured experience of their relation to the world, even though they do not have conceptual knowledge. This paper provides an explanation of Avicenna’s position concerning the cognitive content of sense perception and self-awareness in non-human animals as an attempt to show that Avicenna’s stance should be considered in the current discussion as an alternative that provides a provocative solution to a mainstream issue in contemporary philosophy.

Keywords

Cognitive Content External World Conceptual Knowledge Sense Perception Internal Faculty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad PanamericanaMexico CityMexico

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