Abstract
Although Descartes and Malebranche argue that we are immaterial thinking things, they also maintain that each of us stands in a unique experiential relation to a single human body, such that we feel as though this body belongs to us and is part of ourselves. This paper examines Descartes’s and Malebranche’s accounts of this feeling. They hold that our experience of being embodied is grounded in affective bodily sensations that feel good or bad: namely, sensations of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, and so on. These bodily sensations ground our experiential identification with the body because they represent the body’s needs and interests as though they were own, such that we experience an important aspect of our well-being as consisting in the preservation of the body. According to these Cartesians, then, we feel embodied in part because we experience ourselves as having a bodily good.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, see M2, AT VII 27/CSM II 18; Discourse IV, AT VI 33/CSM I 127; and Search for Truth, AT X 521/CSM II 415. For an explanation of abbreviations, short titles, and citation forms, see “Short Titles and Abbreviations for Primary Texts” at the end of the essay.
- 2.
To keep Descartes and his fictional narrator (i.e. the meditator) of the Meditations distinct, I shall refer to the meditator with the feminine pronouns “her” and “she”. In this case, however, the meditator seems to be speaking for Descartes.
- 3.
See M6, AT VII 76/CSM II 52; M6, AT VII 80/CSM II 56; and Letter to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT III 694/CSMK III 228.
- 4.
Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty reads Malebranche as a kind of proto-phenomenologist as well (Merleau-Ponty 1968). See for example, Search, V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365; Search, I.12.5, OCM I 137–138/LO 58; Christian Meditations, XI.15, OCM X 122; and DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78.
- 5.
- 6.
In my dissertation, I argue that I experience one human body as mine and part of myself because I experience this body as though it were the subject of my mental life. More specifically, I experience one human body as mine because: (1) I experience this human body as the subject of my acts of sensing, (2) I experience this body as the subject of my volitions/inclinations to move this body, and (3) I experience the states of this body as determining my well-being.
- 7.
Although there has been increasing attention to the metaphysics of the union between mind and body, less attention has been paid to what it is like to be embodied according to the Cartesians. There are a few notable exceptions, however. See, for example: Gueroult (1959), Gouhier (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1968), Williams (1978), Cottingham (1986), Alanen (2003), Simmons (2003b, 2008), Brown (2006), Carriero (2009), Kolesnik-Antoine (2009), and Curley and Koivuniemi (2015).
- 8.
Gouhier (1962), Alanen (2003), and Simmons (unpublished) emphasize this point.
- 9.
For a more detailed account of this process see Simmons (2003a).
- 10.
See Search I.7.4, OCM I 97/LO 34; Search I.9.3, OCM I 116/LO 45; and Search I.14.1, OCM I 156/LO 68.
- 11.
See also Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365.
- 12.
Passions II.82, AT XI 389/CSM I 357. See also Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 613/CSMK III 312.
- 13.
- 14.
For relevant texts in Descartes, see M6, AT VII 76/CSM I 52; M6, AT VII 80/CSM II 56; Letter to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT III 694/CSMK III 228; and Passions I.24, AT XI 347/CSM I 337. For similar texts in Malebranche, see Search I.12.4, OCM I 137/LO 57; Search I.12.5, OCM I 138–139/LO 58; Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366; Elucidations VI, OCM III 66/LO 575; Treatise on Morality I.10.5, OCM XI 118; DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78; and Dialogues on Death II, OCM XIII 408–409.
- 15.
For the purposes of this paper, I bracket the contribution the passions make to our sense of bodily ownership. That being said, it is unclear whether Descartes is drawing a sharp distinction between passions and other bodily sensations in this context.
- 16.
Simmons (2008) offers an alternative reading of this passage, according to which Descartes’ view is that these bodily sensations confer a sense of bodily ownership in virtue of the fact that these sensations are interoceptive.
- 17.
Search I.12.4, OCM I 137/LO 57. I translate ‘chatouillement’ as ‘pleasurable sensation’ in this context, rather than the more literal ‘tickling’. In the Treatise Descartes defines ‘chatouillement’ as “a certain bodily pleasure [une certaine volupté corporelle]” which “is very close to pain in respect of its cause but quite opposite in its effect” (Treatise, AT XI 144/CSM I 103).
- 18.
See also Search I.12.5, OCM I 138–139/LO 58; Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366; Elucidations VI, OCM III 66/LO 575; Treatise on Morality I.10.5, OCM XI 118; DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78; and Dialogues on Death II, OCM XIII 408–409.
- 19.
Simmons (2008) reads Malebranche this way.
- 20.
Gueroult (1959, v. III, p. 52) recognizes this point.
- 21.
See Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366.
- 22.
See DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 79.
- 23.
M6, AT VII 80/ CSM II 56. Here is the Latin and French: “quam quod habeam corpus, cui male est cum dolorem sentio, quod cibo vel potu indiget, cum famem aut sitim patior, & similia/que j’ai un corps qui est mal disposé quand je sens de la douleur, qui a besoin de manger ou boire, quand j’ai les sentiments de la faim ou de la soif, etc.” (M6, AT VII 80/CSM II 56).
- 24.
After developing this reading of Descartes on my own, it was brought to my attention that John Carriero also makes this point in his book Between Two Worlds (2009, p. 393).
- 25.
Carriero recognizes that, according to Descartes, we experience our body’s interest as our own, and reads him as making this point in the famous “pilot in a ship” passage (Carriero 2009, p. 394). That being said, Carriero suggests that the mind has an antecedent concern for the body that explains why the mind takes the body’s interests and needs as its own. He writes, “God’s setting things up so that the cognitive agent’s confused cognition of its hurt foot registers as unpleasant works best against a background where it cares about its body, so that the body’s bads, goods, and needs are its bads, goods, and needs” (Carriero 2009, p. 395, emphasis mine). In contrast, I think we should reverse the order of explanation. On my reading, the reason the mind cares so much about the body is precisely because the mind experiences the body’s needs as its own. Shapiro also argues that, according to Descartes, the mind “takes” the body’s interests as its own, although she seems to think of this “taking” as something we actively do (Shapiro 2003, 2011). See also Louis de la Forge, who seems to read Descartes in the same way as I do (La Forge 1666, Chap. 14, p. 213).
- 26.
Search V.1, OCM II 130/ LO 339. See also Preface to the Search, OCM I 11/LO xxxiv; Search I.12.3, OCM I 137/LO 57, and OCM XIV 15.
- 27.
Interestingly, Malebranche argues that it is a quite general phenomenological principle that if I phenomenologically identify with something’s interests, I will thereby experience this thing as part of myself (Search IV.13.1, OCM II 114/LO 330).
- 28.
See Alquié (1974), Chap. VIII-C, for helpful discussion.
- 29.
Treatise on Morality I.10.8, OCM XI 119. See Treatise on Morality II.2.11, OCM XI 164; and II.14.1, OCM XI 269.
- 30.
DM I.1, OCM XII 33/JS 6. See Search I.12.3, OCM I 137/LO 57; Search I.12.4, OCM I 139/LO 58; and Search II.i.5.1, OCM I 215/LO 102.
- 31.
Search I.12.5, OCM I 142/LO 60. See Search I.5.1, OCM I 72/LO 21; Search I.10.5, OCM I 126–127/LO 51; Search V.4, OCM II 161/LO 359; and Christian Conversations, OCM IV 37.
- 32.
See Search I.10.5, OCM I 127–128/LO 51–52; and Elucidations XV, OCM III 226–227/LO 670.
- 33.
See Search III.i.1.2, OCM I 385/LO 200; and Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365.
- 34.
See Search I.11.3, OCM I 132/LO; Search I.12.5, OCM I 142/LO 60; and Dialogues VI.3, OCM XII 136.
- 35.
An early version of this paper was presented at the Subjectivity, Selfhood, and Agency conference at the University of Uppsala, and I am grateful for the many helpful criticisms and questions I received from the audience there. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who have helped me by reading various drafts of this material: Jean-Pascal Anfray, Delphine Kolesnik-Antoine, Jeff McDonough, Sam Newlands, Sandrine Roux, Tad Schmaltz, and Susanna Siegel. A special thanks goes to Alison Simmons, for all her help along the way, her extensive comments and advice at every step of the process, and, perhaps most of all, her path-breaking work on the Cartesian phenomenology of embodiment.
Bibliography
In the notes and text, I use the following abbreviations and short titles:
Discourse: Descartes, Discourse on Method/Discours de la Méthode in AT VI.
Elucidation: Malebranche, Elucidation on the Search After Truth/Éclaircissements sur la Recherche de la Vérité in OCM III.
DM: Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion/Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion in OCM XII.
M: Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy/Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae in AT VII.
O/R: Descartes, Objections and Replies to Objections in AT VII.
Passions: Descartes, Passions of the Soul/Les Passions de l’Ame in AT XI.
Principles: Descartes, Principles of Philosophy/Principia Philosophia in AT VIII.
Search: Malebranche, Search After Truth/Recherche de la Vérité in OCM I-II.
Treatise: Descartes, Treatise on Man/L’Homme in AT XI.
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Chamberlain, C. (2016). A Bodily Sense of Self in Descartes and Malebranche. In: Kaukua, J., Ekenberg, T. (eds) Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26914-6_14
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