Practical Threshold Password-Authenticated Secret Sharing Protocol

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9326)

Abstract

Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols allow a client to secret-share a secret s among n servers and protect it with a password \(\mathsf {pw}\), so that the client can later recover s from any subset of t of the servers using the password \(\mathsf {pw}\), but so that no coalition smaller than t learns anything about s or can mount an offline dictionary attack on the password \(\mathsf {pw}\). Some TPASS protocols have appeared in the literature recently. The protocol by Bagherzandi et al. (CCS 2011) leaks the password if a client mistakenly executes the protocol with malicious servers. The first t-out-of-n TPASS protocol for any \(n>t\) that does not suffer from this shortcoming was given by Camenisch et al. (CRYPTO 2014). This protocol, proved to be secure in the UC framework, requires the client to involve in many communication rounds so that it becomes impractical for the client. In this paper, we present a practical TPASS protocol which is in particular efficient for the client, who only needs to send a request and receive a response. In addition, we have provided a rigorous proof of security for our protocol in the standard model.

Keywords

Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing protocol ElGamal encryption scheme Shamir secret sharing scheme Diffie-Hellman problems 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of CS and ITRMIT UniversityMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.School of Computing ScienceNewcastle UniversityNewcastle upon TyneUK
  3. 3.Hewlett-Packard LaboratoriesBristolUK
  4. 4.Faculty of Information TechnologyMonash UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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