Abstract
The enforcement of rights is a critical requirement of privacy law. Absent actual enforcement, there is little meaningful incentive for companies to comply with privacy requirements. Enforcement also helps to ensure that the individuals whose privacy is placed at risk are fairly compensated. In matters involving a large number of consumers, providing a remedy to all users affected by a company’s practice is difficult and often times inefficient. For this reason, courts in the US provide for “class action litigation”, lawsuits brought on behalf of a large number of individuals in similar circumstances. The theory is that it is more efficient to merge all of the individual suits that might otherwise be brought. But class action litigation has its own shortcomings. Attorneys who represent the class members frequently settle these cases with the companies and agree to terms that provide benefits to the company, such as eliminating the possibility of all future lawsuits, and sacrifice the benefits that the individuals who they purport to represent might otherwise achieve. US courts are sensitive to the problem of collusion between the lawyers in class action settlements and have increasingly scrutinised these agreements to ensure that the settlements protect the interests of class members and are consistent with the purposes for which the lawsuit was brought. In the area of consumer privacy, the problem is particularly serious with class action attorneys increasingly trading the privacy rights of Internet users for their own private benefit. As a consequence, US consumer privacy organisations are challenging the settlements and turning to the Federal Trade Commission and others to block their adoption. In this article, the authors recommend that the US courts continue to closely scrutinise these agreements for fairness to the class members. Regarding the allocation of funds from such settlements, the authors propose that courts adopt objective criteria to ensure that the monies will be distributed for purposes that serve the interests of the class and are consistent with the reason for the litigation. The authors contend that these factors are the fundamental requirements for cy pres allocations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See generally Data Breach FAQ: https://corporate.target.com/about/shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ
- 2.
Harris, Elizabeth, et al. “A Sneaky Path into Target Customers’ Wallets”, The New York Times, 18 Jan 2014b
- 3.
Harris, Elizabeth, and Nicole Perlroth, “For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow”, The New York Times, 11 Jan 2014a
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
Reuters, “Neiman Marcus data breach occurred as far back as July”, published in The Chicago Tribune, 17 Jan 2014 http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-17/business/chi-neiman-marcus-data-breach-occurred-as-far-back-as-july-20140117_1_cyber-attack-neiman-marcus-ginger-reeder
- 6.
Roberts, Jeff John, “Target hit with dozens of lawsuits over mass data breach”, GigaOm, 27 Dec 2013b http://gigaom.com/2013/12/27/target-hit-with-dozens-of-lawsuits-over-mass-data-breach/
- 7.
Schectman, Joel, “Target Faces Nearly 70 Lawsuits Over Breach”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 Jan 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/15/target-faces-nearly-70-lawsuits-overbreach/
- 8.
Cy pres is a corruption of the French si près (so near).
- 9.
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8–9 (2013).
- 10.
A recent news report indicates that Germany will soon allow consumer organisations to bring claims for violations of the national data protection law. Privacy Laws and Business, “German Consumer Protection Organizations to be Empowered to Sue Businesses for Data Protection Law Violations”, 14 Feb 2014. www.bitkom.org/de/presse/8477_78620.aspx (in German, announcing the draft law) www.vzbv.de/12880.htm (in German, the VZBW’s 13 February 2014 statement welcoming of the Minister of Justice’s announcement of 11 Feb 2013).
- 11.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
- 12.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
- 13.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
- 14.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
- 15.
Geraghty, 445 U.S., pp. 402–03; see also Re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The rule thus represents a measured response to the issues of how the due process rights of absentee interests can be protected and how absentees’ represented status can be reconciled with a litigation system premised on traditional bipolar litigation.”).
- 16.
See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997)); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2013); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (“It is important to remember that the class action device exists primarily, if not solely, to achieve a measure of judicial economy, which benefits the parties as well as the entire judicial system. It preserves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be litigated in an efficient, expedited, and manageable fashion.”).
- 17.
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If every small claim had to be litigated separately, the vindication of small claims would be rare. The fixed costs of litigation make it impossible to litigate a $50 claim (our guess; there is no evidence of what the average claim of a member of the plaintiff’s class in this case might be worth) at a cost that would not exceed the value of the claim by many times.”); Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 23(b)(3) was designed for situations such as this, in which the potential recovery is too slight to support individual suits, but injury is substantial in the aggregate.”).
- 18.
See Re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (referring to economies of scale available through the class actions device).
- 19.
Rotenberg, Marc, “Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy”, Stanford Technology Law Review, February 2001. http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf
- 20.
US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens , Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems , Washington, DC, 1973. http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/
- 21.
Ibid., p. 41.
- 22.
See, e.g., The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, 2012; Federal Trade Commission (FTC) , Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change:Recommendations for businesses and policymakers, March 2012. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/PrivacyReport_FINAL.pdf
- 23.
5 U.S.C. § 552.
- 24.
15 U.S.C. § 1681.
- 25.
18 U.S.C. § 2510.
- 26.
18 U.S.C. § 2710.
- 27.
18 U.S.C. § 2721.
- 28.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (“(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or (B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (setting damages as “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.”).
- 29.
131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
- 30.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct, p. 1744.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
Ibid., pp. 1745–46.
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
According to Wikipedia, a clickwrap agreement (also known as a “clickthrough” agreement or clickwrap licence) is a common type of agreement often used in connection with software licences. A browsewrap agreement refers to a contract or licence agreement on access to or use of materials on a website or downloadable product.
- 35.
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
- 36.
- 37.
Ibid.
- 38.
Ibid. at *2.
- 39.
Ibid. at *1.
- 40.
Ibid. at *3.
- 41.
Re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 317 (2d Cir. 2009).
- 42.
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
- 43.
Ibid., p. 2311.
- 44.
Ibid., p. 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
- 45.
See Koniak, Susan P., and George M. Cohen, “Under Cloak of Settlement”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1996, pp. 1051, 1054 (describing “class lawyers in the GM Truck, who negotiated a settlement in which the lawyers would receive $9.5 million in fees, while their clients were to get coupons to buy another GM Truck” and “class lawyers in the Ford Bronco II case, who requested $4 million in fees for negotiating a settlement in which their clients were to receive a warning sticker, a safe driving videotape, a road atlas, an owner’s manual, a flashlight and a free vehicle inspection (but not free vehicle repairs) as compensation for having purchased a vehicle that allegedly was prone to roll over”); Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1984) rev’d, 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (“When attorney’s fees are negotiated as part of a class action settlement, a conflict frequently exists between the class lawyers’ interest in compensation and the class members’ interest in relief.”).
- 46.
Hay, Bruce, and David Rosenberg, “‘Sweetheart’ and ‘Blackmail’ Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy”, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 75, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 1377–1408.
- 47.
See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[i]t is well settled that a class action judgment is binding on all class members” provided that “absent members were ‘in fact’ adequately represented by parties who are present”).
- 48.
Grimmelmann, James, “Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 91, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 387–474. http://www.nclawreview.org/category/archives/91/issue-2/
- 49.
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2008).
- 50.
- 51.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 828 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (U.S. 2013).
- 52.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 830 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (U.S. 2013).
- 53.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2013).
- 54.
No. 11-1726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 55.
Sponsored Stories are commercial messages that republish actions users have taken on Facebook , such as: likes on a page; likes, shares or comments on a page’s post; votes on a question; check-ins at a location; joins of an event; installs of an app; uses or plays of an app; likes or shares of a website. See Facebook , “What actions can be turned into Sponsored Stories?”. https://www.facebook.com/help/326113794144384/. In addition to merely republishing a user’s interaction or content, Sponsored Stories can include additional advertiser content that the user may have never encountered, let alone endorsed, under the category of a “Related Post”. See Gayle, Damien, “Is Facebook ‘impersonating’ users to promote stories they’ve never seen to all their friends?”, Daily Mail, 24 Jan 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2267575/Is-Facebook-impersonating-users-promote-stories-theyve-seen-friends.html
- 56.
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 6–8, Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-1726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 57.
Order denying motion for preliminary approval of settlement agreement at 3, Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-01726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 58.
Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-1726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 59.
Goel, Vindu, “Facebook Privacy Deal is Under Attack,” The New York Times, 13 Feb 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/technology/facebook-deal-on-privacy-is-under-attack.html. See generally Fraley v. Facebook , http://www.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/
- 60.
Agreement, at 7, Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010).
- 61.
Mot. Prelim. Approval, Dkt. 52, at 5.
- 62.
Fisch, Edith L., The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States, Matthew Bender, New York, 1950, § 1.00. Cy pres is an ancient device, originating as far back as sixth century Rome; see Gray, Hamish, “The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in Charities”, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 33, 1953, pp. 30–51 [p. 32], and being incorporated into English common law, either as a reflection of a preference for charities over other institutions or a consequence of the close relationship between the church and the courts. See ibid.
- 63.
Shepherd, Stewart R., “Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 1972, pp. 448–465 [p. 452]. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1599010
- 64.
Barnett, Kerry, “Equitable Trusts : An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 7, June 1987, pp. 1591–1614. http://www.jstor.org/stable/796495; DeJarlais, Natalie A., “The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 38, April 1987, pp. 729–767 [p. 732].
- 65.
Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 3 Jan 1974).
- 66.
Shepherd, supra note 63, at pp. 453–57.
- 67.
S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The purpose of the cy pres distribution is to ‘put the unclaimed fund to its next best compensation use, e.g., for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class.’”) (quoting Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007).
- 68.
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the “choice of charity and its relation to the class members and class claims—or lack thereof—figure[s] heavily in our analysis”); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474–75 (5th Cir. 2011) (considering cy pres relief appropriate only if “the unclaimed funds should be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the interests of those similarly situated”).
- 69.
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007).
- 70.
See Re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, No. MDL 1361, 2005 WL 1923446 (D.Me. 9 Aug 2005).
- 71.
The Sherman Act, passed by Congress in 1890, was a landmark in antitrust legislation.
- 72.
Park v. The Thomson Corp., 05 CIV.2931 (WHP), 2008 WL 4684232 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2008).
- 73.
Ibid. at *2. The final settlement “provided that Class Members would receive the entirety of the Fund. Only the residue of uncashed claimants’ checks or a surplus resulting from lower than anticipated administration costs would devolve to a cy pres fund.”
- 74.
S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
- 75.
Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1990).
- 76.
Ibid., p. 1304.
- 77.
Ibid., p. 1308.
- 78.
663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
- 79.
Ibid., p. 1037.
- 80.
Ibid., p. 1034.
- 81.
Ibid., p. 1038, citing Re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F.Supp.2d 1392, 1396–99 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (distributing $1.85 million remaining from a price-fixing class action settlement relating to merchandise sold at professional stock car races to 10 organisations including the Duke Children’s Hospital and Health Center, the Make-a-Wish Foundation, the American Red Cross and the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation); Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (awarding $2 million from an antitrust class action settlement to 15 applicants, including the San Jose Museum of Art, the American Jewish Congress, a public television station, and the Roger Baldwin Foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois).
- 82.
Ibid., p. 1041.
- 83.
Lane v. Facebook , Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (U.S. 2013).
- 84.
Ibid., p. 817.
- 85.
Settlement Agreement at 12, Lane v. Facebook, No. 08-03845 (N.D. Cal. filed 12 August 2008).
- 86.
Ibid.
- 87.
Ibid.
- 88.
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039.
- 89.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (U.S. 2013).
- 90.
Ibid., p. 821.
- 91.
Ibid., p. 821.
- 92.
Ibid., p. 822.
- 93.
Ibid., p. 834 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
- 94.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2013) (Smith, Kozinski, O’Scannlain, Bybee, Bea and Ikuta, dissenting). An en banc review is one where a case is heard before all the judges of a court rather than by a panel selected from them.
- 95.
Ibid., p. 794 (“Rather, a potential donor must look to other factors, such as the MacArthur Foundation’s past record of service or its specific list of projects, to determine whether it is reasonably certain that a donation will truly bring about the promised effects.”).
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Ibid.
- 98.
Ibid., pp. 794–95.
- 99.
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
- 100.
Ibid., p. 9.
- 101.
Ibid.
- 102.
See Redish, Martin H., et. al., “Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis”, Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 3, July 2010, pp. 617–666. http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Redish_BOOK.pdf
- 103.
See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 2010, § 3.07. http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=80
- 104.
Ibid. at § 3.07(c).
- 105.
See Perkins v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 3:05–CV–100 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. 10 July 2012) (considering first whether a “reasonably diligent effort has been made to locate class members who are the direct beneficiaries of the class action settlement” and whether “existing identified class members have been fully compensated” before considering cy pres); Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1997)(“cy pres recovery should be reserved for unusual circumstances”).
- 106.
See, e.g., Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010); Berry et al. v. LexisNexis Risk & Analytics Group Inc., No. 11-00754 (E.D. Va. 2011); Re Netflix Privacy Litigation, No. 11-00379 (N.D. Cal. filed 26 Jan 2011); Re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. 2 June 2011).
- 107.
See Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Fraley v. Facebook , No. 11-01726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 108.
Ibid.
- 109.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 110.
Ibid.
- 111.
Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-1726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
- 112.
Ibid.
- 113.
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038.
- 114.
See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2012); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990).
- 115.
Re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338, 184 L. Ed. 2d 239 (US 2012).
- 116.
Re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338, 184 L. Ed. 2d 239 (US 2012).
- 117.
Indeed, one recent settlement in a privacy class action lawsuit defended the selection of cy pres recipients on precisely this ground. See Supplemental Declaration of Kassra Nassiri. at 4, Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010) (“Plaintiffs have contended that the [Stored Communications Act] is, like other privacy protections, based on a ‘notice and choice’ approach.”).
- 118.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2013).
- 119.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2013).
- 120.
See, e.g., Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010); Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-1726, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
- 121.
Nashchin, 663 F.3d at 1039 (citing Bear Stearns, 626 F.Supp.2d at p. 415).
- 122.
Roberts, Jeff John, “Why privacy settlements like Facebook’s “Sponsored Stories” lawsuit aren’t working”, GigaOm, 19 Sept 2013a. http://gigaom.com/2013/09/19/why-privacy-settlements-like-facebooks-sponsored-stories-lawsuit-arent-working/
- 123.
Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, “Why we turned down $290,000”, 13 Feb 2014. http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/blog/why-we-turned-down-money
- 124.
Letter of Amicus Curiae Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood Supporting the Objector-Appellants Schachter et al., 12 Feb 2014. http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites/default/files/CCFCAmicusLetter.pdf
- 125.
Fraley v. Facebook , http://www.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/; EPIC, Fraley v. Facebook. http://epic.org/amicus/facebook/fraley/
- 126.
Ibid., p. 10.
- 127.
Ibid.
- 128.
Notice of Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order Granting Final Approval of Class Settlement, Certifying Settlement Class, and Appointing Class Representatives and Class Counsel, Re Google Buzz Privacy Litigation, 2011 WL 7460099 (No. 10-00672 JW) (N.D. Cal. entered Feb. 16, 2011), p. 6.
- 129.
Order re. Nomination Process for Cy Pres Recipients, supra n. 45 at 1.
- 130.
Ibid., p. 2. The court made explicit its concern that, absent such procedures, worthwhile recipients could be improperly excluded. See ibid. In the 31 May 2011 Order granting final approval of the settlement, the Court acknowledged objections to the proposed cy pres distribution of counsel and set out a “few necessary modifications” to ensure that “the nominations list adequately represents the interests of the class….” Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; Approval of Cy Pres Awards; and Awarding Attorney Fees, Re Google Buzz Privacy Litigation, 2011 WL 7460099 (No. 10-00672 JW) (N.D. Cal. entered 31 Mar 2011), p. 2. http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/googlebuzz/EPIC_Google_Buzz_Settlement.pdf
- 131.
Re Netflix Privacy Litigation, 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801 (N.D. Cal. 18 Mar 2013).
- 132.
Class Action Settlement Agreement, Re Netflix Privacy Litigation (No. 11-00379 entered 25 May 2012), pp. 13–14.
- 133.
See, e.g., Letter to Judge Lucy H. Kohn concerning Fraley v. Facebook Proposed Settlement, No. 11-01726 from EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg, on behalf of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Center for Digital Democracy , the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and the Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, 11 July 2012. http://www.epic.org/privacy/EPIC-et-al-Fraley-Cy-Prs-Ltr-7-12-12.pdf
References
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 2010. http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=80
Barnett, Kerry, “Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 7, June 1987, pp. 1591–1614. http://www.jstor.org/stable/796495;
Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, Letter of Amicus Curiae, Supporting the Objector-Appellants Schachter et al., 12 Feb 2014. http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites/default/files/CCFCAmicusLetter.pdf
Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, “Why we turned down $290,000”, 13 Feb 2014. http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/blog/why-we-turned-down-money
DeJarlais, Natalie A., “The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 38, April 1987, pp. 729–767.
EPIC, Fraley v. Facebook, http://epic.org/amicus/facebook/fraley/
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for businesses and policymakers, March 2012. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/PrivacyReport_FINAL.pdf
Fisch, Edith L., The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States, Matthew Bender, New York, 1950.
Gayle, Damien, “Is Facebook ‘impersonating’ users to promote stories they’ve never seen to all their friends?”, Daily Mail, 24 Jan 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2267575/Is-Facebook-impersonating-users-promote-stories-theyve-seen-friends.html
Goel, Vindu, “Facebook Privacy Deal is Under Attack,” The New York Times, 13 Feb 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/technology/facebook-deal-on-privacy-is-under-attack.html
Gray, Hamish, “The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in Charities”, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 33, 1953, pp. 30–51.
Grimmelmann, James, “Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 91, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 387–474. http://www.nclawreview.org/category/archives/91/issue-2/
Harris, Elizabeth, and Nicole Perlroth, “For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow”, The New York Times, 11 Jan 2014.
Harris, Elizabeth, et al., “A Sneaky Path into Target Customers’ Wallets”, The New York Times, 18 Jan 2014.
Hay, Bruce, and David Rosenberg, “‘Sweetheart’ and ‘Blackmail’ Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy”, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 75, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 1377–1408.
Koniak, Susan P., and George M. Cohen, “Under Cloak of Settlement”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1996.
Privacy Laws and Business, “German Consumer Protection Organizations to be Empowered to Sue Businesses for Data Protection Law Violations”, 14 Feb 2014. www.bitkom.org/de/presse/8477_78620.aspx
Redish, Martin H., et. al., “Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis”, Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 3, July 2010, pp. 617–666. http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Redish_BOOK.pdf
Reuters, “Neiman Marcus data breach occurred as far back as July”, published in The Chicago Tribune, 17 Jan 2014. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-17/business/chi-neiman-marcus-data-breach-occurred-as-far-back-as-july-20140117_1_cyber-attack-neiman-marcus-ginger-reeder
Roberts, Jeff John, “Why privacy settlements like Facebook’s ‘Sponsored Stories’ lawsuit aren’t working”, GigaOm, 19 Sept 2013. http://gigaom.com/2013/09/19/why-privacy-settlements-like-facebooks-sponsored-stories-lawsuit-arent-working/
Roberts, Jeff John, “Target hit with dozens of lawsuits over mass data breach”, GigaOm, 27 Dec 2013. http://gigaom.com/2013/12/27/target-hit-with-dozens-of-lawsuits-over-mass-data-breach/
Rotenberg, Marc, “Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy”, Stanford Technology Law Review, February 2001. http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf
Rotenberg, Marc, Letter to Judge Lucy H. Kohn concerning Fraley v. Facebook Proposed Settlement, No. 11-01726 from EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg, on behalf of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Center for Digital Democracy, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and the Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, 11 July 2012. http://www.epic.org/privacy/EPIC-et-al-Fraley-Cy-Prs-Ltr-7-12-12.pdf
Schectman, Joel, “Target Faces Nearly 70 Lawsuits Over Breach”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 Jan 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/15/target-faces-nearly-70-lawsuits-over-breach/
Shepherd, Stewart R., “Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 1972, pp. 448–465. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1599010
The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, 2012.
US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Washington, DC, 1973. http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/
Court cases
Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2013).
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 1998).
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997).
Berry et al. v. LexisNexis Risk & Analytics Group Inc., No. 11-00754 (E.D. Va. 2011).
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012).
Fraley v. Facebook, No. 11-1726 (N.D. Cal. filed 8 Apr 2011).
Geraghty, 445 U.S., pp. 402–03.
Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1984) rev’d, 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474–75 (5th Cir. 2011).
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 828 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (U.S. 2013).
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997).
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8–9 (2013).
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007).
Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 3 Jan 1974).
Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006).
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011).
Park v. The Thomson Corp., 05 CIV.2931 (WHP), 2008 WL 4684232 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2008).
Perkins v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 3:05–CV–100 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. 10 July 2012).
Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008).
Re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592, 2006 WL 662341, at *1 (S.D.N.Y., 16 Mar 2006).
Re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995).
Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010).
Re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, No. MDL 1361, 2005 WL 1923446 (D.Me. 9 Aug 2005).
Re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. 2 June 2011).
Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, No. 10-4809 (N.D. Cal. filed 25 Oct 2010).
Re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338, 184 L. Ed. 2d 239 (US 2012).
Re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F.Supp.2d 1392, 1396–99 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Re Netflix Privacy Litigation, No. 11–00379 (N.D. Cal. filed 26 Jan 2011).
S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1990).
Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2008).
Additional references not mentioned in the chapter, but germane to the subject:
Allen, Anita, and Marc Rotenberg, eds., Privacy Law and Society, 3d. ed., West, 2016.
JDSupra, “EPIC Objects to Facebook Settlement, Cites Failure to Benefit Class Members (Letter two)”, 16 July 2012.
Marketwatch, “Five Public Interest Groups Underscore Opposition To Settlement In Google Privacy Suit”, 16 Oct 2013.
Roberts, Chief Justice John, Statement respecting the denial of certiorari, Mark v. Lane, 571 U.S. ___ (2013).
Rotenberg, Marc, Julia Horwitz and Jeramie Scott (eds.), Privacy in the Modern Age: The Search for Solutions, The New Press, 2015.
The Register, “Judge: Google class action ‘usual suspects’ cash-fling ‘smells’: Proposed payout gives class members nothing – objectors”, 5 Sept 2014.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rotenberg, M., Jacobs, D. (2016). Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action Litigation and the Challenge of cy pres . In: Wright, D., De Hert, P. (eds) Enforcing Privacy. Law, Governance and Technology Series(), vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25047-2_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25047-2_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-25045-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-25047-2
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)