Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Some Key Topics in Feminist Philosophies of Science: An Introduction

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 317))

  • 629 Accesses

Abstract

In this first chapter we will briefly introduce some key topics that, perhaps in different ways, are part and parcel of both “traditional” philosophies of science and feminist philosophies of science: the situatedness of knowledge, the notion of relationality, the idea of conceiving sciences as sets of communal practices, the underrepresentation and exclusion of women, the critique to the value-free ideal, the ethical, political, and social dimension of sciences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Alcoff, L. M., & Potter, E. (Eds.). (1993). Feminist epistemologies. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amoretti, M. C., & Vassallo, N. (2011). Scientific knowledge: Situatedness and intersubjectivity without standpoints. Logic and Philosophy of Science, 9(1), 517–522.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amoretti, M. C., & Vassallo, N. (2012). On the independence of the social and situated dimension of scientific knowledge from the notion of standpoint. In S. Knauss, T. Wobbe, & G. Covi (Eds.), Gendered ways of knowing in science: Scope and limitations (pp. 57–74). Trento: FBK Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amoretti, M. C., & Vassallo, N. (2013a). A way of saving normative epistemology? Scientific knowledge without standpoint theories. In V. Karakostas & D. Dieks (Eds.), Epsa11 perspectives and foundational problems in philosophy of science (pp. 467–478). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Amoretti, M. C., & Vassallo, N. (2013b). Is there any problem with gender-specific medicine? Verifiche, 42(1–3), 139–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amoretti, M. C., & Vassallo, N. (2015). Against sex and gender dualism in gender-specific medicine. In U. Mäki, I. Votsis, S. Ruphy & G. Schurz (Eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki (pp. 357–367). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, E. (1995a). The democratic university: The role of justice in the production of knowledge. Social Philosophy and Policy, 12, 186–219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, E. (1995b). Knowledge, human interests, and objectivity in feminist epistemology. Philosophical Topics, 23, 27–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, E. (2004). Uses of value judgements in science: A general argument, with lessons from a case study of feminist research on divorce. Hypatia, 19, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, E. (2011). Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/. Accessed January 15, 2015.

  • Antony, L. (1993). Quine as feminist: The radical import of naturalized epistemology. In L. Antony & C. Witt (Eds.), A mind of one’s own: Feminist essays on reason and objectivity (pp. 185–226). Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barwell, I. (2007). Towards a defence of objectivity. In K. Lennon & M. Whitford (Eds.), Knowing the difference. Feminist perspectives in epistemology (pp. 79–84). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, R. (2001). The bias paradox in feminist epistemology. In N. Tuana & S. Morgen (Eds.), Engendering rationalities (pp. 195–217). Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrier, M., Howard, D., & Kourany, J. A. (Eds.). (2008). The challenge of the social and the pressure of practice: Science and values revisited. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clough, S. (2008). Solomon’s empirical/non-empirical distinction and the proper place of values in science. Perspectives on Science, 16, 265–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Code, L. (1991). What can she know? Feminist theory and the construction of knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Code, L. (2004). The power of ignorance. Philosophical Papers, 33, 291–308.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Code, L. (2006). Ecological thinking: The politics of epistemic location. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Duran, J. (1991). Toward a feminist epistemology. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge. London: New Left Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker, M., & Hornsby, J. (2000). Introduction. In M. Fricker & J. Hornsby (Eds.), The cambridge companion to feminism in philosophy (pp. 1–9). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Garavaso, P., & Vassallo, N. (2007). Filosofia delle donne. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grasswick, H. (Ed.). (2011). Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science: Power in knowledge. London: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haely, K. C. (2008). Objectivity in the feminist philosophy of science. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanson, N. R. (1958). Patterns of discovery: An inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haraway, D. J. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. Feminist Studies, 14, 575–599.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haraway, D. J. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (1993). Rethinking standpoint epistemology: “What is strong objectivity”? In L. M. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies (pp. 49–82). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (1995). “Strong objectivity:” A response to the new objectivity question. Synthese, 104, 331–349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (1998). Is science multicultural? Postcolonialisms, feminisms, and epistemologies: Race, gender, and science. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (2004). A socially relevant philosophy of science? Resources from standpoint theory’s controversiality. Hypatia, 19, 25–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S. (Ed.). (2008). Sciences from below: Feminism, postcolonialism, and modernities. Durham: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harding, S., & Hintikka, M. B. (Eds.). (1983). Discovering reality. Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hrdy, S. (1986). Empathy, polyandry, and the myth of the coy female. In R. Bleier (Ed.), Feminist approaches to science. New York: Pergamon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Intemann, K. (2001). Science and values: Are value judgments always irrelevant to the justification of scientific claims? Philosophy of Science, 68, S506–S518.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Intemann, K. (2005). Feminism, underdetermination, and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 72, 1001–1012.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaggar, A. M. (Ed.). (2008). Just methods: An interdisciplinary feminist reader. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keller, E. F. (1983). A feeling for the organism: The life and work of barbara mcclintock. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keller, E. F. (1985). Reflections on gender and science. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keller, E. F., & Longino, H. E. (Eds.). (1996). Feminism and science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kincaid, H., Dupré, J., & Wylie, A. (Eds.). (2007). Value-free science? Ideals and illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohlstedt, S. G., & Longino, H. E. (Eds.). (1997). Women, gender, and science: New directions (Osiris, 12). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kourany, J. A. (1998). A new program for philosophy of science, in many voices. In J. A. Kourany (Ed.), Philosophy in a feminist voice. Critiques and reconstructions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kourany, J. A. (2010). Philosophy of science after feminism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kourany, J. A. (2012). The ideal of socially responsible science: Reply to Dupré, Rolin, Solomon, and Giere. Perspectives on Science, 20, 344–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lacey, H. (1999). Is science value free? Values and scientific understanding. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lennon, K., & Whitford, M. (Eds.). (1994). Knowing the difference. Feminist perspectives in epistemology. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (1979). Evidence and hypothesis: An analysis of evidential relations. Philosophy of Science, 46, 35–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (1983). Beyond “bad science”: Skeptical reflections on the value-freedom of scientific inquiry. Science, Technology and Human Values, 8, 7–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (1994). In search of feminist epistemology. Monist, 77, 472–485.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (2001). The fate of knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, H. E. (2006). The social dimensions of scientific knowledge. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, L. H. (1990). Who knows: From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, L. H. (1993a). Epistemological communities. In L. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, L. H. (1993b). Who knows? What can they know? And when? Reason Papers, 18, 45–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, L. H. (1995). A feminist naturalized philosophy of science. Synthese, 104, 399–421.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pinnick, C. L., Koertge, N., & Almeder, R. F. (2003). Scrutinizing feminist epistemology: An examination of gender in science. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potter, E. (2007). Feminism and philosophy of science. An introduction. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth, and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological relativity, and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, M. (2001). Social empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vassallo, N. (Ed.). (2009). Donna m’apparve. Torino: Codice Edizioni.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wylie, A. (2003). Why stanpoint matters. In R. Figueroa & S. Harding (Eds.), Science and other cultures: Issues in philosophies of science and technology (pp. 26–48). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wylie, A., & Nelson, L. H. (2007). Coming to terms with the values of science: Insights from feminist science studies scholarship. In H. Kincaid, J. Dupré, & A. Wylie (Eds.), Value-free science? Ideals and illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We want to thank our contributors for their competence, cooperativeness, and patience, as well as an anonymous reviewer for his/her comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Lucy Fleet for supporting and encouraging the project from the beginning and up to its completion.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Genoa, Genova, Italy

    Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo

Authors
  1. Maria Cristina Amoretti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Nicla Vassallo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Maria Cristina Amoretti .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Classics, Philosophy, Hist, University of Genoa, Genova, Italy

    Maria Cristina Amoretti

  2. Faculty of Humanities, University of Genoa,, Genova, Italy

    Nicla Vassallo

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Amoretti, M.C., Vassallo, N. (2016). Some Key Topics in Feminist Philosophies of Science: An Introduction. In: Amoretti, M., Vassallo, N. (eds) Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 317. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26348-9_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation