Abstract
The existing IR literature does not provide theoretical and empirical tools to establish what concretely sovereignty erosion is and how to test and detect it, particularly in respect to those states claiming sovereignty. This chapter fills this theoretical gap through an elaboration that will lead the way towards empirical analysis later on in the book. It fundamentally solves the theoretical problem as to how to identify the difference between credible and incredible claims of sovereignty, and neutralise the possible hypocritical use of différance to claim the organised hypocrisy of state sovereignty by default of counterevidence. Emphasising the importance of positive sovereignty to assess the factual credibility of state claims of sovereignty, the logic of the principal-agent relation is used to determine whether the subject recognises the credibility of the sovereign’s claims of state sovereignty. In contrast to the negotiation stage of the policy process where the sovereign/principal’s claims of undeniable organisation of the hypocrisy of state sovereignty incontrovertibly apply, the implementation stage allows us to test whether the subject/agent provide empirical evidence of the presence of agency slippage that is not due to and controlled by the sovereign/principal. Integration theories are useful to grasp the empirical elements describing the manifestations of situations of state sovereignty erosion due to subject/agent non-recognition of the sovereign/principal’ claims of organised hypocrisy of sovereignty. Accordingly, analytical tools such as path dependence, cultivated and functional spillover, and plurality of principals allow one to devise a method to test the credibility of the sovereign’s claims of sovereignty and possibly assess state sovereignty erosion.
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Notes
- 1.
Both these works present Rosenau’s distinction.
- 2.
“Negative liberty is defined by Berlin as ‘the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others’ (Berlin 1969 [1958]: 122). It affords individuals ‘freedom from’ interference and therefore presupposes individual self-determination. […] Negative sovereignty can also be defined as freedom from outside interference: a formal-legal condition […]. […] Positive liberty, according to Berlin, ‘consists in being one’s own master’. It is ‘freedom to’: being active and self-directive; choosing pursuing, and realizing goals. […] Positive sovereignty likewise presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than formal condition” (Jackson 1990: 27–29 passim). For Jackson there are, however, important distinctions between negative and positive sovereignty or liberty depending on the inner divisibility of states in respect to the indivisibility of individuals (Jackson 1990).
- 3.
The four criteria are: “1. A change in the authority empowered to recognize sovereignty; 2. The diffusion of meta-political authority to alternative institutions (e.g., religious organizations, transnational corporations, international institutions) whose membership would be exclusively non-state actors; 3. The state’s loss of its monopoly on coercion; and 4. The deterritorialization of state authority claims” (Thomson 1995: 229).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Guardiola-Rivera describes the anti-falsificationist process of immunisation disguising its illusory features with modern positivism. “[…] the modern conception of sovereignty, associated from the very outset with the practice of flattening the world and ‘eliminating’ thick practices. It relies upon something akin to the instruments of magic, a sort of sorcery that allows for the illusion that the processes of expansion is infinite and totally self-referential, having in itself the cause of its own endless movement. From the very outset this machinery has combined optical illusion and mathematics (first geometry, nowadays cybernetics) with forms of mimesis (theatrics, reproduction and representation) in an attempt to announce the coming catastrophe, in order to advert it, by representing it as the consequence of the deed done by some arch-enemy. The magical trick operates when, following the expulsion or the sacrifice of the chosen enemy, the announced catastrophe remains a non-actualised possibility. In fact, this sleight of hand gives the machinery its own principle of movement; it becomes an automaton. The prime example of this machinery can be seen in the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan” (Guardiola-Rivera 2010: 142).
- 7.
It must not be forgotten the possible presence of a definitional fusion not appropriately distinguishing between sovereignty and government. As further elaborated, the effective and satisfactory governmental delegation of given competences to third actors to obtain given benefits do not represent per se an evidence of sovereignty erosion.
- 8.
“In sum, the division and specialization of labor, underwritten by the creation of the jurisdiction-specific subunits, allows an institution to decentralize its operations. This, in turn, facilitates the delegation of authority and resources to specialists who, because they have disproportionate influence over events in their respective bailiwicks, also have incentives to develop their expertise further. The very act of delegating, however, generates a problem of control in which specialists may have opportunities to pursue private objectives at odds with the public purposes of the institution (what organization theorists refer to as the moral hazard problem)” (Shepsle 2010: 367).
- 9.
In the Swiss case of popular sovereignty, it means that both the Swiss people (i.e. the sovereign/principal) and the government in all its decisional and administrative parts (the subject) must similarly indicate the former as being the one ultimately governing or ruling. Then, of course, the government is also a principal in respect to its agencies. However, it always remains a subject/agent in respect to the popular sovereignty of the Swiss citizens and cantons.
- 10.
The sovereign/principal of a given state may directly (e.g. through referenda) or indirectly (e.g. through the legislative power of the representative parliament) express himself depending on the institutional settings of the state. See Held (2006: 281–284). In this case, Swiss direct democracy even allows the popular decision on the Constitutional and legal review and on the ratification and entry into force of international treaties (Auer et al. 2006: 14).
- 11.
Tallberg indicates that, despite the principal’s controls, the agent maintains a certain marge de manœuvre.
- 12.
The reference to the “state” as institutional framework is functional to the necessity of testing the possible erosion of Swiss state sovereignty within the context of Swiss-EU relations.
- 13.
In particular, Thomson explains: “My concepts of authority and control are meant to address Ruggie’s concern somewhat differently. Control measured in terms of capabilities is probably not different from what Ruggie terms ‘power’. On the other hand, my concept of authority concerns those who have the right to make the rules, while Ruggie’s ‘social purpose’ seems to refer to the content of those rules” (Thomson 1995: 223). See Ruggie (1982).
- 14.
To this end, the effectiveness of policies varies, but the problem of state sovereignty erosion does not directly refer to effectiveness, but to the credible effectiveness of the sovereign authority and control. Smith explains that “states have considerable spaces where they do not control what occurs; most obviously the criminal world but also issues of the black economy, people who leave their homes without trace, the treatment of abused children in families – the list is as long as can be imagined” (Smith 2009: 103). It is also important to realise that an ineffective state policy may be considered as sovereign once recognised as credible.
- 15.
Within the formulation stage there are different phases depending on the state institutional framework. “It would be foolish to imply that the task of formulation has the same character in different systems and different states” (Heywood 2007: 433). Referring to Richardson (1982), Heywood indicates the possibility of detecting two dimensions of policy formulation: “whether policy formulation is based on consultation or imposition, and whether governments engage in long term planning or react to events on a more or less day-to-day basis” (Heywood 2007: 433).
- 16.
At this initial stage, no particular distinction is made between different state policies having all formalised any sort of delegation or competence shared with a foreign entity (such as the EU or a state). Prior investigation on the implementation of these policies is necessary, as well as further theorisation about policy implementation, before proceeding with such a distinction.
- 17.
Policy convergence is defined as “the tendency for policies (in different countries) to begin to take on similar forms over time” (Cini and Borrogan 2010: 449). In what concerns the EU policy convergence and institutional isomorphism see also Knill (2005), Radaelli (2000a), and Harmsen and Wilson (2000).
- 18.
See Richardson (1982).
- 19.
For instance, Epstein and O’Halloran describe how “Congress limits executive branch discretion in this manner all the time, simply by passing specific, detail filled legislation” (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999: 26).
- 20.
- 21.
As Müller points out, the EEA Swiss rejection is not to be seen as a Swiss opposition to the “European idea as such” (Müller 2007: 257). According to him, the Swiss electorate simply decided in accordance with an, at that time, unfavourable estimation of the EEA agreement costs and benefits (Müller 2007: 257). Müller supports this by emphasising the successive attitude of the Swiss electorate “generally positive about the EU objectives, its common market, and the four freedoms” (Müller 2007: 257).
- 22.
To this end, Heywood illustrates the four main theories of decision-making (i.e. rational actor models; incremental models; bureaucratic organisation models; and belief system models) by also providing theoretical insights putting into discussion the rationality of actors as asserted by liberal intergovernmentalists (2007: 426–430).
- 23.
See Wincott (1995: 602).
- 24.
Despite recognising that “intergovernmentalism dominated supranationalism” (Wincott 1995: 606) in the adoption of the SEA, Wincott adds that: “Yet as we have seen the basic, innovative policy techniques required for the internal market programme had been fashioned in the daily work of supranational institutions long before the Member States considered these issues […]” (Wincott 1995: 606).
- 25.
Ilgen’s definition of sovereignty is not a simplification of what previously discussed when defining sovereignty. Indeed, Ilgen, at the same time, uses but does not grab the fictional essence of sovereignty. His definition rests upon the evident metaphysics of presence taking for granted that sovereignty may exist. Indeed, Ilgen’s approach does not reveal the transcendental origin of sovereignty, its being a belief, but simply tries to determine when and where there is sovereignty. In so doing, it precisely reveals the presence of a belief in the possibility of sovereignty that is its prerogative, or that of being present even when absent. The direct use of Ilgen’s definition of sovereignty not resorting to a prior deconstruction would also miss the essence of sovereignty without adequately doing justice to its theological dimension.
- 26.
“The term bureaucrat, a perfectly innocent word describing a governmental official or civil servant (and also sometimes used for clerks and managers in the private sector), has acquired disagreeable connotations of heartlessness and sluggishness” (Shepsle 2010: 407). The term bureaucrat, as used or quoted in this research, is totally innocent and must not be misinterpreted. There is no reference to any possible negative connotation and its use is only based on its original semantic accuracy.
- 27.
This situation must not be confused with the public expenditure problem related to state administration growth (Niskanen 1975, 2007). As Peters explains: “In his model, Niskanen argues that legislatures have little or no ability to control the bureaus, because of the monopoly of information held by those bureaus” (Peters 2010: 13). Peters illustrates the counterargument to Niskanen’s expenditure control loss: “This model of bureaucracy also seriously underestimates the capacity of the legislature to develop means for independent judgment” (Peters 2010: 14). Since this work deals with the state sovereignty problem rather than with state administrative efficiency, it is important to dwell on the fact that bureaucrats are not a priori trying to maximise their gains by eroding state sovereignty. In this respect, Niskanen’s models and rationales, with their critics and alternatives, are also well presented by Shepsle (2010: 407–444).
- 28.
For Majone, the problem of accountability in the competence transfer from the principal to the agent questions the legitimacy of supranational institutions, such as those of the EU: “Political principals create agencies, define their legal authority, objectives and decision-making procedures, appoint key personnel, and exercise budgetary control. They also monitor agency activities to offset information imbalances, and when such activities stray from the desired result, principals have the means to bring them back into line. In short, the key insight of agency theory is that control is to a large extent a question of good institutional design, while older theories viewed control as being exercised from one fixed point within a given institutional framework. As will be shown later on, this more dynamic, multi-dimensional view of control is highly relevant to the legitimacy and accountability problems of non-majoritarian institutions. It should be pointed out, however, that agency theory, which has its roots in the new economics of organisation, has not been used so far to deal with such normative issues. Indeed, the current popularity of the principal-agent model with political scientists may obscure some important differences between economic and political organisations. Thus, democratically accountable principals can transfer policy-making powers to non-majoritarian institutions, but they cannot transfer their own legitimacy. This loss of legitimacy can be an important, in some cases the most important, ‘agency cost’. The old doctrine opposing the delegation of policy-making powers to non-elected officials (delegata potestas non potest delegari) was concerned precisely with the loss of legitimacy entailed by delegation” (Majone 1999: 7).
- 29.
Moreover, Pierson (1996: 123) precisely refers to the EU integration process.
- 30.
“Consequently, top officials cannot expect to have the kind of monopoly of access to authoritative decision making that they were at least considered by some formerly to enjoy. In part the declining influence of top officials might be expected as a consequence of a growing policy role of the EU because much of the representation of national interests through national bureaucrats in Brussels and Strasbourg is channelled through middle ranking officials who tend to make up the intergovernmental bureaucratic committees that participate in EU policy making” (Page and Wright 2007: 9).
- 31.
“The argument that the European civil service represents bureaucratic ballast – a force for inertia and timid action which reduces the scope for political initiative – is also wide of the mark” (Page 1997: 161).
- 32.
Page considers EU bureaucracy as being very similar in this aspect to that of the USA’s. Pressures on bureaucracy and sovereign control are not exclusively international problems, but also a concern already present at the level of state administration (Page 1997).
- 33.
As Page recalls (1997), it must not be forgotten that the EU Commission has a sort of janus-faced nature looking at both the legislative and executive functions. This may eventually create additional confusion in terms of accountability. Other than both the survey power (through supervision as guardian of the Treaties) and legal representation, the EU Commission has other two powers; participation in EU decision-making (through proposals and recommendations) and EU policy implementation (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2005: 427–431).
- 34.
Jensen (2010: 75) refers to the EU supranational agenda.
- 35.
- 36.
Many political events such as the empty chair crisis and the subsequent Luxembourg compromise showed that the neo-functionalist ability to predict the EU regional integration developments was rather unsatisfactory. Many scholars pointed out the inadequacy of the neo-functionalist heuristic, and even Haas (1976), after having recognised the neo-functionalists limits, reduced the explicative ambitions of his integration theory. For a good interpretation of Haas’ self-criticism, Rosamond points out that “Haas’s intention was rather more subtle and the choice of the adjective ‘obsolescent’ rather than ‘obsolete’ was significant. […] Haas was categorically not saying that the study of integration has ceased to be relevant. Rather, he was signalling a turning point in the way in which phenomena such as the EC should be conceptualised” (Rosamond 2000: 88).
- 37.
- 38.
“Rather than simply adopting the traditional or classical model, many of those who sought to reuse neo-functionalist theory accepted it as a partial theory, that is, as a theory which would explain some but not all of the European integration process” (Jensen 2010: 82).
- 39.
- 40.
“Only the convinced ‘European’ possessed long-run positive expectations with respect to ECSC in 1950, and among the elites directly concerned with coal and steel there were few such persons. The crucial evolution of such expectations among the bulk of ECSC labour leaders – both Socialist and Christian – is one of the clearest demonstrations of the role of a combined social welfare-economic democracy ideology, looking for realisation through the medium of new central institutions. These groups […] are now in the vanguard of more integration […] because they see in supranational rules and organs the means to establish a regulated large-scale industrial economy permitting the development of permanent worker influence over industry. Thus a ‘spill-over’ into new economic and political sectors certainly occurred in terms of expectations developing purely in the national contexts of the elites involved” (Haas 2004: 291–292).
- 41.
“[…] the realist focus on sovereignty carries over into intergovernmentalist treatments of the EC. Most intergovernmentalist analyses suggest that the preferences of member-state governments are heavily weighted toward preserving sovereignty, […]. The issue is often posed in principal-agent terms (Garrett 1992). The principals (member-states) may delegate certain responsibilities to agents (international organizations), but only with the strictest oversight. The core calculation for member-states is whether the benefits of collective action outweigh any possible risk to autonomy. […]. The EC, he [ Moravcsik, A/N] adds, ‘has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which sets the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation. […] (Moravcsik 1991: 473)’. […] If the EC is an international regime in which member-state governments have carefully designed passive instruments to allow them to carry out collective goals, periods of ‘consolidation’ are of little interest” (Pierson 1996: 128–130 passim).
- 42.
Moravcsik uses the term consolidation that is plausibly taken as a very similar synonym of implementation.
- 43.
Lodge criticises the invisible loyalty transfer by pointing out that national communities are prevented from recognising the importance of international organisations activity because of the lack of popular direct perception and evident symbols (Lodge 1978).
- 44.
In line with the intrinsic advantage of the supranational delegation itself, sovereign states may also not be interested in costly efforts to keep omniscient and constant control over the developments of policies without profiting from the efficient use of the agents’ expertise.
- 45.
See Niemann (1998: 430–432) for a definition of these four kinds of spillover effect.
- 46.
See Niemann (2006: 37) also for the fifth kind of spillover effect.
- 47.
Burley and Mattli add: “This expansion will continue as long as those authorities do not collide with equally powerful countervailing interests. Alternatively, of course, one objective might conflict with another objective. Such limits define the parameters within which this ‘functionalist’ logic can work. In the construction of a community legal system, such limits were initially very few, and the functional logic was very strong” (Burley and Mattli 1993: 65).
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
“Understanding ECJ–government interactions in these game-theoretic terms sheds considerable light on the evolution of the European legal system. From this perspective, it is not at all surprising that Burley and Mattli can point to numerous court rulings against powerful member governments that the governments subsequently abide. Where the adversely affected domestic sectors are unimportant (as in Cassis) the court can further its interests by ruling against the government because it understands that the government is very likely ultimately to accept the decision. But where a powerful government has a strong vested interest in protecting a sector of its economy (as in Cinetheque), the court is much less likely to challenge an existing barrier to trade. And in such cases there is no reason for the involved government not to accept the decision. These cases may be less noteworthy for those looking for examples of the erosion of national sovereignty in Europe, but from a game- theoretic perspective they are just as important because they delineate the limits on ECJ power and the importance of national governments to legal integration” (Garrett 1995: 180).
- 51.
“Intergovernmentalism argues that integration is merely an institutionalization of close co-operation between Member States, who consciously give and take bits and pieces of their sovereignty (in areas of ‘low politics’) in order to improve the promotion of their national interests, including the protection of their sovereignty, in areas of ‘high politics’” (Aalberts 2004: 30).
- 52.
To this end, Marks et al. show how multi-level governance goes beyond the two level games: “Instead of the two level game assumptions adopted by state-centrists, MLG theorists posit a set of overarching, multi-level policy networks. The structure of political control is variable, not constant, across policy areas” (Marks et al. 1996: 41).
- 53.
MLG is mainly used to study European Union politics, but is also an important heuristic tool to understand “local government, federalism, […], international relations, and public policy” (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 241).
- 54.
Aalberts defines MLG as “a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies” (Aalberts 2004: 23).
- 55.
- 56.
This quotation particularly refers to the EU integration process thus applying to the research question of this book as discussed below.
- 57.
In particular, Haas enumerates three types of constructivism (systemic school; norms and cultures school; and soft rationalist school) and affirms that: “The verdict is clear: NF has a great deal in common with one type of Constructivism only (i.e. soft rationalism, Ed.), the type which remains unwilling to break completely with the utilitarian/individualistic tradition and insists on softening the anti-positivism of many constructivists by embracing the pragmatist epistemology” (Haas 2006: 443).
- 58.
See for instance the idea of a post-modern European state or c (Beck and Grande 2011).
- 59.
On the resilience of intergovernmentalism, see Pusterla (2014).
- 60.
See Aalberts’ interpretation stating that sovereignty does not disappear but shifts from one locus of authority to another prevailing one. However, it is far from obvious that these competing actors have the intention and desire to reclaim their sovereignty, since by doing so they would then be asked to match performative and constative. On the contrary, it is more likely that they cleverly exercise their authority without chasing the spectre of sovereignty and leaving states the responsibility to give credibility to their fiction of sovereignty. This is why it is certainly better to talk about the plurality of principals rather than of “sovereign/principals”. These competing principals do not look for sovereignty since aware of its costs. These principals may prefer to rule rather than claim sovereignty.
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Pusterla, E. (2016). Credibly (Re)claiming Sovereignty. In: The Credibility of Sovereignty – The Political Fiction of a Concept. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26318-2_4
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