Cyber Security and Confidentiality Concerns with Implants

  • Vinod Kumar Khanna


Many lifesaving implantable devices are equipped with wireless technology. This technology enables remote device checks and relieves patients from recurrent consultant visits. But this convenience is associated with unforeseen hazards. These hazards are the security and privacy of data. The labor needed to defend patients from exploits of stealing or nastiness gains more significance. This is especially so with increasing use of wireless telecommunication facilities and the services of global computer network or Internet by implanted devices. The susceptibilities of medical devices are of two types, viz., control or privacy susceptibilities. In control susceptibilities, an unauthorized person acquires control of device operation. The unlicensed person reprograms the device without the patients’ knowledge to disable its therapeutic services. In privacy susceptibilities, confidential patient data are disclosed to an unsanctioned party. Both vulnerabilities are detrimental to patient’s health outcome. Both are avoidable by incorporating well-thought-out measures in device design.


Security Confidentiality Privacy Encryption Cryptography Jamming Hijacking Insulin pump ICD Biosensor Shield 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vinod Kumar Khanna
    • 1
  1. 1.CSIR-Central Electronics Engineering Research InstitutePilaniIndia

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