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Is There a Role for Computation in the Enactive Paradigm?

  • Carlos F. BritoEmail author
  • Victor X. Marques
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 376)

Abstract

The main contribution of this paper is a naturalized account of the phenomenon of computation. The key idea for the development of this account is the identification of the notion of syntactical processing (or information processing) with the dynamical evolution of a constrained physical process, based on the observation that both evolve according to an arbitrary set of rules. This identification, in turn, revealed that, from the physical point of view, computation could be understood in terms of the operation of a component subdivided into two parts, (a) the constrained process and (b) the constraints that control its dynamics, where the interactions with the rest of the system are mediated by configurational changes of the constrained process. The immediate consequence of this analysis is the observation that this notion of computation can be readily integrated into the enactive paradigm of cognition.

Keywords

Enaction Computation Syntax Arbitrariness Computation Varela Organism Searle 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversidade Federal do CearáFortalezaBrasil
  2. 2.Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do SulPorto AlegreBrasil

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