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Whistleblowing: National Report for France

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Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 16))

Abstract

Multinational companies implementing the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imported initially whistleblowing systems in France. At first, French public authorities were reluctant to welcome such systems as they recall the occupation time during the Second World War. Today, French law and authorities are less hostile to whistleblowing. In particular, three laws have been passed granting protection for whistleblowers in some specific areas (public health, environment, economic crimes).

French law has not only transposed the American whistleblowing model. Thus, first, the French authorities restricted indoor whistleblowing to a precise list of fields, which the legislator has extended little by little. French law also gave a new basis, which has completely changed the economy of those procedures. Indeed, basing the whistleblowing regulations on freedom of expression of the whistleblower, and not on internal control, opens the door to outdoor whistleblowing. There is no set hierarchy between both procedures. Consequently, the protection of whistleblowers lies in good faith, the non-abusive use of this freedom and the confidentiality of their identity. The restrictions which might be imposed on freedom of expression have to be strictly defined, as every exception to a principle of law. Besides, the French legislator brought an original protection by sanctioning discrimination in some case of whistleblowing. By doing so, the legislator defines different regimes according to the object of whistleblowing, making the applicable law more complex and less understandable. The originality of the French system also and most importantly comes from the protection granted to the accused person. Employers are dissuaded from implementing systems, which might facilitate denunciation. The accused person must also have access to the elements of the whistleblowing, which allows them to prepare their defence. Indeed, the French model is grounded on a sense of mistrust towards whistleblowing, which has brought public authorities to search for a balance between the protection of the whistleblower and the protection of the accused person.

As a false alert can raise a true panic, a false issue can provoke true complications (See G Lacroix, Les euphorismes de Grégoire (Paris, Max Milo, 2007))

The first part of this chapter was written by Morgan Sweeney the second by Katrin Deckert.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For instance, Statutory auditors, see C. com., art. L. 820-7 et L. 823-12.

  2. 2.

    See DF Thompson, ‘À la recherche d’une responsabilité du contrôle’, Revue française de science politique, 6/2008, p. 182.

  3. 3.

    For a critic see J Delgas, ‘De l’éthique d’entreprise et de son cynisme’, D. 2004, p. 3126.

  4. 4.

    National Commission on Computer Technology and Freedom (CNIL) has defined whistleblowing as “a scheme, complementing existing alert system, to encourage employees from the private or the public sector to report unethical or unlawfull behaviour and designed to monitor the alert”; See CNIL’s deliberation n° 2005-305 adopted on 8 December 2005 relating to automatic authorization for data processing in a whistleblowing system. The most current definition of whistleblowing is: “The disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action”, See F de Bry, ‘Salariés courageux oui, mais héros ou délateurs? Du Whistleblowing à l’alerte éthique’, Revue internationale de psychosociologie et de gestion des comportements organisationnels, 34/2008, vol. XIV, p. 298.

  5. 5.

    Some whistleblowing systems are opened to subcontractors and occasional collaborators.

  6. 6.

    In France, Philippe Pichon, a police officer has revealed in a book the unlawfulness usage of the offense processing system (STIC). He has been sanctioned after he published his book. In France, Doctor Irène Frachon, revealed the mediator scandal against the Servier pharmaceutical labatory.

  7. 7.

    See F. Chateauraynaud et D Torny, Les sombres précurseurs: une sociologie pragmatique de l’alerte et du risque, (Paris, éditions de l’EHESS, 1999).

  8. 8.

    See D Lochak, ‘La dénonciation, stade suprême ou perversion de la démocratie’, in L’État de droit: Mélanges en lhonneur de Guy Braibant (Paris, Dalloz, 1996), p. 451.

  9. 9.

    Résolution 1729, §1, Protection of whistleblowers, 2010. This definition is wider than the Cnil’s. The CNIL do only recognise systems put in place by employers open to their employees. The NGO Transparence-International France grants another definition: “It is the action taken by an individual who witnessed during his professional activity an unlawful act and who civic minded decide to report it to the authorities in order to put an end to it”; see “Déclencher l’alerte – Un dispositif de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption”, Présentation du rapport 2004 sur le whistleblowing, La lettre de Transparence, oct. 2004, p. 7. More recently, before Parliamentary debate, another definition has been given: “an individual or a group of personns who seek to make known the seriousness of a threat against the majority opinion”; see rapport AN, n° 650, relatif à l’indépendance de l’expertise en matière de santé et d’environnement et à la protection des lanceurs d’alerte, par J.-L. ROUMEGAS, 23 janv. 2013, p. 8.

  10. 10.

    This study is focusing on private sector employees. The public sector employees do have a mandatory obligation to report any criminal offence to the public prosecutor.

  11. 11.

    For studies in labour law, see O Leclerc, ‘La protection du salarié lanceur d’alerte’, in E Dockés (dir.), Au cœur des combats juridiques (Paris, LGDJ, 2007), p. 287. In favor of whistleblowing, PH Antonmattei et P Vivien, Chartes éthiques, alerte professionnelle et droit du travail français: état des lieux et perspectives (Rapport – La documentation française, 2007).

  12. 12.

    For a critical point of view on public servants situation, see JPh Foegle et A Slama, ‘Refus de transmission d’une QPC sur la protection des fonctionnaires lanceurs d’alerte’, La Revue des droits de lhomme, Actualités Droits- Libertés, mis en ligne le 14 mars 2014, available at www.revdh.revues.org/628.

  13. 13.

    The Sarbanes-Oxley Act had been adopted on 31 July 2002. However, the legislator formerly passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Bill text 101st Congress (1989–1990).

  14. 14.

    At New York.

  15. 15.

    ENRON was the energy trading number 1 and the seventh biggest company in the USA. Worldcom was a telecommunication company gone bankrupt after revelation on accounting discrepancies.

  16. 16.

    See F Barrière, ‘Le Whistleblowing – à propos de l’arrêt du 8 décembre 2009 de la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation’, Rev. soc., 2010, p. 483.

  17. 17.

    See below.

  18. 18.

    See FG Trébulle, ‘L’efficacité comparée du droit et de l’obligation de dénoncer en droit du travail et de l’environnement’ in M. Behar-Touchais (dir.), La dénonciation en droit privé (Paris, Économica, 2010), p. 31.

  19. 19.

    Some authors do refer to « shared social values », see V Rebeyrol, ‘La réception du « whistleblowing » par le droit français’, JCP E n° 24, 14 juin 2012, 1386, p. 32.

  20. 20.

    Art. L. 2313-2 of the Labour Code.

  21. 21.

    Art. L. 2323-78 of the Labour Code.

  22. 22.

    Art. L. 4132-2 of the Labour Code.

  23. 23.

    Art. L. 1121-1 of the Labour Code. As speech is free, using whistleblowing scheme should not be mandatory for employees.

  24. 24.

    CNIL’s deliberation n° 2005-305 adopted on 8 December 2005 relating to automatic authorization for data processing in a whistleblowing system. This deliberation has been modified by both deliberations n° 2010-369 adopted on 14 October 2010 and n° 2014-042 adopted on 30 January 2014.

  25. 25.

    Today, thanks to the different Acts of Parliament passed recently, whistleblowing system are now authorized in the fields of non-discrimination, anti-competitive practices, environment protection, health and safety at work.

  26. 26.

    Art. 2 of Deliberation no. 2005-305.

  27. 27.

    The whistleblower can be rewarded (generally in due proportion of the amount of the avoided sanction). Obviously the whistleblower must reveal his identity to be rewarded.

  28. 28.

    See also TGI Libourne, 15 September 2005 (BSN Glasspack), Comm. com. électr.2005, comm. 191, note A. LEPAGE ; Comm. com. électr. 2005, comm. 194, note E. A.CAPRIOLLI. TGI Nanterre, 27 déc. 2006 (Dupont de Nemours): SSL, 15 January 2007, n° 1290.

  29. 29.

    TGI de Caen, court’s order on 5 November 2009 (Comité d’Entreprise Benoist Girard et autres/Benoist Girard). The judges did consider the whistleblowing to be void as the whistleblower identification was not requested.

  30. 30.

    D Danet, ‘Misère de la corporate governance’, RIDE, 4/2009, p. 407, et spéc. p. 428.

  31. 31.

    See CNIL’s orientation guide issued on 10 November 2005 (modified in August 2004) on whistleblowing systems and data protections.

  32. 32.

    See Art. 2 and 10 of CNIL’s Deliberation no. 2005-305 above-cited. Confidentiality is a legislative requirement coming from art. 39 the Data protection Act no. 78-17 issued on 6 January 1978. Such protection should encourage and reassure whistleblowers, see F Barrière, ‘Du contrôle interne à la dénonciation rémunérée?’, JCP E n° 27, 7 July 2011, 1527, n° 19.

  33. 33.

    Art. 9 of the CNIL’s guidance no. 2010-369 issued on 14 October 2010.

  34. 34.

    Art. 10 of the CNIL’s guidance no. 2010-369 issued on 14 October 2010.

  35. 35.

    See part 2.

  36. 36.

    See part 2.

  37. 37.

    See the law enacted on 11 October 2013 « relative à la transparence financière » (financial transparency), which is the continuation of the previous law enacted on 13 nov. 2007 « relative à la lutte contre la corruption » (fight against corruption).

  38. 38.

    See the law enacted on 16 April 2013 « relative à l’indépendance de l’expertise en matière de santé et d’environnement et à la protection des lanceurs d’alerte » (for health and environnement Independent expertise and whistleblower’s protection). In matter of environment, a former Act already set up an alert, but it could be activated only by some public authorities and environmental NGOs.

  39. 39.

    Conditions for processing whistleblowing will be set by government regulation.

  40. 40.

    This « droit de suite » working like the workers’ delegates process. However, whistleblowers seem to have a less strong « droit de suite »: The employer has the obligation to keep the whistleblower informed, not to respond to his concerns.

  41. 41.

    For instance the national agency for medical safety of drugs (Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé (ANSM had been put in place by the law enacted on 29 december 2011 « relative au renforcement de la sécurité sanitaire du médicament et des produits de santé » (drugs safety reinforcement).

  42. 42.

    See Art. 1.

  43. 43.

    See M Bacache, ‘L’alerte: un instrument de prévention des risques sanitaires et environnementaux ’, RTD civ. 2013, p. 689.

  44. 44.

    See Art. 53 of the law enacted on 3 August 2009 « de programmation relative à la mise en oeuvre du Grenelle de l’environnement » (known as the program Law on implementation of the « Grenelle » environnement Round table).

  45. 45.

    See the law enacted on 11 October 2013, « relative à la transparence de la vie publique (transparency in public life) the one enacted on 6 December 2013, « relative à la lutte contre la fraude fiscale et la grande délinquance économique et financière » (fight against tax evasion and serious economic and financial crime).

  46. 46.

    See Art. 25.

  47. 47.

    See Cass. soc., 14 December 1999, no. 97-41.995.

  48. 48.

    That was the case in Pierre case law (see above). The French judiciary Supreme Court also stated that an employee can respond to an open letter send to all personnel by the employer to respond to his alleged involvement in the company’s malfunction (Cass. soc., 22 June 2004).

  49. 49.

    See Cass. soc., 26 October 2005, no. 03-41.796.

  50. 50.

    In some situations, employees do enjoy immunity. For instance, according to article L. 313-24 of the social work and family Code a social-healthcare institution employee can denounce any abuse without risking any sanction.

  51. 51.

    See Cass. soc., 28 April 2011, no. 10-30.107. The employee can express himself/herself with a sarcastic or humours’ tone, see Cass. soc., 2 February 2011, no. 09-69.351.

  52. 52.

    See Cass. soc., 14 March 2000, no. 97-43.268.

  53. 53.

    Except abuse, or secret and confidentiality infringement.

  54. 54.

    See Cass. soc., 2 March 2011, no. 09-68.890.

  55. 55.

    Above mentioned.

  56. 56.

    Art. 1.

  57. 57.

    For instance, the whistleblower can send an e-mail both to his/her employer and to the competent authority.

  58. 58.

    See Art. 25.

  59. 59.

    A unique registry might have been more efficient, see A Laude, ‘Science et démocratie : garantir un juste équilibre. – À propos de la loi du 16 avril 2013’ (10 June 2013), JCP G, doctr. 690.

  60. 60.

    Therefore the whistleblower’s protection falls into journalist’s sources protection, see ECHR, M. et a. c. France, 12 April 2012, no. 30002/08. As long as the piece of information revealed falls in the public interest, the journalist’s source is protected. For instance, it is forbidden to search for the public servant’s identity who revealed the content of a regional audit chamber report.

  61. 61.

    See Art. 20.

  62. 62.

    See the report « Pour un renouveau démocratique : rapport de la Commission de rénovation et de déontologie de la vie publique » (nov. 2012) – commission dite « Jospin » – recommandait pourtant l’instauration d’une alerte éthique de tout citoyen à destination des déontologues des institutions et administrations (proposition n°35).

  63. 63.

    See V Rebeyrol, ‘La réception du « whistleblowing » par le droit français’ (14 June 2012), JCP E no. 24, 1386, no. 20.

  64. 64.

    See Cnil, Policy paper issued on 10 November 2005 for the implementation of whistleblowing procedure complying with Act no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties. See also M Bacache, ‘L’alerte : un instrument de prévention des risques sanitaires et environnementaux’ (2013), RTD civ., p. 689.

  65. 65.

    See above.

  66. 66.

    Art. L. 1121-1 of the Labour Code.

  67. 67.

    See above, the Clavaud case (Cass. soc., 28 April 1988).

  68. 68.

    See above.

  69. 69.

    See O Leclerc, ‘Sur la validité des clauses de confidentialité en droit du travail’ (2005), Dr. soc, p. 173. When a whistleblowing procedure is implemented in a corporation, it must be agreed that the person in charge of the procedure may receive any type of information (secret, confidential or not), himself/herself not being compelled to respect the confidentiality or secrecy of those information.

  70. 70.

    Art. L. 1227-1 of the Labour Code.

  71. 71.

    The judiciary Supreme Court deducts an obligation of discretion for the employee, see Cass. soc., 25 March 1981, no. 79-40.976.

  72. 72.

    On an employee’s right to not abide by an illegal order, see, eg., Cass. soc., 6 April 2004, no. 01-45.227.

  73. 73.

    See Cass. soc., 20 November 2013, no. 10-28.582.

  74. 74.

    See B Ines, ‘Clause de confidentialité : tiers privé d’un moyen d’assurer sa défense’ (10 Dec 2013), Dalloz Actualité (www.dalloz-actualite.fr).

  75. 75.

    A right now affirmed by the Fist Civil Chamber of the judiciary Supreme Court in a decision rendered on the basis of Art. 9 of the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code and Art. 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “by deciding as it did, without determining whether the production of evidence in cause was indispensable to the exercise of his/her right to evidence, and proportional to the antinomies rights in presence, the Court of Appeal’s decision lacks legal basis”, see Cass. civ. 1re, 5 April 2012, no. 11-14.177.

  76. 76.

    Articles L. 1132-3 and L. 1153-3 of the Labour Code.

  77. 77.

    Article L. 1161-1 of the Labour Code.

  78. 78.

    Cass. soc., 29 October 2013, no. 12-22.447.

  79. 79.

    It might have been possible to base the employees’ whistleblowing on their duty of loyalty toward their employer. In this regard, it might have been possible to implement a compulsory whistleblowing, as soon as the employee gains knowledge of the information. If the employee does not exercise whistleblowing, he/she would be guilty and might be sanctioned. However, it seems more reasonable, and pragmatic, to base whistleblowing on freedom of expression, which as a fundamental liberty is above the contractual parties’ duty of loyalty.

  80. 80.

    We do not study here the specific duties of public agents. Some authors plead for a real duty to denounce any infringement in some economy sectors, see, eg., A Maurel, ‘Le devoir d’alerte des chercheurs’ in C Byk (dir.), Les scientifiques doivent-ils être responsables ? Fondements, enjeux et évolution normative (Bordeaux, Les Éditions hospitalières, 2013), p. 47. This obligation might, besides, come from a duty of vigilance, as recognized by the Conseil constitutionnel, on the basis of Art. 1 and 4 of the Chart, in a decision rendered on 8 April 2011: “Everyone has a duty of vigilance towards damages affecting the environment which may be a foreseeable consequence of one’s activity”, see Cons. const., 8 April 2011, no. 2011-116 QPC.

  81. 81.

    There is a permissible doubt on whistleblowing in the field of public health and environment. The law enacted on April 16, 2014 seems to compel the employee to alert the employer. On the interpretation of Art. L. 4133-1 of the Labour Code, see above.

  82. 82.

    Cass. soc. 15 December 2009, no. 07-44.264.

  83. 83.

    Cass. soc., 21 September 2011, no. 09-72.054.

  84. 84.

    Cass. soc., 29 April 2009, no. 07-44.798.

  85. 85.

    See eg. Cass. soc., 6 March 2012, no. 10-20.983.

  86. 86.

    See esp., A Laude, ‘Science et démocratie : garantir un juste équilibre. – À propos de la loi du 16 avril 2013’ (10 June 2013) JCP E n° 24, doct. 690, no. 19; L Gamet, ‘Éclairage – Le salarié lanceur d’alerte’ (June 2013), BJS, no. 6, 198, p. 378, esp. p. 379.

  87. 87.

    Cass. soc., 10 March 2009, no. 07-44.092 ; Cass. soc., 27 October 2010, no. 08-44.446.

  88. 88.

    Cass. soc., 7 February 2012, no. 10-18.035.

  89. 89.

    If the author is not an employee, such behaviour can constitute a breach of contract. The employee’s civil liability may only be incurred in case of wilful misconduct.

  90. 90.

    Cass. soc., 12 June 2006, no. 10-28.345.

  91. 91.

    See, eg., CA Paris, 13 March 2013, no. 12/03679, in which the Court decided that the whistleblower did not abuse of his/her freedom of expression, but on the contrary, acted in the corporation’s interests by signalling an attempted corruption.

  92. 92.

    Injurious denunciation is punished by a 6 months’ imprisonment and a 75,000 euros fine, see Art. 226-10, subpara. 1 of the Penal Code.

  93. 93.

    ECHR, Guja c. Moldova, 12 February 2008, no. 14277/04.

  94. 94.

    Section 70 of the decision.

  95. 95.

    The Court seems to encompass all the employees and not only the public agents.

  96. 96.

    Section 73 of the decision.

  97. 97.

    Sections 73–79.

  98. 98.

    ECHR, Mor v France, 15 December 2011, no. 28198/09; see also L Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘Actualité de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (juillet-décembre 2011)’ (2012) AJDA, chron. p. 143; S Lavric (2012), D. obs. p. 667; ibid; T Wickers (2013), D. obs. p. 136; C Porteron (2012), AJ pénal, note p. 337; J-P Marguénaud (2012), RSC, obs. p. 260 ; B Pastre-Belda (2012), JCP G, p. 26.

  99. 99.

    ECHR, Tanasoaica c. Roumanie, 19 June 2012, no. 3490/03. See also FG Trébulle, D. 2012, obs. p. 2557.

  100. 100.

    See esp. section 50 of the decision.

  101. 101.

    Now codified in Art. L. 1161-1 of the Labour Code.

  102. 102.

    Non-discrimination in the field of public health and environment was codified in Art. L. 1351-1 of the Labour Code, see A. Laude, ‘Science et démocratie : garantir un juste équilibre. À propos de la loi du 16 avril 2013’ (10 June 2013), JCP E n° 24, doct. 690, no. 19. In the field of economic and financial misdemeanours, non-discrimination was codified in Art. L. 1132-3-2 of the Labour Code. In the field of conflict of interest, non-discrimination was not codified.

  103. 103.

    The definition of non-discrimination is the same in all the four studied laws. Thus, we will study them together.

  104. 104.

    However, it seems that the employer may take into account the whistleblowing for any measure favourable to the employee. A whistleblower could be promoted in consideration of the whistleblowing – which demonstrates a concern for the corporation’s interests.

  105. 105.

    The protection is extended to interns, applicants for jobs and trainees.

  106. 106.

    In consequences, in the field of dismissal for example, there is a right to the reintegration of the employee in the corporation, and the employer cannot oppose to this measure.

  107. 107.

    See above. In the law enacted on 11 October 2013, contrary to the two others, the legislator deemed useful to remind that “any person who talks or testifies about facts linked a conflict of interest […] in bad faith or with the intention to harm or with an at least partial knowledge that the disclosed facts are not accurate is punished by the sanctions provided in Art. 226-10, subpara. 1 of the Penal Code”- the misdemeanour of injurious denunciation.

  108. 108.

    Such proof might be difficult to establish in case of an indoor whistleblowing: The information is received through a procedure established by the employer; hence the employer has all the material means of communication of the whistleblowing[…] The employer, if he/she is sued for discrimination toward the whistleblower, will be unwilling to communicate such elements.

  109. 109.

    The judge might also order any investigation deemed useful to form his/her opinion.

  110. 110.

    Guidance no. 1/99 on the level of protection of personal data in the United States and the on-going discussions between the European Commission and the American government, adopted by the Group 29 – an European, independent advisory committee on the protection of data and private life – on January 26, 1999, confirmed the CNIL’s position, estimating that “far from deterring” whistleblowing mechanisms, Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data contributed to their good functioning, by giving a framework and reducing the risks.

  111. 111.

    See above.

  112. 112.

    In some situations, the accused person is even obliged to respond to it. It is the case when an institution representing the employees exercises its whistleblowing right, see above.

  113. 113.

    A more detailed study see L Flament, ‘Comment mettre en place un dispositif d’alerte professionnelle ?’ (26 March 2013) JCP S, 1133.

  114. 114.

    All of those measures must be applied loyally.

  115. 115.

    The European Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must also be respected. The European Commission currently works on a project reforming the protection of personal data that should lead to a Regulation which would replace the 1995 Directive: European Commission, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World. A European Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century”, Communication (COM(2012) 9 final), 25 January 2012.

  116. 116.

    Art. 9 of the CNIL Deliberation, above-cited, taken in application of Art. 6 and 32 of the Act no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties.

  117. 117.

    The above-cited law gives to the person the right to oppose to the processing of the data, if he/she invokes a legitimate motive. Such right is difficult to apply in the case of a whistleblowing: the accused person is normally not present when the whistleblowing is submitted and thus cannot exercise this right.

  118. 118.

    In accordance with Art. 39 and 40 of the Act no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties.

  119. 119.

    Art. 10 of the above-cited CNIL Deliberation, and Art. 2 of Deliberation no. 2005-305 above-cited, as modified by Deliberation no. 2014-042 from January 30, 2014.

  120. 120.

    See Art. 10 of Deliberation no. 2005-305 above-cited.

  121. 121.

    Art. 6 of the above-cited Deliberation.

  122. 122.

    CNIL, Deliberation no. 2005-11 adopted on 26 May 2005 on the approval of the Compagnie européenne d’accumulateurs towards the implementation of an “ethic guideline”, and Deliberation no. 2005-110 adopted on 26 May 2005, on the application of approval of McDonald’s France for the implementation of a professional integrity system.

  123. 123.

    In order to conform itself to the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the McDonald’s group wanted to implement, in its French subsidiary, a professional integrity system which would allow French employees of the group to alert the American mother company about behaviours “allegedly infringing on French legal rules and on the code of ethics”. The American company Exide Technologies, as for it, wanted to implement in its European subsidiary, the Compagnie européenne d’accumulateurs (CEAC), a “hotline” for its employees. This procedure would have allowed employees of the group to “communicate with the audit committee of the board of directors of Exide Technologies about such topics as inaccuracies in the budget that might be encountered”, and to alert directors of the group on alleged violations of the rules of the corporations or the enforceable laws. In both cases, the whistleblower had the choice to remain anonymous or to disclose his/her identity; he/she had to reveal the identity of the accused person and indicate the nature of the allegations. Those data were processed in a central report under the responsibility of the director in charge of ethics in the group, confidentially communicated to the director of the legal department of the group and sent to the accurate service, depending on the type of allegation made. This service was then to make the decision of whether to investigate, and if so, the investigation would take place under the control of the French director of the legal department. Exide Technologies’ procedure also provided that any employee concerned by the whistleblowing would be informed “as soon as possible of the allegations against him, so that he is able to defend himself”.

  124. 124.

    Art. 226-20 of the Penal Code.

  125. 125.

    Art. 6 of the above-cited deliberation, as modified by Deliberation no. 2010-369 adopted on 14 October 2010.

  126. 126.

    Cons. const., 29 December 1989, no. 89-268.

  127. 127.

    See eg. PH Coppens and J Lenoble (dir.), Démocratie et procéduralisation du droit (Bruxelles, Bruylant, Coppens and Lenoble J dir. 2001).

  128. 128.

    Pursuant to Art. L. 1321-2 of the Labour Code. The whistleblowing procedure, which might lead to a disciplinary sanction, falls into the scope of internal rules. Its implementation thus involves a consultation of the work council, a communication to the Labour inspector and to the secretariat of the Labour tribunal, and to display it in the corporation’s offices.

  129. 129.

    ibid.

  130. 130.

    Above-cited.

  131. 131.

    L Gamet, ‘Le whistleblowing (ou le salarié mouchard)’ (2006) BJS, p. 307.

  132. 132.

    D Danet, ‘Misère de la corporate governance’ (2009) RIDE, p. 407.

  133. 133.

    Above-cited.

  134. 134.

    In accordance with Art. 6 of the Act no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties.

  135. 135.

    The employee may be assisted by another employee of the corporation.

  136. 136.

    The requirement of justification appears with the employer’s decision after the interview.

  137. 137.

    See also V Rebeyrol, ‘La réception du « whistleblowing » par le droit français’ (14 June 2012) JCP E 1386.

  138. 138.

    Except within the 16 April 2013 Act (possibly) and the whistleblowing by institutions representing employees, see above.

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Deckert, K., Sweeney, M. (2016). Whistleblowing: National Report for France. In: Thüsing, G., Forst, G. (eds) Whistleblowing - A Comparative Study. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25577-4_6

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