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DTLS-HIMMO: Achieving DTLS Certificate Security with Symmetric Key Overhead

  • Oscar Garcia-Morchon
  • Ronald Rietman
  • Sahil Sharma
  • Ludo Tolhuizen
  • Jose Luis Torre-Arce
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9326)

Abstract

Billions of devices are being connected to the Internet creating the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT not only requires strong security, like current Internet applications, but also efficient operation. The recently introduced HIMMO scheme enables lightweight and collusion-resistant identity-based key sharing in a non-interactive way, so that any pair of Internet-connected devices can securely communicate.

This paper firstly reviews the HIMMO scheme and introduces two extensions that e.g. enable implicit credential verification without the need of traditional digital certificates. Then, we show how HIMMO can be efficiently implemented even in resource-constrained devices, enabling combined key agreement and credential verification more efficiently than using ECDH-ECDSA. We further explain how HIMMO helps to secure the Internet and IoT by introducing the DTLS-HIMMO operation mode. DTLS, the datagram version of TLS, is becoming the standard security protocol in the IoT, although it is very frequently discussed that it does not offer the right performance for IoT scenarios. Our design, implementation, and evaluation show that DTLS-HIMMO operation mode achieves the security properties of the DTLS-Certificate security suite while exhibiting the overhead of symmetric-key primitives without requiring changes in the DTLS standard.

Keywords

HIMMO Lightweight (D)TLS Quantum TTP infrastructure. 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oscar Garcia-Morchon
    • 1
  • Ronald Rietman
    • 1
  • Sahil Sharma
    • 1
  • Ludo Tolhuizen
    • 1
  • Jose Luis Torre-Arce
    • 1
  1. 1.Philips Group Innovation, ResearchEindhovenThe Netherlands

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