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Introduction

  • Tianyu WangEmail author
  • Lingyang Song
  • Walid Saad
  • Zhu Han
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)

Abstract

In this chapter, we formally introduce the notions of coalition formation games (CF games) and the extended overlapping coalition formation games (OCF games). In particular, we present the basic game models and stability notions. For OCF games, we show that computation of stable outcomes can generally be intractable, and thus, we identify several constraints that lead to tractable subclasses of OCF games, and provide efficient algorithms for solving games that fall under these subclasses.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tianyu Wang
    • 1
    Email author
  • Lingyang Song
    • 1
  • Walid Saad
    • 2
  • Zhu Han
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Electrical Engineering and Computer SciencePeking UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Wireless@VT, Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringVirginia TechBlacksburgUSA
  3. 3.Electrical and Computer Engineering DepartmentUniversity of HoustonHoustonUSA

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