Abstract
The main claim of the present paper is to defend that some specific oral debate forms of the African traditions seem to correspond structurally speaking to non-monotonic reasoning in a way that is not that different from nowadays argumentation-based approaches of legal reasoning within the context of western juridical systems. So, the aim of this survey consists in two points: on the one hand, we will show that polemical debates in African oral traditions implement systematically a non-monotonic inference, that is closed to what Aristotle termed by “dialectical arguments”; on the other hand, we are suggesting a way to deal with non-monotonic inference in a dialogical framework.
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Notes
- 1.
In recent work, Bernadette Dango (2015) suggested that the establishment of an analogy could be thought as finding some kind of mapping that displays the transition from one epistemic state to a second one, such that the latter is more specific than the first one. Moreover, according to Dango the didactic role of proverbs is to train in creating such kind of mappings. In other words, according to Dango; the way to teach and transmit knowledge gathered by a given tradition amounts teaching on how to apply it in a specific situation.
- 2.
- 3.
Quite often it has been said that dialogical logics has a pragmatic approach to meaning. I concede that the terminology might be misleading and induce one to think that the theory of meaning involved in dialogic is not semantics at all. Helge Rückert proposes the more appropriate formulation pragmatistische Semantik (pragmatist semantics).
- 4.
Presentation based on Hansson, where this notation is precised by saying that, for any two sets X and Y, X\Y is the set of elements of X which are not in Y.
- 5.
- 6.
Cf. Keiff 2007.
- 7.
Clerbout (Nicolas), 2014; La sémantique dialogique. Notions fondamentales et éléments de métathéorie, London, College Publications, „Cahiers de Logique et d’épistémologie“ series, Vol. 21.
- 8.
In the present survey we don’t use the rank-device which is very relevant and useful for the new reformulation and new perspectives on this topic.
- 9.
In the standard literature on dialogues, there is an asymmetric version of the intuitionist rule, called E-rule since Felscher (1985).
- 10.
The rule concerning the introduction of an ordinary extra-premise [R S*2.1] takes account of the fact that, in a controversy the part which introduces the debate usually utters – at least, that is supposed – all statements useful for sustaining his position, meanwhile omitting one or more details which could weaken this position. The same holds for juridical antagonism, where the litigant is supposed to present, since the start of the debate, all elements of the accusation providing the strength of his complaint. It becomes impossible, during the controversial exchange of respective arguments, that the litigant introduces some new statements. This is the ethic motivation of this formal restriction relative to the introduction of extra-premise under which the proponent plays.
However, intending the ideal conditions of equilibrium of a debate, it is necessary to allow the challenger the possibility of bringing the details of precision lacking in the initial statement (complaint) of the litigant, by introducing a unique extra-premise. Furthermore, the impossibility for the proponent to attack this extra-premise is simply due to the fact that one cannot rebut or contest a statement which hasn’t been uttered yet by a protagonist, though the existence of this statement is supposed beforehand as one of the material conditions of the dialogue. In fact, we must keep in mind that we are in the context of material dialogues and of non-monotonique argumentation process.
- 11.
Here, the revision operation performs the Levy’s identity which is constituted of two steps: a) first, contract the database (in the instance, it’s the set of all the argument’s premises) from the negation of the revision’s formula; next, extend this contracted database by adding the revision’s formula itself.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Prof. Juan Redmond (Universidad de Valparaíso) who motivated our participation in the ISELL (International Symposium of Epistemology, Logic and Language 2012/Lisbon), where the content of this essay was presented for the first time. Many thanks also to the team “Pragmatisme Dialogique”, lab. UMR-8163: STL at the University of Lille 3, and particularly to Dr. Nicolas Clerbout (Convenio de Desempeño HACS – Universidad de Valparaíso/Chile) whose recently published book on metadialogic has been useful for our own presentation of the dialogical logic. Finally, we deeply thank Prof. Shahid Rahman (Université de Lille, UMR: 8163) for his tireless scientific support and his friendship.
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Nzokou, G. (2016). Defeasible Argumentation in African Oral Traditions. A Special Case of Dealing with the Non-monotonic Inference in a Dialogical Framework. In: Redmond, J., Pombo Martins, O., Nepomuceno Fernández, Á. (eds) Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 38. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_14
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