Abstract
In this paper, I explore how an embodied perspective on cognition might inform research on artificial intelligence. Many embodied cognition theorists object to the central role that representations play on the traditional view of cognition. Based on these objections, it may seem that the lesson from embodied cognition is that AI should abandon representation as a central component of intelligence. However, I argue that the lesson from embodied cognition is actually that AI research should shift its focus from how to utilize explicit representations to how to create and use tacit representations. To develop this suggestion, I provide an overview of the commitments of the classical view and distinguish three critiques of the role that representations play in that view. I provide further exploration and defense of Daniel Dennett’s distinction between explicit and tacit representations. I argue that we should understand the embodied cognition approach using a framework that includes tacit representations. Given this perspective, I will explore some AI research areas that may be recommended by an embodied perspective on cognition.
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Notes
- 1.
This is Dretske’s strategy as well. For example, in “The Epistemology of Belief,” Dretske says, “I have begun to talk more and more about information, so let me pause a moment to explain what I mean by this way of talking. I mean nothing very technical or abstract. In fact, I mean pretty much what (I think) we all mean in talking of some event, signal or structure carrying (or embodying) information about another state of affairs. A message (i.e., some event, stimulus or signal) carries information about X to the extent to which one could learn (come to know) something about X from the message” (Dretske 1983, p. 10).
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Spitzer, E. (2016). Tacit Representations and Artificial Intelligence: Hidden Lessons from an Embodied Perspective on Cognition. In: Müller, V.C. (eds) Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Synthese Library, vol 376. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26485-1_25
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