Theories About the Development of Science

Abstract

This chapter gives a short overview of twentieth century currents in the study of scientific methodology, i.e., logical positivism, falsificationism, Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, Lakatos methodology of scientific research programmes and Feyerabend’s critique of all such general theories about scientific thinking.

The main issue is, and has always been, how we should characterize scientific methods in such a way that one can use the characterization to exclude from science all those activities that do not properly belong to science (superstitions, religious arguments, pseudoscience, etc.), and include in science all those activities that are scientific (physics, biology, astronomy, etc.). This formulation suggests that there is a tension between the normative and descriptive goals of philosophy of science. According to my grasp of the situation, Popper’s biggest mistake was that he was far too normative and did not sufficiently take into consideration how science is actually performed. This mistake allowed his critics to question the relevance of his view. Kuhn, on the other hand, made the opposite mistake. He concentrated far too much on describing the development of science, which lost him the possibility of saying anything about how science ought to be carried out in order for it to qualify as science. Philosophical theories about the development of science must balance both of these aspects in order for them to have any relevance.

Accordingly, in this chapter I propose that the starting point should be the hypothetical-deductive method and the related approach to scientific theories.

I also discuss Newton-Smith’s model of scientific rationality, observing that basically it is an application of the belief-desire model of rational action to scientific communities.

‘Anything goes.’

P. Feyerabend.