Abstract
Khudra is a block cipher proposed in the SPACE’2014 conference, whose main design goal is to achieve suitability for the increasingly popular Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation. It is an 18-round lightweight cipher based on recursive Feistel structure, with a 64-bit block size and 80-bit key size. In this paper, we compute the minimum number of active F-functions in differential characteristics in the related-key setting, and give a more accurate measurement of the resistance of Khudra against related-key differential cryptanalysis. We construct a related-key boomerang quartet with probability \(2^{-48}\) for the 14-round Khudra, which is better than the highest probability related-key boomerang quartet of the 14-round Khudra of probability at most \(2^{-72}\) claimed by the designers. Then we propose a related-key rectangle attack on the 16-round Khudra without whitening key by constructing a related-key rectangle distinguisher for 12-round Khudra with a probability of \(2^{-23.82}\). The attack has time complexity of \(2^{78.68}\) memory accesses and data complexity of \(2^{57.82}\) chosen plaintexts, and requires only four related keys. This is the best known attack on the round-reduced Khudra.
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Ma, X., Qiao, K. (2015). Related-Key Rectangle Attack on Round-reduced Khudra Block Cipher. In: Qiu, M., Xu, S., Yung, M., Zhang, H. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9408. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25645-0_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25645-0_22
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