Abstract
This paper formulates the paradox of analyticity similar to the Liar Antinomy. The proposed analysis shows that T-equivalences play a crucial role in generating both logical puzzles. The main lesson derived from the paradox of analyticity suggests that the concept of analytic sentences should be defined in a metalanguage, at least if it is understood in the semantic manner.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
S. Kripke, An outline of a theory of truth. J. Philos. 72, 690–716 (1975)
R.M. Smullyan, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992)
A. Tarski, Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych, Towarzystwo Naukowe, Warszawskie, Warszawa 1933; Eng. translation, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages in A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Papers from 1923 to 1939, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1956, 152–278
A. Tarski, The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 4, 341–375 (1944); reprinted in A. Tarski, Collected Papers, v. II: 1935–1944, Birkhäuser, 1986, 661–699
J. Woleński, Analytic vs. synthetic and a priori vs. a posteriori, in Handbook of Epistemology, ed. by I. Niniiluoto, M. Sintonen, J. Woleński (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004), pp. 781–839
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Woleński, J. (2016). Paradox of Analyticity and Related Issues. In: Abeles, F., Fuller, M. (eds) Modern Logic 1850-1950, East and West. Studies in Universal Logic. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24756-4_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24756-4_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-24754-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-24756-4
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)