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The Challenge of a Historical Epistemology of Space

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Historical Epistemology of Space

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in History of Science and Technology ((BRIEFSHIST))

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Abstract

The chapter introduces the program of a historical epistemology of space and discusses the relation of the historical development of knowledge to its phylogenetic and ontogenetic developments. The chapter further provides an overview on the remaining chapters of the book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For Plato , see, for instance, the discussion on geometry in Politeia, 526c 9–527c 11. A prominent rationalistic treatment of space is found in René Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy , Part 2, in particular §§ 8–21 (Descartes 1644, 37–44; for an English translation, see Descartes 1984, 42–49). An example of the division of spatial knowledge into an a priori and an experiential part from the early twentieth century is Carnap (1922, 62–67), who distinguishes formal, intuitive, and physical space, of which only the first is completely independent of experience; at the same time Carnap argues that the cognitive structure given by a topological space of infinitely many dimensions is the precondition for any kind of spatial experience. For a constructivist argument about the a priori nature of Euclidean space, see, for instance, Lorenzen (1984 ) , who wants to show “how the Euclidean theorems are to be proven in Plato’s sense solely from definitions and postulates (as fundamental constructions).” (“[...] wie die euklidischen Theoreme im Sinne Platons allein aus Definitionen und Postulaten (als Grundkonstruktionen) zu beweisen sind,” Lorenzen 1984, 15, English translation M.S.)

  2. 2.

    See Kant’s Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space in his Critique of Pure Reason, B 41–42 (Kant 1998, 69–70).

  3. 3.

    Kant (1997).

  4. 4.

    See Lorenz (1977) for a classic work on evolutionary epistemology and Vollmer (1994) for a concise overview.

  5. 5.

    See Piaget (1970) and other works by Piaget cited in this book.

  6. 6.

    ‘Institutions’ are here understood in the most general sense as social patterns structuring and controlling collective actions.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Damerow (1996, 371–381). Accounts of historical epistemology as the term is understood here include, among others, Damerow (2007) and Renn (2004, 2005).

  8. 8.

    Related studies are Damerow (2007) concerning the concept of number, and Dux (1992) and Elias (1988) concerning the concept of time. A programmatic outline of a historical epistemology of perception is Wartofsky (1979). For long-term histories of concepts of space in science and philosophy, see Gent (1971), Jammer (1954), and Gosztonyi (1976).

  9. 9.

    See, for instance, Schurig (1976, in particular 164–214), for a discussion of the coevolution of anatomy and culture in anthropogenesis . For a more recent account and further references to the literature, see Odling-Smee et al. (2003, 239–281) who discuss coevolution from the perspective of niche construction.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Damerow (1994, 312).

  11. 11.

    We may speak of development whenever change produces circumstances that serve as a necessary precondition for specific further changes. To deny historical development of cognition would mean to deny the dependency of cognition on its earlier forms and thus, ultimately, to deny its dependency on society and culture. But, as shall be argued in this book, this dependency is what distinguishes human cognition from animal intelligence. Its denial would mean to assume naively that any thought and insight was possible at any time in history. The idea of the historical development of cognition should not be taken as implying value-judgements, of course. The outright identification of developmental approaches with value-judgements reveals an (often unconscious) ethnocentrism, since it uncritically presupposes that ‘our modern’ modes of thinking are per se valued higher.

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Schemmel, M. (2016). The Challenge of a Historical Epistemology of Space. In: Historical Epistemology of Space. SpringerBriefs in History of Science and Technology. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25241-4_1

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