Abstract
In several parts of his work Philip Pettit suggests a solution to the skeptical problem of rule-following. The hub of this solution is global response-dependence expressed via alleged a priori biconditionals. We scrutinize Pettit’s proposed solution by disclosing several unclarities and ambiguities in his formulation of the a priori response-dependent biconditionals. We argue that especially three aspects remain unclear: (a) What exactly is supposed to be a priori?, (b) What is the response-dependent biconditional supposed to connect?, (c) What does Pettit mean by apriority? Convincing answers to these questions are crucial for the final evaluation of Pettit’s solution.
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Notes
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Our example is, of course, Kripke’s famous example of “quus”: “So perhaps in the past I used ‘plus’ and ‘+’ to denote a function which I will call ‘quus’ and symbolize by ‘⊕’. It is defined by: x ⊕ y = x + y, if x,y < 57, [or: x ⊕ y = 5, if x,y ≥ 57]. Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’?” (Kripke (1982), 8f.).
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See also Wright (1980), 219–220.
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In response to our talk Pettit admitted that his account can be described to be a kind of mixture of these two classical accounts.
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“And I have argued that, if we are to make sense of thinking, in particular if we are to resolve Kripke’s version of the Wittgensteinian problem of rule-following, then we must acknowledge a global form of response-dependence.” (Pettit (2002c), 50).
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For a discussion of realism and response-dependence see also Norris (2005).
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“It does not say that something is red if and only if it looks red in conditions that ensure that red things look red; it says that something is red if and only if it answers in a certain way to the sensations and practices of those who use the concept.” (Pettit (2002c), 68).
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See also: “The claim that it is a priori that something is red just in case it is disposed to look red to normal observers in normal circumstances” (Pettit (1998), 56).
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“Under these accounts we do not think of the property of redness as a disposition, in the way that we think of fragility as a disposition, and yet the a priori linkage between redness and the disposition to produce certain sensations of redness is firmly established” (Pettit (1998), 56).
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Note that there is also another difference between the quotes: in the first one, Pettit speaks about a disposition to look red whereas in the second quote he talks about looks. We are not sure whether this makes any difference according to Pettit.
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There are some other quotes we do not really understand in Terms, Things and Response-dependence, e.g. the following one: “Constistently with ‘red’ referring to a mind-independent property, […] there will still be a question as to why that property gets to be identified as redness. And the answer to that question must be that given how we use the word ‘red’, it is a priori knowable that it will refer to a property that causes things to look red” (Pettit (1998), 62). Here, we have a priori knowledge not of a biconditional, but of some causal connection. We leave it to the reader to decide whether this is a new formulation of the biconditional or not.
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“It is a priori that something is red, in the canonical example, if and only if it is such as to look red in favorable conditions” (Pettit (2002a), 11); “On the account developed here being red is connected a priori with a certain response: looking red in favorable conditions […]” (ibid., 15).
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In the paper Response-Dependence without Tears that was also published in 2002 and co-authored with Frank Jackson, we seem to have the same incongruity. Thus, we find the following statement: “It may be a priori that something is denominably T, as we can put it, if and only if it is such as to seem T under independent, favorable specifications.” (Jackson and Pettit (2002a), 102). Here, we have an a priori connection between something being denominably t and something seeming T. On the same page, however, it is also referred to the “a priori connection between being and seeming, […] a connection that supposes denominability” (ibid.). Here, denominability is a condition for the connection between being and seeming. We think, as the title of our paper suggests, that we are far away from response-dependence without tears.
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Thus, we find the statement that “response-dependence fits well with realism, even with the cosmocentric aspect of realism” (Pettit (2002a), 14) and also the statement that “response-dependence entails a rejection of the realist cosmocentric thesis” (ibid., 17). We do not see how the same thesis can both fit well with as well as entail a rejection of the cosmocentric aspect of realism.
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See also Pettit’s characterization of a posteriori: “It must be connected to that inclination in an a posteriori fashion, so that it is a matter for empirical checking that the inclination leads a subject correctly or incorrectly” (CM, 95/96).
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See also: “And this will be a priori knowable, being knowable on the basis of considerations to do with how a basic term like ‘F’ is mastered and gains its meaning.” (JD, 249); “It is a priori knowable, it is knowable just in virtue of understanding how the referent of the concept is fixed.” (CM, 196). “But what the biconditional tells us is still plausibly a priori. Knowledge of the practices current among those who use the concept is sufficient to give knowledge of the truth of the proposition; we do not have to know in detail about which conditions actually pass the discounting test.” (Pettit (2002c), 68/69).
- 21.
See also Pettit (2002c), 69.
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Bahr, A., Seidel, M. (2016). Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals – A Sea of Tears?. In: Derpmann, S., Schweikard, D. (eds) Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_2
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