Abstract
Initially, I will show how Wundt’s logical theory of mental processes became weaker, according with the successive re-elaborations of his theory of perception presented in the distinct editions of his Textbook of Human Physiology, as well as in some articles. Then I will present his rejection of the unconscious, together with the justification given in the Grundzüge, relating it to the emergence of a new theory of consciousness. Finally, I will discuss the philosophical roots that motivated him to introduce this conceptual rupture within his project of scientific psychology.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to note, though, that Wundt was not the first to use the expression ‘physiological psychology .’ Lotze (1852) had already used it in the title of the first part of his book—“general fundamental concepts of physiological psychology” (p. 1). In fact, Wundt recognized Lotze as the “forerunner of our present physiological psychology” (PIG, p. 512). Nonetheless, the idea was already widespread at that time. The physiologist Theodor Piderit (1826–1912), for example, had also used the term some years before Wundt (Piderit, 1863). Hermann Ulrici (1806–1884), although he did not use the term, came close to it by claiming that “such a physiological part constitutes the necessary point of departure for psychology” (Ulrici, 1866, p. 14, emphasis in original). According to Heinrich, the doctrines of Lotze and Ulrici represent “the passage from a ‘psychology with a soul’ to a ‘psychology without soul’” (Heinrich, 1895, p. 32), a claim I cannot agree with, given Ulrici’s explicit commitment to a substantive notion of soul (Ulrici, 1866), let alone his defense of spiritism (Ulrici, 1879a, 1879b).
- 2.
Wundt would explicitly admit to this rupture almost 30 years later, in the second edition of the Vorlesungen (1892), in the Preface of which he affirmed having abandoned many of the ideas present in the first edition, which were now seen as a “a sin of my youth” (VMT2, p. v). For this reason, he reduced almost by half its length (from 57 to 30 lectures) and restricted its content to individual, experimental psychology, eliminating all the references to unconscious processes. The English translation, contrary to what we are sometimes led to believe (e.g., Wellek, 1967), is not a translation of the first edition in two volumes but only of this second, completely revised edition, and obviously does not represent Wundt’s initial project (see Sect. 5.2). Furthermore, in two of his mature texts on the relationship between logic and psychology, Wundt identified his early logical theory of the mind as a clear example of the pernicious effects of logicism upon psychological analysis (LUP, pp. 506–508; PUL, pp. 563–566).
- 3.
Even Diamond’s essay, which reveals important aspects about Wundt’s early academic life—notwithstanding his poorly supported hypotheses about the psychological meaning of Wundt’s attitudes—does not include any discussion of this theoretical change (Diamond, 1980). David Robinson (1987) mentions “Wundt’s shift from psychology of the unconscious to psychology of conscious action” (p. 52) and presents a hypothesis that I will discuss later (see Sect. 3.5). Wolfgang Nitsche (1990), in the only essay that deals with Wundt’s early philosophical assumptions in more detail, fails to notice it. Claudia Wassmann (2009) recognizes that Wundt later gave up his theory of the unconscious but does not discuss this point either.
- 4.
It is worth remembering that the logical theory of the mind , which supports Wundt’s early psychological system, comprises two independent, albeit related theses: 1) all mental processes are logical inferences (mental panlogism); 2) there exist unconscious mental processes that determine conscious states and must be part of psychological analysis. The theory of unconscious inferences (thesis 3) is a consequence of theses 1 and 2 (see Sect. 2.3). Failure to recognize this independence hinders the interpretation of the evolution of Wundt’s thought, as we shall see in the following.
- 5.
We must also consider the fact that the Lehrbuch is Wundt’s first and only scientific publication after the Vorlesungen between the years 1864 and 1865 (E. Wundt, 1927).
- 6.
Petersen (1925) and Graumann and Sommer (1983) did not notice this change. Petersen saw signs of change only in the second edition of the Lehrbuch (LPM2), published in 1868. According to Graumann and Sommer, this hypothetical character (‘as if’) of the unconscious logical processes would only appear in 1869, in a paper devoted solely to the issue of spatial perception (UEG). In both studies, however, the authors failed to take into account certain subtleties of Wundt’s initial theory, which considerably affects their respective interpretations.
- 7.
In that same year (1867), Wundt also published a paper devoted solely to the issue of visual perception, in which he explicitly defended the hypothesis of the unconscious inferences (NLG, p. 45).
- 8.
Nonetheless, Wundt continued to argue that his hypothesis of unconscious inferences was the best theory available to explain the formation of perception.
- 9.
In the third edition of the Lehrbuch, published in 1873, Wundt still supported the theory of unconscious inferences as a useful tool, despite acknowledging that it did not describe mental processes in themselves (LPM3, p. 555).
- 10.
I will return to this point in the paragraphs that follow, showing the fundamental change involved here.
- 11.
Wundt maintained this conceptual distinction until the second edition of the Lehrbuch (LPM2, p. 507), published in 1868. In the third (1873) and fourth (1878), it disappears.
- 12.
In Sect. 3.4, we will see how Wundt extended the sphere of consciousness, allowing him to speak of a conscious synthesis.
- 13.
Although he did not investigate the progressive weakening of Wundt’s initial conception, Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) seems to have been the first to see in the Grundzüge a modification of Wundt’s previous hypothesis about the unconscious. At first he understood it as a restriction made by Wundt (Hartmann, 1878, I, pp. 364–366). It was only later that he would understand that the displacement to the physiological level implied a real break with the psychological notion of the unconscious (Hartmann, 1901, p. 93). He was not the only one, however. James (1890/1981) and Haeckel (1918/1960) also noticed Wundt’s rejection of his early psychological theory.
- 14.
Blumenthal also notices this point. According to him, “it is clear that Wundt’s psychology emerges in its lasting form in the second edition of his Grundzüge (1880)” (Blumenthal, 2001, p. 128, emphasis in original).
- 15.
Following the internal logic of my interpretation, this point will only be elucidated in the next two chapters, where Wundt’s theory of knowledge and principle of psychic causality will be presented and discussed.
- 16.
This tendency to see representations no longer present in consciousness as ‘psychic dispositions’ will be preserved in the subsequent editions of the Grundzüge (GPP3, II, p. 235; GPP4, II, p. 265; GPP5, III, p. 331; GPP6, III, p. 305). However, in his System der Philosophie (System of philosophy), published in 1889, he introduced a third term, namely, ‘psychophysical dispositions’ (SP1, pp. 556–557). This would not prevent him from sometimes using the term ‘psychic disposition’ (GDP, p. 247). In any case, the important point here is that the meaning remains unchanged. Whether as physiological, psychic, or psychophysical dispositions, they do not belong to psychological analysis and explanation. Furthermore, they fulfill the same epistemological function in Wundt’s system, as I will explain in Sect. 3.5.
- 17.
In order to avoid misunderstandings arising from the cultural and temporal distance that separates us from the nineteenth century, it is appropriate here to clarify what Wundt meant when he referred to his studies in logic and the philosophy of nature (logische und naturphilosophische Studien). In his own words, it is “the history of physics and mechanics, and the philosophy present in both” (EE, p. 226).
- 18.
Except for my preliminary study on this book (Araujo, 2012b), there is no other attempt in the literature to relate it to Wundt’s psychological thought. So far, Petersen (1925) has been the only one to suggest a possible influence of this work on Wundt’s theoretical development. However, he did not explain the terms of this possible relationship, and never conducted any systematic investigation to support his hypothesis. Instead, he contented himself with leaving this possibility suggested. The other studies that deal with Wundt’s philosophical system (Arnold, 1980; Eisler, 1902; Heußner, 1920; König, 1909; Nef, 1923) manage at most only to mention the existence of this text. Even when it was published, it appears to have received little attention, as Wundt himself later recognized (PMN, p. v). More recently, in a retrospective consideration of the rise of hypothetical thinking in mechanics, Pulte considered Wundt’s book to be “one of the latest manifests of what may be called ‘classical mathematical philosophy of nature ’” (Pulte, 2009, p. 77). However, Pulte’s analysis is restricted to the context of the philosophical foundations of physics and cannot contribute to answering my central question in this investigation. Only Bergmann (1867) and Cornelius (1867) have discussed Wundt’s book in more detail, but they both focused on the correctness of Wundt’s deduction of the axioms, an aspect that is also irrelevant for my present purposes. In the case of Bergman, despite the criticism directed at Wundt, he compliments the academic merits of the work.
- 19.
All this evidence of Wundt’s intense philosophical interest at that time, along with his philosophical ideas already present, refutes the strong externalist thesis of Ben-David and Collins (1966), according to which Wundt’s transition to philosophy would occur only after 1871, caused by his inability to secure the chair in physiology at Heidelberg after Helmholtz’s departure. Even if they are right in pointing out the influence of certain socio-institutional factors in the development of every science, this leaves untouched the particular question I am investigating, which can only be properly explained through a conceptual analysis of Wundt’s philosophical development.
- 20.
In fact, there is a very short mention of the role of mental synthesis in the production of space intuition (PAC, p. 101). However, the subject under consideration is geometry, not psychology.
- 21.
Unlike Bergmann (1867) and Cornelius (1867), I will not treat here the logical or empirical adequacy of Wundt’s deductions, because to do so would lead me far away from the central purpose of this book. Furthermore, this issue is completely irrelevant to my argument. My only interest here is to show how Wundt’s philosophical reflection plays a key role in the modification he introduced to his psychological project.
- 22.
According to Wundt’s definition, axioms are “a set of general truths that cannot be further derived from other principles belonging to the same science” (PAC, p. 1). However, many years later, when he came to this subject on two different occasions, he rejected the concept of axiom as outdated and adopted the more modern term ‘hypothesis’ (UPA; PMN, p. 3), which led him to change the title of the book for the second edition. Pulte (2009, pp. 77–79) has also observed this change between the two editions. However, the rejection of the concept of axiom did not mean a radical modification in Wundt’s central idea, which was to show the epistemological foundations of the general principles of physics.
- 23.
The six axioms underlying physics, according to Wundt, were as follows: 1) all causes in nature are causes of motion; 2) every cause of motion lies outside of that which is moved; 3) all causes of motion act in the direction of a straight line that connects their starting point to their ending point; 4) the effect of every cause persists; 5) for every action there is an equal reaction; and 6) every effect is equivalent to its cause (PAC, p. 6).
- 24.
The term ‘dialectic’ has a pejorative connotation here, indicating a false dispute, which in principle cannot be decided in favor of any side. In this sense, the idea of a dialectical dispute seems to be very close to that of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (CRP, B85–88), as I will argue in Sect. 3.5.
- 25.
Already implicit in this discussion about ontological mistakes is the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ontological claims, which will be presented later in the context of Wundt’s theory of knowledge (see Sect. 4.3).
- 26.
Nonetheless, we should keep in mind that since Wundt had not yet reached a final form for his new psychological theory, there were still traces of his old theory in the first edition of the Grundzüge. For example, he still accepted the logical guise of psychological processes for popular purposes, even after rejecting the logical theory of the mind as a whole (GPP1, p. 709; BBA, pp. 137–138). From the second edition (1880) onward, this idea disappeared.
- 27.
The distinction between these two forms of consciousness will be established in the following, where I will present Wundt’s new theory.
- 28.
Wundt maintained this passage until the fifth edition of the Grundzüge (GPP2, II, p. 195; GPP3, II, p. 225; GPP4, II, p. 255; GPP5, III, p. 320). In the sixth edition, Wundt claimed, “the decisive characteristic consists in the connection of mental contents” (GPP6, III, p. 300, emphasis in original).
- 29.
From the beginning, Wundt’s strategy was to eliminate from experimental psychology all metaphysical questions related to consciousness that could disturb the progress of the empirical investigations. As we will see in the next chapter, a sound metaphysics, for Wundt, could only emerge after the results of the empirical sciences had been determined.
- 30.
It is important to understand here the difference between representation and concept in Wundt’s new theory. For him, a representation (simple, complex, or general) is always a concrete psychological content. All concepts (both empirical and abstract), by contrast, are postulates of our thought; that is, they are logical demands imposed upon a group of representations (empirical concepts) or upon relations among representations (abstract concepts), so that these can conform to a certain order. However, since there exists only representations in consciousness, and since such postulates extrapolate any possible concrete experience, they can never be psychologically realized (concretely represented) as such. To be realized in consciousness, a concept must be reduced every time to a particular representation, thereby losing its general character. For this reason, a concept does not have the same psychological reality as a representation (GPP1, pp. 665–691).
- 31.
This alternation between both perspectives (genetic and systematic) is a constant in Wundt’s work. With the development of his new psychological theory, he increasingly emphasized that his goal was to describe and explain the genesis of mental processes. He never abandoned the systematic point of view in his theoretical expositions, however. The lack of attention to these different levels of analysis can affect the understanding of some passages of Wundt’s work.
- 32.
Wundt developed his concept of apperception from Leibniz, adapting it to his theoretical purposes. For Leibniz, apperception meant the entrance of perception into self-consciousness, a notion that Wundt judged as being too narrow. Hence, he extended it to encompass also the simple act of focusing on a representation, which is carried out by attention, as well as its product (GPP1, p. 718). Wundt maintained this conceptual distinction between Blickfeld and Blickpunkt, and between perception and apperception, until the end (GPP2, II, p. 206; GPP3, II, pp. 235–236; GPP4, II, p. 267; GPP5, III, p. 333; GPP6, III, p. 307).
- 33.
According to Wundt, every self-consciousness involves an apprehension by attention (apperception), but not every act of attention implies self-consciousness (GPP1, p. 718). Also in relation to this point, he would never change his mind again (GPP2, II, p. 206; GPP3, II, p. 236; GPP4, II, p. 267; GPP5, III, p. 333; GPP6, III, pp. 322–324). For a detailed discussion of Wundt’s notion of apperception and its relation to self-consciousness, see Lietzmann (1904), Nieden (1888), Staude (1883), Szczurat (1903), and Weser (1913).
- 34.
David Robinson (1987) speculates that the increasing popularization of the language of the unconscious in German philosophy led Wundt to abandon it, but he fails to offer convincing evidence for this. “One popular author in particular,” Robinson argues, “opportunistically connected Wundt’s concept to his own theory of the unconscious. The retired Prussian army officer and inveterate scribbler of philosophical books and tracts, Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906), published his Philosophy of the Unconscious in 1869, and included relevant passages from Wundt’s Beiträge on unconscious inference as support for his views. Hartmann’s pessimistic vision of unconscious forces driving the universe, however, was not at all congenial to a positive thinker like Wundt” (Robinson, 1987, p. 54, emphasis in original). This cannot explain Wundt’s change of mind, however. First, he began rethinking his early theory much earlier than the publication of Hartmann’s book, as I have shown. Second, Hartmann did not appropriate Wundt’s theory, because his two main sources, as he himself admitted in his book, are Schopenhauer and Hegel, both of whom had in some way accepted the unconscious before Wundt. Besides, in the first two editions of the book, he did not include “relevant passages from Wundt’s Beiträge,” as Robinson claims, but only mentioned very briefly that Wundt accepted the theory of the unconscious inferences in the Beiträge (Hartmann, 1869, p. 19; 1870, pp. 26 and 287). At least until 1872, when Hartmann published his complementary essays to his Philosophy of the Unconscious, there are no signs of Wundt playing any role in Hartmann’s argument at all (Hartmann, 1872). In later editions, Hartmann did include brief passages of the Beiträge, but these still did not play any central role in his metaphysical conception of the unconscious (e.g. Hartmann, 1873, pp. 33–34, 295, 304). Still later, he added other passages unrelated to Wundt’s theory of unconscious inferences but related to his Physiological Psychology , published in 1874, at a time when Wundt had already abandoned it (e.g., Hartmann, 1878, I, p. 388). Third, Wundt’s conception of the unconscious was purely psychological (cognitive), not metaphysical (see Sect. 2.3). When he first criticized the mystical tendencies in Schopenhauer’s and Hartmann’s conception of the unconscious (UAP, p. 13; PIG, pp. 503–510), he was describing and evaluating the development of German philosophy and, therefore, was adopting a philosophical standpoint, not a psychological one. Although psychology and philosophy were intertwined for him, they belonged to different levels of analysis. Moreover, this critique came out at a time when he had already rejected his previous psychological theory of the unconscious. Thus, his critique of a metaphysical unconscious has nothing to do with his rejection of a psychological unconscious.
- 35.
In 1783, Kant published his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics to dispel some misunderstandings related to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). In what became one of the most famous passages of his work, he confessed that the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) had interrupted his dogmatic slumber, without giving further details (AA IV, 260). Wundt also acknowledged his own early thinking as dogmatic. In contrast with Kant, though, he never identified his ‘Hume.’ For a detailed discussion of Kant’s relation to Hume, see Carl (1989, pp. 146-158).
- 36.
Besides Drobisch, the only criticism directed against Wundt came from the German physiologist Ewald Hering (1834–1918). Between 1863 and 1864, the two men engaged in a dispute about visual perception (Hering, 1863, 1864; Wundt, UHK). Hering referred to contradictions, methodological problems, and mistaken mathematical calculations in Wundt’s theory. However, he focused on the physiological side of Wundt’s account, leaving aside the problem of unconscious inferences. For this reason, I will not consider him as a candidate for a direct influence on Wundt’s theoretical change of mind.
- 37.
Dühring was a jurist who turned to philosophy. After his Habilitation in 1863, he became a docent at the University of Berlin until 1877, when he lost his license. However, despite all the controversies caused by his social and political writings, his work on the philosophical foundations of natural science and of human knowledge in general received substantial attention at the time (Gerhardt, Mehring, & Rindert, 1999). For example, Vaihinger (1876) considered Dühring to be one of the three main representatives of German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century.
- 38.
Petersen (1925, pp. 112–113) is so far the only exception. He suggested that Kant’s philosophy was in the background of Wundt’s physikalische Axiome, but he did not present any evidence to support his idea. In fact, the relationship between Kant and Wundt has not been addressed in a proper manner and deserves a much deeper treatment than I can offer here, because it goes beyond this early phase of Wundt’s philosophical development. So far, there have been only three small studies on this topic (Fahrenberg, 2008; Lehmann, 1915; Nef, 1913), and in spite of discussing central aspects of Wundt’s logic and epistemology, none of them has addressed Kant’s influence on the development of Wundt’s philosophical ideas. I think this has happened because they focused on Wundt’s mature work, leaving aside the issue of his formation. Moreover, in the general expositions of Wundt’s philosophical system (Arnold, 1980; Eisler, 1902; Heußner, 1920; König, 1909; Nef, 1923), in which comparisons between him and Kant abound, this occurs in a fragmentary and often superficial way.
- 39.
I mean silence in relation to his psychological program. During this period, Wundt published mainly physiological works and reviews. There are only four exceptions, which are articles related to experimental psychology, dealing with sensory perception and measurement of mental processes (E. Wundt, 1927, pp. 4–10). However, there is no sign of his gigantic psychological program developed in the Vorlesungen, which means that he was no longer satisfied with it. It could be argued that, because of institutional demands or some other external factor, he was unable to dedicate much time to psychology in this period and therefore could not publish anything new. However, if we look at his lectures between 1864 and 1874, we see that he taught psychology and anthropology throughout those years (E. Wundt, pp. 67–68). Hence, the reason must be within the early program itself.
- 40.
This should not be interpreted as an adoption of Kant’s transcendental idealism but as an appropriation and source of inspiration. As I will show in the next chapter, Wundt’s mature philosophy is very different from Kant’s. Furthermore, he adopted later a more critical attitude in relation to Kant, the reasons for which I will also discuss in the next chapter. However, in order to understand this more negative attitude, we have first to establish the terms of the positive influence.
- 41.
The term Verschmelzung (fusion), for example, was used by Herbart to designate one of the two fundamental types of relationship among representations (Herbart, 1850a, § 22).
- 42.
The idea that concepts are not representations, in the psychological sense of the word, but postulates or logical ideals, also belongs to Herbart’s psychology (Herbart, 1850a, § 78, §§ 179–193).
- 43.
For an analysis of Herbart’s conception of the mind and self-consciousness, see Sachs-Hombach (1993, pp. 126–134).
- 44.
I cannot offer here a more detailed comparison between the philosophical and psychological positions of Herbart and Wundt because this would lead me far beyond my current purposes.
- 45.
According to Wundt, Kant committed the same error as Hume, confounding the causal nexus with temporal succession and thereby reinforcing that tendency toward the above-mentioned (Sect. 3.3) conceptual confusion between ground-consequence and cause-effect (PAC, p. 101).
- 46.
If I were to follow a citation analysis, I would have to conclude that Aristotle was the main influence on Wundt. However, a careful reading of this text reveals that most of the references, not just those to Aristotle, concern examples of mistaken conceptions in the development of physics.
- 47.
I will not present here a detailed account either of the Analytic or of the Dialectic, only the manner in which Wundt appropriated them.
- 48.
This is, so to speak, the more traditional way of reading Kant (e.g., Allison, 2004). For an alternative interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason regarding this topic, see Patricia Kitcher (1990), who defends a psychological reading of Kant’s text, which she calls Kant’s ‘transcendental psychology.’ In this way, Kitcher tries to make Kant useful for contemporary cognitive science.
- 49.
Another possible influence on Wundt’s epistemological reflections is Schopenhauer. There are similarities between the physikalischen Axiome and certain passages from On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, especially the distinction between ground (Grund) and cause (Ursache) and the restriction of the application of causal law to events (Schopenhauer, 1847/2004c, §§ 20, 24 and 29). In the physikalischen Axiome, Wundt cited Schopenhauer’s book twice (PAC, pp. 93–94).
- 50.
Kant is, of course, mainly responsible for this situation. Not only did he use terms such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘representation,’ and ‘subjective’ in different senses and sometimes vaguely, but on occasion he also failed to follow his own prescription of not mixing psychological-empirical issues with the tasks of transcendental philosophy. This is not to mention the difficulties arising from differences between two editions of the same work, such as those concerning Transcendental Deduction in the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, which has given rise to very distinct, and often incompatible, interpretations (e.g., Allison, 2004; Carl, 1992; Henrich, 1976; Kitcher, 2011; Longuenesse, 1998).
- 51.
- 52.
Patrick Frierson (2014) argues for the existence of an empirical psychology in Kant. In fact, he gives many examples of Kant’s empirical analysis of the human mind and behavior (e.g., cognitive and volitional processes, psychopathology, moral action, etc.). However, this only shows that Kant, at different places and different times, elaborated certain reflections on psychological matters, not that he had an empirical psychology. Moreover, Frierson does not take into consideration the fact that Kant changed his mind about the nature and status of empirical psychology , which renders it impossible to treat his psychological analyses from different periods as if they belonged to a permanent project of empirical psychology.
- 53.
Since the appearance of Kant’s Anthropology Lectures as volume 25 of the Academy Edition in 1995, the topic has been subject to detailed and systematic studies (e.g., Brandt, 1999; Cohen, 2009; Jacobs & Kain, 2003; Sturm, 2009; Wilson, 2006). However, with the exception of Sturm’s study, the relationship between empirical psychology and anthropology has not received due attention and remains to be further investigated. For a recent attempt, see Leite & Araujo (2014).
- 54.
Since the central issue here is Wundt’s rejection of unconscious representations, I will restrict myself to the discussion of unconscious representations, leaving aside the question of other unconscious mental activities, as proposed, for example, by Rockmore (2012). I am assuming here that, for both Kant and Wundt, every representation is a mental activity, but not every mental activity is a representation.
- 55.
For the Jäsche Logik, I use the translation by M. Young in Kant (1992).
- 56.
Bondeli (2014a) gives a broader definition, relating it to other concepts in Kant’s work.
- 57.
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment , Kant gave the following definition of sensation: “We understand by the word ‘sensation’ an objective representation of the senses; and in order not always to run the risk of being misinterpreted, we will call that which must always remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of ‘feeling’” (AA V, 206, emphasis in original). For the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I use the translation by P. Guyer and E. Matthews in Kant (2000). As for perception, it is an empirical intuition accompanied by consciousness (CPR, A120/B160).
- 58.
For the Pragmatic Anthropology, I use the translation by R. Louden in Kant (2007a).
- 59.
In the first edition of the Grundzüge, Wundt referred explicitly to this passage of Kant’s Anthropology (GPP1, 637–638).
- 60.
To give a couple of examples, Kitcher (1999, pp. 346–347) first used the expressions ‘obscure consciousness’ and ‘obscurely conscious’ to refer to the obscure representations discussed by Kant. Recently, she seems to have changed her mind, sustaining that, “his theory clearly implies that unconscious representations are necessary for cognition” (Kitcher, 2012, p. 16). In fact, the majority of scholars tend to use ‘unconscious representation,’ but not always in the same sense. Brook (1994, p. 140) and Madrid (2012, p. 212) affirm that the Kantian unconscious is very close to Freud’s model, whereas Heidemann (2012, pp. 50–56) includes also the clear and indistinct representations under the list of unconscious representations, and Schulting understands that “‘Obscure’ does however not denote ‘unconscious’ in the strict sense” (Schulting, 2012, p. 293).
- 61.
In the anthropology lecture entitled Parow, one finds the following remark: “Consciousness does not produce any representations, but only elucidates them” (AA XXV, 249, my translation).
- 62.
In his Anthropology , Kant used the same distinction between two kinds of consciousness, but this time with new terms: reflective vs. intuitive, pure vs. empirical, consciousness of understanding vs. consciousness of inner sense (AA VII, 135).
- 63.
Bondeli (2014b) also notes this point but does not establish the difference between the two kinds of consciousness involved in this issue.
- 64.
I think this reading of Kant is not far from that which Hanna (2005, 2008) calls Kantian non-conceptualism. “The thesis of Non-Conceptualism about mental content says that representational content is neither solely nor wholly determined by our conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both solely and wholly determined by non-conceptual capacities and can be shared by humans and non-human animals alike” (Hanna, 2008, p. 42, emphasis in original). Crone (2012) and Schulting (2012) develop similar ideas and speak of a pre-conceptual, phenomenal, or non-apperceptive consciousness in Kant, while Ginsborg (2008) criticizes a non-conceptualist reading of Kant. This is in fact a much-debated topic in current Kant scholarship. For a brief overview of different positions involved in this debate, see Hanna (2013).
- 65.
For the Prolegomena, I use the translation by G. Hatfield in Kant (2002b).
- 66.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduced the faculty of imagination to mediate between sensibility and understanding, thereby preparing representations for the proper logical synthesis of the latter (CPR, A99-102).
- 67.
I will rely on the presentation of Wundt’s theory that I offered in Sect. 3.4.
- 68.
It comes as no surprise, as I will show in Chap. 5, that one of the main types of experimental investigation Wundt carried out in his laboratory in Leipzig was related to the scope of consciousness.
- 69.
In the next chapter (Sect. 4.5), I will come back to this point, showing how Wundt positioned himself in relation to the development of Neo-Kantianism in Germany.
- 70.
- 71.
It should be noted, however, that from the beginning, the Neo-Kantians’ link with the historical Kant was very problematic, to say the least. As Kühn points out, “their relationship to Kant was rather ‘loose’, and thus their common philosophical outlook, insofar as it exists, cannot be reduced to this relationship” (Kühn, 2010, p. 115).
- 72.
Some authors see in Otto Liebmann (1840–1912) the real starting point of Neo-Kantianism (e.g., Beck, 1967; Ollig, 1979). However, as Köhnke argued, any such attempt is not only arbitrary but also incorrect, because it eliminates distinct authors and currents that were simultaneously defending the need of a return to Kant—the only common point among them (Köhnke, 1986, pp. 213–214). For example, Kuno Fischer (1824–1907) had already published, 5 years before Liebmann, two books on Kant, promoting and defending his views on human knowledge (Adair-Toteff, 2003). Some years later, Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915), one of Fischer’s former students and a leading figure of Neo-Kantianism, affirmed that Fischer had played a decisive role in the movement (Windelband, 1898, p. 2). Also relevant in this context, although usually neglected, is the fact that Beneke had already published, three decades before, a book on Kant and the task of philosophy. He saw in a return to Kant the future of German philosophy: “Kantianism in its full purity will triumph over the metaphysical method” (Beneke, 1832, p. 89).
- 73.
In the Preface of the second edition of his On Will in Nature, published in 1854, Schopenhauer repeatedly defended Kant against the philosophy of his time and advised his readers to read Kant (Schopenhauer, 1854/2004a).
- 74.
Helmholtz himself not only recognized his Kantian agenda, but also repeatedly discussed Kant’s conception in his physiological and philosophical essays. His statement that “Kant’s ideas are still alive” (Helmholtz, 1855, p. 42) clearly indicates his attempt to reconcile Kant’s philosophy with the science of his time.
- 75.
Riehl (1904, p. 7) and Lenoir (2006, p. 141), for example, defend a rupture with Kant, whereas Heimann (1974, p. 221) and Fullinwider (1990, p. 43) argue that Helmholtz remained a Kantian up to the end of his life. In a more radical interpretation, Schmitz claims that the proximity of Helmholtz and Kant is only apparent, and that in fact he was closer to Locke and Hume (Schmitz, 1996, p. 54). The problem with such general claims is that they are usually based on analyses of different topics (philosophy of science, geometry, physiology, etc.), which can lead to different results. However, the main issue here is the lack of a general agreement as to what it means to be a Kantian. With regard to geometry, for example, although it is generally claimed that Helmholtz distanced himself considerably from Kant by pursuing an empirical approach to space intuition (Hatfield, 1990, pp. 218–226; Lenoir, 2006, p. 201), it is possible to see a certain Kantian agenda, as Hyder (2009, p. 2) claims. Regarding Helmholtz’s philosophy of science, the situation is no different, as one can infer from the analyses of Heimann (1974) and Schiemann (2009), for example. More recently, Hatfield (2012) has presented another point of divergence between Helmholtz and Kant, namely, the question of primary and secondary qualities. Nevertheless, a complete account of this relationship is still lacking.
- 76.
According to Koenigsberger, Helmholtz’s interest in epistemological questions began very early and was related to his father’s deep knowledge of Fichte’s idealism (Koenigsberger, 1902, p. 244). In fact, in a letter to his father in 1855, Helmholtz wrote, “Last Tuesday, I gave a talk … on human vision, in which I tried to make especially clear the conformity of the empirical facts of sensory physiology to the philosophical conception of Kant and Fichte” (Koenigsberger, 1902, p. 242). Heidelberger (1993, 1994) has explored Fichte’s influence on Helmholtz’s philosophy of science.
- 77.
Later, Helmholtz speaks again of “innate forms of intuition and laws of thought” (Helmholtz, 1855, p. 41).
- 78.
For Schmitz, Lange is the main representative of the transition from physiological to genuine Neo-Kantianism (Schmitz, 1996, p. 107).
- 79.
- 80.
According to Hartung (2010a, p. 5), Zeller discovered in Heidelberg his role as a systematic philosopher. However, he became famous as a historian of philosophy, not as a systematic philosopher. In fact, his work on the historical development of Greek philosophy was considered a masterpiece in the nineteenth century and continues to be edited and translated to this day. For Zeller’s life and impact on the historiography of philosophy in general, see Diels (1911) and Hartung (2010b).
- 81.
Hartung states that Zeller’s inaugural speech “launches a new functional concept (Funktionsbegriff) of philosophy, which has now to deal with the conflicts with the particular sciences and their autonomous methodological and conceptual apparatus” (Hartung, 2010a, p. 5). For Zeller’s role in the debate between philosophy and science in the nineteenth century, see Hartung (2010c).
- 82.
In fact, in a paper on spatial perception published in 1869, Wundt criticized Helmholtz precisely for his attempt to use causality as the only a priori element while maintaining an empirical approach for the remainder of the perceptual process, especially the idea of inductive inference (UEG, pp. 226–230). It is very interesting to note that Wundt’s criticism of Helmholtz coincides exactly with his formal rejection of unconscious inferences as the bedrock of psychology (UEG, p. 233).
- 83.
In the first edition of Lange’s History of Materialism , Wundt’s physiological and psychological work does not even appear. Only in the second edition, published in 1875, did Lange include Wundt’s Grundzüge as a representative example of the new scientific psychology he was defending (Lange, 1875, pp. 369–370, 438–440).
- 84.
Mayerhofer and Vanecek (2007) and Teo (2002) defend the general thesis of Lange’s influence on the historical development of German psychology in the nineteenth century. I think this issue deserves a more detailed treatment and in-depth analyses of concrete cases beyond general statements of influence. Be that as it may, I will not discuss this topic here. For my present purposes, the relevant point is that although Lange’s famous expression ‘psychology without a soul’ already appears in the first edition of his History of Materialism (Lange, 1866, p. 168), it was only in the second edition (Lange, 1875) that he really discussed the state of psychology, including Wundt’s Grundzüge. Thus, at least in Wundt’s case, there can be no influence here, because this discussion occurred when Wundt had already inaugurated his new conception of psychology.
- 85.
- 86.
As I will show in the next chapter (Sect. 4.5), this does not mean that Wundt adhered to Neo-Kantianism properly speaking. Instead, he criticized the movement as a whole and tried to keep himself away from it.
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de Freitas Araujo, S. (2016). The Grundzüge and the Abandonment of the Unconscious. In: Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26636-7_3
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