Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Expert Evidence and International Criminal Justice pp 1–22Cite as

Introduction and Context

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 579 Accesses

Abstract

The international criminal justice process, as a set of rules and standards that govern the conduct of proceedings in all major contemporary international and internationalised criminal tribunals, is a peculiar compromise between the special objectives of these international institutions and the domestic legal traditions upon which their procedural law is based. In contrast to the many other established systems of rules used on the international level—known collectively as international law—international criminal proceedings were not conceived of as a system with a solid conceptual foundation. The mandate of this kind of proceedings was to regulate relationships within an area of practice that had appeared too quickly to allow for a thorough theoretical reflection upon or discussion of its main issues, which could have generated a sui generis system of norms serving to adjudicate international criminal law. Founded instead on a ‘mélange’ of readily available procedural devices, international criminal proceedings have incorporated mechanisms taken from two major, very different and, in some ways, outwardly conflicting Western procedural traditions—the adversarial, common law order of the Anglo-Saxon legal systems, and the inquisitorial, civil law order of the Romano-Germanic or ‘Continental’ legal systems. Procedural law as applied by the early ad hoc international criminal courts brought together normative procedural devices transplanted from their respective legal environments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), etc.

  2. 2.

    Safferling, C.J.M. (2003), Towards an International Criminal Procedure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33.

  3. 3.

    The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis of August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S 279.

  4. 4.

    Khan, K. and Dixon R. (2009), Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice, Procedure and Evidence. London: Thompson Reuters, p 680.

  5. 5.

    Bassiouni, M.C. and Manikas P. (1996), Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., p. 863.

  6. 6.

    Schabas, W. (2006), The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 453.

  7. 7.

    Tochilovsky, Vladimir. International Criminal Justice: “Strangers in the Foreign System,” Criminal Law Forum, 2004; Schabas, W. (2006), The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 453; May, R. and Wierda, M. (2002), International Criminal Evidence. New York: Transnational Publishers, p. 93; Defrancia, C. (2001), Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters, 87 Virginia Law Review, p. 1382.

  8. 8.

    Schabas, W. (2012), Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 16; see also Schabas, W. (2007), An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1–2; Friman, H. (2003), Inspiration from the International Criminal Tribunals When Developing Law of Evidence for the International Criminal Court, 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals.

  9. 9.

    Friman, H. (2003), Inspiration from the International Criminal Tribunals When Developing Law of Evidence for the International Criminal Court, 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, p. 375.

  10. 10.

    Hand, L. (1901), Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harvard Law Review, p. 54.

  11. 11.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3.

  12. 12.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

  13. 13.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012.

  14. 14.

    Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-05-88/2-A, 8 April 2015; Prosecutor v. Popović, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-05-88-A, 30 January 2015.

  15. 15.

    Cassese, A. (2008), International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 443.

  16. 16.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 114.

  17. 17.

    Schabas, W. (2006), The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 481; Klinkner, M. (2009), Forensic Science Expertise for International Criminal Proceedings: An Old Problem, a new Context and a Pragmatic Resolution, 13(2) International Journal of Evidence & Proof, pp. 102–129; Singh, A. (2010), Expert Evidence in Khan. K., Buisman, C. and Gosnel, C. (2010), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 635–637.

  18. 18.

    Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Prosecution Filing of Expert Report Pursuant to Rule 94(bis) and Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Call an Additional Expert Witness. Case SCSL-2004-16-T, 8 August 2005; Hassan-Morlai, P.M. (2009), Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Lessons and Contributions from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 3 African Journal of Legal Studies, p. 106.

  19. 19.

    Schabas, W. (2006), The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 291; Safferling, C.J.M. (2003), Towards an International Criminal Procedure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 54–57.

  20. 20.

    For the adversarial contest, it is following the procedure that results in truth, the procedural truth. For the inquisitorial investigation, it is the active enquiry by the tribunal that brings about the truth, the material truth.

  21. 21.

    Jackson, J. (2009) Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice, p. 20.

  22. 22.

    Jackson, J. (2009) Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 18–19.

  23. 23.

    Safferling, C.J.M. (2003), Towards an International Criminal Procedure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 54, citing Amoury Combs, N. (2002), Coping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 152.

  24. 24.

    Schabas, W. (2006), The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 348.

  25. 25.

    Jorg, N., Field, S., and Brants, C., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in Fennel, P., Harding, C., Jorg, N., and Swart, B. (1995), Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 41.

  26. 26.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6.

  27. 27.

    Van Kesel, G., European Trends Towards Adversary Styles in Procedure and Evidence, in Freeley, M., and Miyazawa, S. (2002), The Japanese Adversary System in Context. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 227.

  28. 28.

    Van Kesel, G., European Trends Towards Adversary Styles in Procedure and Evidence, in Freeley, M., and Miyazawa, S. (2002), The Japanese Adversary System in Context. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 227; Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.

  29. 29.

    Damaška, M. (1997), The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 47 American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 839.

  30. 30.

    See Saks, M., and Park, R.C. (2006), Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 Boston College Law Review.

  31. 31.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10.

  32. 32.

    Damaška, M. (1997), Evidence Law Adrift. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 92.

  33. 33.

    Posner, R.A. (2001), Frontiers of Legal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 340.

  34. 34.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 11.

  35. 35.

    Damaška, M. (1987), The Death of Legal Torture, 87 Yale Law Journal, p. 860.

  36. 36.

    Twinning, W. (1985), Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

  37. 37.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S.J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 12.

  38. 38.

    Jackson, J. (2009), Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice, p. 19.

  39. 39.

    Safferling, C.J.M. (2003), Towards an International Criminal Procedure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 127.

  40. 40.

    Foster, C.E. (2011), Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10.

  41. 41.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 23.

  42. 42.

    Greene, B. (2004), The Fabric of the Cosmos. London: Penguin Books Ltd., pp. 7–11, 95–98; Foster, C.E. (2011), Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–11.

  43. 43.

    Foster, C.E. (2011), Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–11; Greene, B. (2004), The Fabric of the Cosmos. London: Penguin Books Ltd., pp. 153–160, 176.

  44. 44.

    Deason, E.E. (1998), Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 Oregon Law Review, p. 99; See also Greene, B. (2001), The Elegant Universe. New York: Vintage Publishing.

  45. 45.

    See Jamieson, D. (1996), Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 545, Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management. New York: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 35–43.

  46. 46.

    Jamieson, D. (1996), Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 545, Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management. New York: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 35–36.

  47. 47.

    Foster, C.E. (2011), Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–11.

  48. 48.

    Kuhn, T. (1996), The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  49. 49.

    Kuhn, T. (1996), The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 4–6.

  50. 50.

    Kuhn, T. (1996), The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 4–6.

  51. 51.

    LeGrand, H.E. (1988), Drifting Continents and Shifting Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–34.

  52. 52.

    Deason, E.E. (1998), Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference. 77 Oregon Law Review, pp. 118–120.

  53. 53.

    Deason, E.E. (1998), Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference. 77 Oregon Law Review, p. 116.

  54. 54.

    Foster, C.E. (2011), Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–11.

  55. 55.

    Damaška, M. (1997), Evidence Law Adrift. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 151.

  56. 56.

    Golan, T. (2004), Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in England and America. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

  57. 57.

    Merton, R. (1973), The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 270–277.

  58. 58.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 138.

  59. 59.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 24.

  60. 60.

    Edmond, G. (2012), Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in International and Interdisciplinary Perspective: Part 1, 16(1) International Journal of Evidence & Proof, p. 56.

  61. 61.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 77.

  62. 62.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012, paras 2369–2371.

  63. 63.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012, paras 2309–2311.

  64. 64.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012, p 9.

  65. 65.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012, pp. 20-21, 23.

  66. 66.

    Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case IT-06-90-A, 16 November 2012, pp. 20-21, 23.

  67. 67.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 78.

  68. 68.

    Bucknell, D. (2011), Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, and Chemical Inventions: World Protection and Exploitation, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1003.

  69. 69.

    Locke, J., auth. (1690) and Nidditch, P., ed. (1979), Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hume, D., auth. (1748) and Nidditch, P., ed. (1975), A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  70. 70.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 49.

  71. 71.

    Schum, D. (1994), Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning. Evanston, IL: Wiley-Interscience, p. 81.

  72. 72.

    Anderson, Schum and Twining proposed four types of ‘general proposition’: ‘scientific truths’, such as the law of gravity; ‘common sense generalisations’, such as the notion that running away is indicative of guilt; ‘commonly held beliefs’, such as national or ethnic stereotypes, including prejudices; and ‘general background information’ about the case in question, such as generalisations about X’s habits (‘case-specific generalizations’). Scientific generalisations vary in terms of their reliability. There are those based upon the ‘laws of science’ (applications of the law of gravity to prove how long it took the victim’s body to strike the sidewalk after he was pushed out of a sixteenth-storey window). There are those based upon well-established principles (such as fingerprint identification). There are those extrapolated from research findings that are less well-established or are recognised as less reliable (such as voice print identification or the relationship between smoking and foetal abnormalities). [Anderson, T., Schum, D., and Twining, W. (2005), Analysis of Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 43, 270; Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 60-61.]

  73. 73.

    Schum, D. (1994), Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning. Evanston, IL: Wiley-Interscience, pp. 82-83, 109; Anderson, T., Schum, D., and Twining, W. (2005), Analysis of Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 351-365.

  74. 74.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 60.

  75. 75.

    Jackson, J.D., and Summers S. J. (2012), The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 43.

  76. 76.

    Cohen, L.J. (1977), The Probable and Provable. Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 257-256.

  77. 77.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 77.

  78. 78.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 77-78.

  79. 79.

    Anderson, R., and Pichert, J. (1978), Recall of Previously Unrecallable Information Following a Shift in Perspective, 17 Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, pp. 1-12.

  80. 80.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 88.

  81. 81.

    Thayer, J. (1898), A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown, p. 524.

  82. 82.

    R. v. Baker (1988) 34 A Crim R 141, at 143.

  83. 83.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 95.

  84. 84.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 110-111.

  85. 85.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 72.

  86. 86.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 98.

  87. 87.

    Haack, S. (2005), Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 American Journal of Public Health, p. 68.

  88. 88.

    Einstein, A. (1954), Physics and Reality, in Einstein, A., Seelig C. and Bargmann, S. (1954), Ideas and Opinions: Based on My Weltbild. New York: Crown Publishers, pp. 290-323.

  89. 89.

    Schum, D. (2003), Evidence and Inference about Past Events: An Overview of Six Case Studies, in Twinning, W., and Hampsher-Monk, I., Evidence and Inference in History and Law: Interdisciplinary Dialogues. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. pp. 9-62.

  90. 90.

    Haack, S. (2005), Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 American Journal of Public Health, p. 68.

  91. 91.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 104, 106-107; see also Allen, R.J., and Miller, J. (1993), The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education, 87 Northwestern University Law Review.

  92. 92.

    Taylor. R.F. (1996), A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony in France and the United States: Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and Procedure, 31 Texas International Law Journal, p. 191; Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 306.

  93. 93.

    A person to whom authority is delegated cannot further delegate that authority to another.

  94. 94.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306-307.

  95. 95.

    Di Lello, E. (1993), Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 Columbia Law Review, p. 484.

  96. 96.

    Dwyer, D. (2008), The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306-307.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Artur Appazov

Authors
  1. Artur Appazov
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Appazov, A. (2016). Introduction and Context. In: Expert Evidence and International Criminal Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24340-5_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24340-5_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-24338-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-24340-5

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation