Abstract
This paper aims to compare the semantics of natural kind terms and that of artifactual terms. To that end, we rely on the natural kind terms’ theory regarded as paradigmatic in contemporaneous semantics, the one put forward by Putnam, who sketched the extension of the semantics of natural kind terms to artifactual terms. In this paper we develop such extension concerning the reference of artifactual terms, although the reference fixing theory we advocate differs from that of Putnam’s. On the other hand, we propose a view on the meaning of these terms which conflicts with the one it would follow from extending to such terms Putnam’s view of meaning on natural kind terms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I will understand the expression “artifactual term” as interchangeable with “artifactual kind term” and consequently “artifact” with “artifactual kind”.
- 2.
In (1973) Putnam distinguishes between physical magnitude terms and natural kind terms, although he claims that there are semantic similarities between both sorts of terms. In this paper I will not deal with physical magnitude terms.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
I will speak of artifactual terms or artifactual kind terms – see note 1 above – instead of names of artifacts.
- 7.
There is not a precise delimitation criterion for everyday artifactual terms, but the examples mentioned by Putnam are clear cases of them.
- 8.
As it is well known, Kripke proposes in the second lecture of (1980) a theory of reference fixing for proper names that he extends in the third lecture to natural kind terms, according to which a term is introduced in an initial baptism in which its reference is fixed by ostension or “by a description” (Kripke 1980, pp. 96 f.). These procedures of reference fixing are similar to those proposed by Putnam concerning natural kind terms.
- 9.
Putnam adds that the indexical description in question is uttered by “someone who is ‘focusing’ on a particular sample of substance” (Putnam 1988, p. 38). On this matter, Putnam asserts that he has taken the notion of “focusing” from Alan Berger; see Putnam (1988, pp. 33 and 130, n. 14). It is remarkable that although in that footnote 14 Putnam claims that Berger introduces the notion of “focusing” in Terms and Truth (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), the published version of that book appeared later, that is, Berger (2002); thus, it is to be assumed that Putnam had access to a preliminary manuscript of that book. Concerning Berger’s notion of “focusing” see chapters 1 and 2 of Berger (2002).
- 10.
- 11.
I say “descriptive-causal” instead of merely “descriptive” because of the causal component involved in the ostensive contact with members of the kind.
- 12.
By the stereotype of an artifactual term there should be understood the properties that according to our common sense beliefs characterize the paradigmatic members of the artifactual kind. Concerning everyday artifacts every competent speaker in the use of the corresponding terms knows the intended function, the appearance and the manner of use of such artifacts. Although it should be recognized that the knowledge of their origin and features of their internal structure can be more imperfect, these are, as a rule, easily discernible.
- 13.
The theory for reference borrowing put forward by Kripke in (1980) for proper names and natural kind terms is historical-causal.
- 14.
Whereas not all artifacts are concrete entities, everyday artifacts are.
- 15.
- 16.
This paper has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness in the framework of the research project FFI2014-52244-P.
References
Abbott, B.: Nondescriptionality and natural kind terms. Linguist. Philos. 12, 269–291 (1989)
Abbott, B.: Reference. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010)
Baghramian, M. (ed.): Reading Putnam. Routledge, London/New York (2013)
Berger, A.: Terms and Truth. Reference Direct and Anaphoric. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2002)
Burge, T.: Some remarks on ‘externalisms’. In: Baghramian (2013), pp. 263–271 (2013)
Devitt, M., Sterelny, K.: Language and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 2nd ed., rev. and extended, 1st ed., 1987 (1999)
Grandy, R.E.: Artifacts: parts and principles. In: Margolis, E., Laurence, S. (2007), pp. 18–32 (2007)
Hilpinen, R.: Artifact. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/artifact/ (2011)
Kornblith, H.: Referring to artifacts. Philos. Rev. 89, 109–114 (1980)
Kornblith, H.: How to refer to artifacts. In: Margolis, E., Laurence, S. (2007), pp. 138–149 (2007)
Koslicki, K.: The Structure of Objects. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008)
Kripke, S.: Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford (1980)
LaPorte, J.: Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)
Losonsky, M.: The nature of artifacts. Philosophy 65, 81–88 (1990)
Margolis, E., Laurence, S. (eds.): Creations of the Mind. Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)
Nelson, J.A.: Schwartz on reference. South. J. Philos. 20, 359–365 (1982)
Putnam, H.: Is semantics possible? In: Kiefer, H., Munitz, M. (eds.) Languages, Belief and Metaphysics. State University of New York Press, New York. Reprinted in Putnam (1975a), pp. 139–152 (1970)
Putnam, H.: Explanation and reference. In: Pearce, G., Maynard, P. (eds.) Conceptual Change. Reidel, Dordrecht. Reprinted in Putnam (1975a), pp. 196–214 (1973)
Putnam, H.: Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical papers, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1975a)
Putnam, H.: The meaning of ‘meaning’. In: Putnam (1975a), pp. 215–271 (1975b)
Putnam, H.: Realism and Reason. Philosophical papers, vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1983)
Putnam, H.: Meaning holism and epistemic holism. In: Cramer, K., et al. (eds.) Theorie der Subjektivität, pp. 251–277. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt (1987)
Putnam, H.: Representation and Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge (1988)
Putnam, H.: Realism with a Human Face. (Edited and with introduction by J. Conant). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1990)
Putnam, H.: Comments on Tyler Burge. In: Baghramian (2013), pp. 272–274 (2013)
Schwartz, S.P.: Putnam on artifacts. Philos. Rev. 87, 566–574 (1978)
Schwartz, S.P.: Natural kinds and nominal kinds. Mind 89, 182–195 (1980)
Schwartz, S.P.: Reply to Kornblith and Nelson. South. J. Philos. 21, 475–479 (1983)
Soavi, M.: Realism, Antirealism and Artefact Kinds. CLEP, Padova (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fernández Moreno, L. (2016). A Comparison of the Semantics of Natural Kind Terms and Artifactual Terms. In: Redmond, J., Pombo Martins, O., Nepomuceno Fernández, Á. (eds) Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 38. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_23
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_23
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-26504-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-26506-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)