Abstract
In a series of papers, Susan Haack promotes her theory of Innocent Realism, which claims that the one real world is both heterogeneous and integrated. Haack’s treatment of fictional entities occupies a central argumentative role in this context. In this paper, we aim to outline three problems with Haack’s account of fictional entities, which we hope will contribute to the refinement of Innocent Realism: (a) the possibility of comparing fictional entities with regards to their respective degree of reality, (b) the individuation of fictional characters along with the reference of fictional names, and (c) the differentiation between fiction and falsehood.
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Notes
- 1.
Whereas her allegiance to Peirce is ubiquitous in her work, Haack distances herself especially from Richard Rorty.
- 2.
- 3.
In “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”, Peirce relates his understanding of what it means for metaphysics to be scientific: “Philosophy seems to consist of two parts, Logic and Metaphysics. […] Logic is the science of thought, not merely of thought as a psychical phenomenon but of thought in general, its general laws and kinds. Metaphysics is the science of being, not merely as given in physical experience, but of being in general, its laws and types.” (Peirce 1998, 36) Among the “great catalogue of problems” discussed in metaphysics, Peirce names the following (which, in Haack’s words, concern “familiar, everyday experience”): “What general explanation or account can be given of the different qualities of feeling and their apparent connection with determinations of mass, space, and time? […] Is Time a real thing, and if not, what is the nature of the reality that it represents?” (Peirce 1906, 375)
- 4.
Motto to Haack’s “The World According to Innocent Realism” (Haack 2016, 33), adopted from Lewis Carroll’s “The Walrus and the Carpenter”.
- 5.
Haack 2016, 33.
- 6.
Claiming so, we do not wish to imply that humans (or even other (hypothetical) superior beings) are capable of doing so. We are well aware of the fact that human epistemic means are limited. In some cases, however, we assume that, at the very least, orderings are possible.
- 7.
In order for this example to be applicable, we here assume that Callisthenes-Alexander is indeed a fictional entity, not merely the result of an incorrect description of the real Alexander. (For a more detailed discussion of the difference between fictionality and false description, see Sect. 4.3.3 below.)
- 8.
In the decisive paragraph, Haack writes that “with respect to King Arthur himself” the best we can say is “that he was real” (Haack 2016, 44). This wording suggests that Haack does not consider the possibility of mutually incompatible bits of legend, which call for a clarification of the reference of “King Arthur”. In her 2013 paper, Haack explicitly mentions different cinematic representations of Captain Ahab’s struggle with Moby Dick, but does not appear to draw any serious conclusions from this (Haack 2013, 214–215).
- 9.
As should be clear by now, a story need not be written down in a book in order to contain fictional entities. Fictional characters are perpetuated by oral traditions, depicted on TV and in movies, and appear in video games. Although we focus on fictional people here, similar reflections apply to fictional animals, places and events.
- 10.
This is, we admit, an assumption that we do not support by means of argument. However, there appears to be no viable competitor.
- 11.
Very vaguely, Haack mentions that somehow “‘fictional pretend-reference’ is parasitic on the practice of regular reference to real people, events, etc.” (Haack 2007a, 212). By itself, this serves merely as a hint, not an answer to the question of reference.
- 12.
For a thorough investigation into the characteristics of fictional entities, see Sect. 4.3.3 below.
- 13.
In the same strain, we might want to continue by claiming that (4) in an inconsistent story, multiple fictional entities are referred to, with reference varying according to the context in which a certain name is used. This, like (2), introduces more problems than it solves.
- 14.
However, Haack very sensibly notes, “it would be something of an embarrassment to discover that the characters or events [an author] thought he had imagined were, actually, real” (Haack 2007a, 209).
- 15.
As Haack points out, fictional characters may resemble or be based on actual people and fictional places may resemble actual places. Real places may also figure in fictional setups. For example, imagine a novelist’s detailed description of an imaginary apartment in New York City with a stunning view of Central Park. It is for exactly this reason that the easy answer—that an entity is fictional if and only if it figures in a work of fiction—is not exactly persuasive.
- 16.
True, acquaintance with some fictional entities is more widely spread and more profoundly anchored than others. Anybody has a word or two to say about Homer Simpson, and the more literate among us may remember the tale of Dorian Gray’s self-transforming painting, but few are introduced to the ruin of Charlotte Temple nowadays, and a great number of heroes were most certainly buried along with the bards of old. Nevertheless, all of the above are fictional entities, whether they exist or existed in the minds of many or few, whether they are remembered or forgotten, whether they have stirred the imagination of artists and masterminds or figure only in scribbled notes buried in someone’s backyard.
- 17.
Haack wisely includes “food labels, theological treatises, newspaper articles […], police reports, tourist brochures, advertising copy, bus timetables, etc., etc.” (Haack 2007a, 213).
- 18.
Haack mentions further criteria, namely that scientific texts be “about stuff, things, and events in the natural world […]; evidence-presenting; aimed at an audience of other scientists; and written in a direct, explicit, dry, closed style.” (Haack 2007a, 211) These criteria apply to scientific texts, but not to other forms of non-scientific writing, which is why we do not discuss them in this context.
- 19.
The difference between scientific, historical and literary or fictional texts may not always be easily detectable, nor need there be a strict separation for the above to be true.
- 20.
If texts were capable of having intentions, we would be able to say that the intention of the author differs from the intention of the text.
- 21.
Haack is, of course, free to return to her definition of reality according to which “x is more fully real, the more independent it is of what you or I or anyone believes about it.” (Haack 2016, 50) How this criterion applies to the fictional, however, is far from evident.
References
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Peirce, Charles S. 1998 [1898]. Philosophy and the conduct of life. In The essential Peirce: Selected writings, vol. 2, ed. The Peirce Edition Project, 27–41. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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Göhner, J.F., Grafe, T., Krone, Y., Ueberfeldt, J. (2016). How Innocent Is Innocent Realism?. In: Göhner, J., Jung, EM. (eds) Susan Haack: Reintegrating Philosophy. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24969-8_4
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