Chapter 3 Global and Regional Legal Regimes Dealing with Commercially-exploited Marine Species

Guggisberg, Solène

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23702-2_3

Solène Guggisberg²⁴

Part of the book series: Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs ((HAMBURG,volume 35))

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Abstract

Several sets of rules have been developed in international law, which are either directly meant to regulate fisheries or which can be used to do so. In some cases, institutions have also been established to coordinate and oversee their implementation by states. The relevant global and regional legal regimes will be presented: the framework regime, the management regimes, the conservation regimes and the trade regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

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Notes

1.
See infra Chapter 4 A.
2.
See infra Chapter 5 D. II.
3.
See infra Chapter 6.
4.
See infra Chapter 5 C. I. 4.
5.
‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS) 1982, 1833 United Nations Treaty Series 397 preamble.
6.
Ibid. article 2.
7.
R. Wolfrum and N. Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 445, 448.
8.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 21(1)(e).
9.
Ibid. article 33(1)(b).
10.
M. H. Nordquist and others (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary: Volume IV (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) 43 (parentheses omitted).
11.
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, 27 August 1999, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) cases n°3 & 4 §70; Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 451.
12.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 448, 451.
13.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 194(5).
14.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 451. The ecosystem approach is generally understood in the sense of determining measures applicable to the target species while taking into account all the interactions which are relevant within the ecosystem, both between species and with the physical environment – it is also referred to as the ecosystem-based fishery management, in opposition to the ecosystem-based management which holistically examines all activities (pollution, shipping, fisheries, etc.) in an area. For more details on this question, see infra Chapter 4 A. II. and B. III. 1. b).
The opinion of J. Morishita (‘What is the ecosystem approach for fisheries management?’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 19, 20) that articles 61(4) and 119(1) of UNCLOS, without naming it, require an ecosystem approach for the conservation of living resources, is not convincing. Indeed, independent and associated species would only be some of the factors to take into account, even for the narrower ecosystem-based fishery management.
15.
UNCLOS (n 5) articles 55, 57.
16.
Ibid. article 56(1)(a).
17.
Ibid. article 61(2).
18.
Ibid. article 61(1).
19.
Ibid. article 61(2).
20.
Ibid. article 62(1).
21.
Ibid. article 61(3)–(4).
22.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 450.
23.
Ibid.
24.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 62.
25.
Ibid. article 63(1).
26.
Ibid. article 63(2).
27.
Ibid. article 64(1).
28.
Ibid.
29.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 449.
30.
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The law of the sea (3^rd edn Juris Publishing – Manchester University Press 1999) 289.
31.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 297(3); R. Barnes, ‘The Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Effective Framework for Domestic Fisheries Conservation?’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea – Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2006) 239; M. A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes and International Law (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press 2011) 38.
32.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 450.
33.
Churchill and Lowe (n 30) 289, 455.
34.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 116.
35.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 452.
36.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 118.
37.
Ibid. article 119(1)(a).
38.
Ibid. article 119(1)(b).
39.
Ibid. article 119(1)(a).
40.
Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan), Arbitral Award, 4 August 2000, Arbitral Tribunal, (2006) XXIII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1 §53–59, 72; T. Tyler, ‘Saving Fisheries on the High-seas: The Use of Trade Sanctions To Force Compliance with Multilateral Fisheries Agreements’ (2006–2007) 20 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 43, 60–61; Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 44–45. See also infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 3. b).
41.
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Meetings of States Parties to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ http://www.un.org/depts/los/meeting_states_parties/meeting_states_parties.htm accessed 4 July 2015.
42.
H. Corell, ‘Oversight of the Implementation of the Global Ocean Regime: The Role of the United Nations’ in D. Vidas and W. Ostreng (eds), Order for the oceans at the turn of the century (Kluwer Law International 1999) 339–340.
43.
UNCLOS (n 5) article 319(1)(2)(a).
44.
J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 201, 203. At first, questions related to fisheries were dealt with in the general part of the Law of the Sea Resolution, but in 2003, two years after the entry into force of the UNFSA, a specific resolution on sustainable fisheries started to be issued.
45.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing and its impact on the living and marine resources of the world’s oceans and seas 22 December 1989, A/RES/44/225.
46.
UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 1994 – Fisheries by-catch and discards and their impact on the sustainable use of the world’s living marine resources 2 February 1995, A/RES/49/118.
47.
UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2010 – Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments 30 March 2011, A/RES/65/38 part VI.
48.
L. de La Fayette, ‘The Role of the UN in International Oceans Governance’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea – Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2006) 69.
49.
UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2010, A/RES/65/38 (n 47) §62, with regard to the traceability of fish products.
50.
Ibid. §5, 36.
51.
Ibid. §101 between RFMOs.
52.
Ibid. §105, 107 urges the RFMOs and states to respectively improve transparency, rely on the best scientific information available, incorporate the precautionary approach and ecosystem approaches etc. and to undertake performance reviews of the RFMOs they are members of.
53.
Ibid. §116.
54.
UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2008 – Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments 24 February 2009, A/RES/63/112 preamble.
55.
W. T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (Clarendon Press 1994) 40, 99, 104.
56.
Churchill and Lowe (n 30) 290; F. Orrego Vicuña, The exclusive economic zone: regime and legal nature under international law (Cambridge University Press 1989) 244–246.
57.
M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2^nd edn Cambridge University Press 2010) 125; P. Sands and others, Principles of International Environmental Law (3^rd edn Cambridge University Press 2012) 403. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), without commenting on the fisheries aspect of it, nevertheless explicitly stated that the establishment of EEZs is part of CIL (Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, I.C.J. Reports 1985 13, 33 §34).
58.
Barnes (n 31) 237, 239; J.-F. de Pulvenis Séligny, ‘The marine living resources and the evolving law of the sea’ (2010) 1 Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law 61, 85–86; Tyler (n 40) 79–80.
59.
W. M. von Zharen, ‘Ocean Ecosystem Stewardship’ (1998) 23 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 1, 33.
60.
Churchill and Lowe (n 30) 290.
61.
Pulvenis Séligny (n 58) 90.
62.
J. Ellis, ‘The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the Precautionary Principle as Interpretive Device and Rule of Law’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development and International Law 289, 290; L. Juda, ‘The 1995 United Nations agreement on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks: A critique’ (1997) 28 Ocean Development and International Law 147, 160.
63.
While pointing out to expected inefficiencies for straddling stocks and potential difficulties with enforcement, R. D. Eckert (The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea (Hoover Institution Press 1979) 129–131) was of the opinion that the EEZ can, by creating an economic rent for the resource owner, reduce unsustainable practices; see also R. Rayfuse, ‘The Interrelationship between the Global Instruments of International Fisheries Law’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 110–111.
64.
P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3^rd edn Oxford University Press 2009) 705; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 148; D. R. Christie, ‘The Conservation and Management of Stocks Located Solely within the Exclusive Economic Zone’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 397; Pulvenis Séligny (n 58) 72; Sands and others (n 57) 397.
65.
The MSY is traditionally used for a management at the margin and does not take into account the relationships with other species and their habitat (Barnes (n 31) 243–244; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 591; Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (n 55) 206; K. Rigg, R. Parmentier and D. Currie, ‘Halting IUU Fishing: Enforcing International Fisheries Agreements’ (OECD Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 2004) 5; G. J. Schram and A. Tahindro, ‘Developments in Principles for the Adoption of Fisheries Conservation and Management Measures’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 257–258). This concept has however evolved and now tends to consider uncertainties and interactions between species (World Ocean Review, The Future of Fish – The Fisheries of the Future (Maribus, Future Ocean 2013) 101).
66.
The precautionary approach is to be understood generally as a method to deal with uncertainties: at the very least scientific uncertainty should not justify a delay in action, but more generally it should be counter-balanced by measures such as buffer-zones, lower quotas, etc. On this concept, see infra Chapter 4 B. II. 2.
67.
For more on the precautionary approach/principle, see infra Chapter 4 B. II. 2. and on the ecosystem approach, see infra Chapter 4 B. III. 1. b).
68.
United Nations, Agenda 21 – The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio (1992) chapter 17 §17.46; this call was further repeated by the UNGA in the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 1992 – United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 29 January 1993, A/RES/47/192 preamble.
69.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 453, on the ‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ (UNFSA) 1995, 2167 United Nations Treaty Series 3 articles 7–8.
70.
UNFSA (n 69) article 3(1).
71.
Ibid. article 7.
72.
Ibid. article 6 and annex II, which develops guidelines to the application of the precautionary approach.
73.
Ibid. article 6(2).
74.
Ellis (n 62) 298–299.
75.
UNFSA (n 69) article 5(d)-(g).
76.
Ibid. article 7(2)(d); Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 453.
77.
UNFSA (n 69) article 5(f).
78.
Wolfrum and Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (n 7) 451.
79.
Ibid. 453–454 and n 24; see also Barnes (n 31) 247.
80.
World Ocean Review, The Future of Fish – The Fisheries of the Future 2013 (n 65) 101.
81.
UNFSA (n 69) article 8; E. Franckx, ‘Fisheries Enforcement: Related legal and institutional issues: national, subregional or regional perspectives’ FAO Legislative Study 71 (Rome 2001) 5.
82.
UNFSA (n 69) article 8(5).
83.
J. R. Mack, ‘International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High Seas’ (1995–1996) 26 California Western International Law Journal 313, 326; P. Vincent, Droit de la mer (Larcier 2008) 218.
84.
UNFSA (n 69) articles 8(4), 17; E. DeLone, ‘Improving the Management of the Atlantic Tuna: The Duty to Strengthen the ICCAT in Light of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement’ (1998) 6 New York University Environmental Law Journal 656, 663–664; P. Oerebech, K. Sigurjonsson and T. L. McDorman, ‘The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement’ (1998) 13 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 119, 122.
85.
UNFSA (n 69) article 18.
86.
Ibid. article 19.
87.
Juda (n 62) 157–158.
88.
UNFSA (n 69) article 21(1)(2).
89.
Ibid. articles 21(3)–(18), 22.
90.
Ibid. article 22(1)(b).
91.
NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement article 18(2). For more on inspection schemes, see infra Chapter 3 B. II. 3.
92.
UNFSA (n 69) article 21(5)–(7).
93.
Ibid. article 21(8) and (11); Oerebech, Sigurjonsson and McDorman (n 84) 132.
94.
UNFSA (n 69) article 23.
95.
On this, see infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 1.
96.
Schram and Tahindro (n 65) 270–271.
97.
UNFSA (n 69) article 5(i).
98.
UNFSA, ‘Annex: Outcome of the Review Conference’ New York 26 May 2006, A/CONF.210/2006/15’, as presented in D. A. Balton and H. R. Koehler, ‘Reviewing the United Nations Fish Stocks Treaty’ (2006–2007) 7 Sustainable Development Law and Policy Review 5, 7.
99.
UNFSA, ‘Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ 27 July 2010, A/CONF.210/2010/7 §24, see also 39–40.
100.
Ibid. §26, 33.
101.
Ibid. §27.
102.
Ellis (n 62) 296–297.
103.
E. J. Molenaar, ‘Non-Participation in the Fish Stocks Agreement: Status and Reasons’ (2011) 26 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 195, 222.
104.
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 3 October 2014’ (2014) http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#Agreement%20for%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20provisions%20of%20the%20Convention%20relating%20to%20the%20conservation%20and%20management%20of%20straddling%20fish%20stocks%20and%20highly%20migratory%20fish%20stocks accessed 4 July 2015.
105.
Barnes (n 31) 248–249; Oerebech, Sigurjonsson and McDorman (n 84) 123–124; J. Ziemer, Das gemeinsame Interesse an einer Regelung der Hochseefischerei: Dargestellt am Beispiel des Fish Stocks Agreement (Veröffentlichungen des Walther-Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel vol 128, Duncker & Humblot 2000) 187–291.
106.
‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (VCLT) 1969, 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 331 article 34; North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports 1969 3, 24–25 §26–27; A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2000) 207.
An exemption could be that of objective regimes: these regimes address issues of general interest for the international community and have effects on all states, so-called erga omnes rights and obligations, hence also towards non-parties (C. F. de Casadevante Romani, ‘Objective Regime’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §1–2) and might be applicable to some fisheries treaties (F. Salerno, ‘Treaties Establishing Objective Regimes’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University Press 2011) 228). Sir Waldock stated that “[a] treaty establishes an objective régime when it appears from its terms and from the circumstances of its conclusion that the intention of the parties is to create in the general interest general obligations and rights relating to a particular region, State, territory, locality, river, waterway, or to a particular area of sea, sea-bed, or air-space; provided that the parties include among their number any State having territorial competence with reference to the subject-matter of the treaty, or that any such State has consented to the provisions in question” (H. Waldock (United Nations International Law Commission Special Rapporteur), ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties (1964)’ 1964, UN Doc A/CN.4/167 and Add.1–3 §26).
The legal framework surrounding them is highly controversial (Casadevante Romani (n 106) §17; for earlier arguments see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2^nd edn Manchester University Press 1984) 104–106) but it also appears that obligations would still need to be acquiesced to by third parties (B. Vukas, ‘Treaties, Third-Party Effect’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §15). Hence it seems to depart only slightly from the traditional law of treaties and will not be examined in detail here. In general on objective regimes and the example of the Antarctic Treaty System, see Aust (n 106) 208–209; M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 37, 66–83, 121–136; Salerno (n 106).
107.
VCLT (n 106) article 35 (obligation must be accepted in writing); A. Mahiou, Le droit international ou la dialectique de la rigueur et de la flexibilité: Cours général de droit international public (Recueil des Cours vol 337, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 314.
108.
Burke considers that views to the contrary are non-defendable (‘Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement’ in H. N. Scheiber (ed), Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000) 110); Hayashi argues that the UNFSA has not become CIL and hence is not opposable to third parties (‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-Members’ in T. M. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum (eds), Law of the sea, environmental law and settlement of disputes: Liber amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Nijhoff 2007) 761–762).
109.
VCLT (n 106) article 38; North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (n 106) 41 §71; Aust (n 106) 210–211. According to R. Rayfuse, some of the provisions of the UNFSA are CIL (‘To Our Children’s Children’s Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in High-seas Fisheries’ (2005) 20 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 509, 525).
110.
Harrison (n 44) 108.
111.
For example in UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 2002 – Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 26 February 2003, A/RES/57/143 §8; UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 2004 – Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments 17 January 2005, A/RES/59/25 §9.
112.
Balton and Koehler (n 98) 7.
113.
Enforcement on the high seas against non-flag state vessels has from the start been very controversial. See for example M. Hayashi, ‘Enforcement by Non-Flag States on the High Seas Under the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ (1996–1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1.
114.
UNFSA, ‘Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement’, A/CONF.210/2010/7 (n 99) annex §1.
115.
G. Vigneron, ‘The Most Recent Efforts in the International Community to Implement the 1995 United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement’ (1999) 10 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 225, 231–233.
116.
F. Orrego Vicuña, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries (Cambridge University Press 1999) 205.
117.
For example, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995) article 6(12); FAO, International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU) 2001 §22 and 28 in particular.
118.
R. Barston, ‘The Law of the Sea and Regional Fisheries Organisations’ (1999) 14 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 333, 346–347; M. W. Lodge and others, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (Chatham House 2007) 21, 133–139; G. Lugten, ‘The role of international fishery organizations and other bodies in the conservation and management of living aquatic resources’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular 1054 (Rome 2010) 21–22; F. Orrego Vicuña, ‘Le droit de la pêche en haute mer: développement et conservation des ressources’ in Mélanges offerts à Laurent Lucchini et Jean-Pierre Quéneudec (ed), La mer et son droit (Pedone 2003) 473–475. For more on these aspects, see infra Chapter 3 B. II. 1.-3.
119.
Balton and Koehler (n 98) 7–8; P. A. Nickler, ‘A tragedy of the commons in coastal fisheries: contending prescriptions for conservation, and the case of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna’ (1998–1999) 26 Environmental Affairs Law Review 549, 557–558. More generally on the evolution following the UNFSA’s adoption, see Committee on Fisheries, ‘Strengthening regional fisheries management organizations and their performances including the outcome of the 2007 RFMOs meeting’, presented at the Twenty-seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries (Rome, 5–9 March 2007) COFI/2007/9 Rev.1 (Rome 2007) 4 §14.
120.
Balton and Koehler (n 98) 7; ‘Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (WCPFC Convention) 2000, 2275 United Nations Treaty Series 43; ‘Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean’ (SEAFO Convention) 2001, 2221 United Nations Treaty Series 189, on which see A. Jackson, ‘The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean, 2001: an introduction’ (2002) 17 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33; NAFO is being amended (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 138–139); NEAFC has undergone major transformations from 1995 to 2005; T. Henriksen, G. B. Hønneland and A. K. Sydnes, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes (Publications on Ocean Development, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 117–118, 129–130; Lugten (n 118) 18–19; Orrego Vicuña, ‘Le droit de la pêche en haute mer: développement et conservation des ressources’ (n 118) 474–475.
121.
Lugten (n 118) 18.
122.
D. H. Anderson, ‘The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995: An Initial Assessment’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 463, 468; D. Freestone, ‘Implementing Precaution Cautiously: the Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 300; Harrison (n 44) 107; Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 15; T. Henriksen, ‘Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations on States Not Party to Regional Fisheries Management Obligations’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development and International Law 80, 81; Schram and Tahindro (n 65) 284.
123.
Hayashi lists for example the non-flag state enforcement measures, the precautionary approach and the principle of compatibility, but also quite confusingly the compulsory participation in RFMOs, which he similarly inserts in his enumeration of measures facilitating the implementation of UNCLOS (M. Hayashi, ‘The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention’ (1995) 29 Ocean and Coastal Management 51, 53–54, 56–62). See also E. Franckx, ‘Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2000) 8 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 49, 61–62.
124.
Hayashi, ‘The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention’ (n 123) 53–54; F. Orrego Vicuña, ‘The International Law of High Seas Fisheries: From Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable Use’ in O. S. Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford University Press 2001) 40–42.
125.
The question is always how much interpretation is needed or allowed and how to avoid that interpretation becomes substitution. On this, see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997 7, Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui §12; Harrison (n 44) 108; Henriksen (n 122) 81.
126.
For example, A. Serdy argued that it does not create an objective regime, since its quasi-closure of the commons is more in the interest of the states already fishing in the region than in the general interest (‘Postmodern International Fisheries Law, or We Are All Coastal States Now’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 387, 389–390).
127.
H. Tuerk, ‘The Waning Freedom of the Seas’ in R. Casado Raigón and G. Cataldi (eds), L’évolution et l’état actuel du droit international de la mer: Mélanges de droit de la mer offerts à Daniel Vignes (Bruylant 2009) 932.
128.
C. Kojima and V. S. Vereshchetin, ‘Implementation Agreements’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §9, 22; Orrego Vicuña, ‘Le droit de la pêche en haute mer: développement et conservation des ressources’ (n 118) 471.
129.
Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 1; R. Bratspies, ‘Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits of International Law’ (2001) 25 Harvard Environmental Law Review 213, 237–241.
130.
T. Bjorndal, ‘Overview, roles, and performance of the North East Atlantic fisheries commission (NEAFC)’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 685, 687; Vincent, Droit de la mer (n 83) 225.
131.
S. Beslier, ‘The exercise of jurisdiction over vessels: new developments in the sector of fisheries’ in E. Franckx and P. Gautier (eds), The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Vessels: New Developments in the Fields of Pollution, Fisheries, Crimes at Sea and Trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bruylant 2010) 51; D. S. Calley, Market Denial and International Fisheries Regulation: The Targeted and Effective Use of Trade Measures Against the Flag of Convenience Fishing Industry (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 114; Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 12; Rayfuse, ‘The Interrelationship between the Global Instruments of International Fisheries Law’ (n 63) 113–114.
132.
Hayashi, ‘The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention’ (n 123) 66, as presented in Franckx, ‘Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (n 123) 63 n 63.
133.
Molenaar, ‘Non-Participation in the Fish Stocks Agreement: Status and Reasons’ (n 103) 227.
134.
UNFSA, ‘Annex: Outcome of the Review Conference’ (n 98) 16–17 §76, 78.
135.
Ibid. 16 §76 (italics added).
136.
Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Award (New Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan) (n 40) §71.
137.
Ibid.
138.
This matter was not directly discussed by ITLOS in the advisory opinion it issued following the request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), received on 28 March 2013 (SRFC, ‘Request for an advisory opinion’ (27 March 2013) http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/Request_eng.pdf accessed 6 July 2015), but ITLOS did examine the nature of the duty to cooperate in conservation and management in the EEZs. See infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 3. c) aa).
139.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 47, on the ‘Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ 1945 article I.
140.
FAO, ‘About us – Fisheries and Aquaculture Department’ http://www.fao.org/fishery/about/en accessed 4 July 2015.
141.
For example the Fisheries Global Information System, FishStat and SOFIA.
142.
FAO, ‘FAO and Regional Fishery Bodies’ http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16918/en accessed 4 July 2015.
143.
The Conference is the supreme governing body of the FAO, is composed of a representative of each member state and meets every two years. The Council is a non-plenary body of 49 representatives chosen to ensure geographical distribution and which serves of governing body between the Conference meetings as well as undertakes the activities it is entrusted with in the FAO Constitution. It is supported by a number of Committees, including the COFI. See K. Mechlem, ‘Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §9–13; P. Sands, P. Klein and D. W. Bowett, Bowett’s law of international institutions (6^th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 85.
144.
FAO, ‘Committee on Fisheries (COFI) – Fisheries and Aquaculture Department’ http://www.fao.org/fishery/about/cofi/en accessed 4 July 2015; see in detail ‘General Rules of the Organization’, Basic texts of the FAO (2013 edn) rule XXX.
145.
‘Rules of Procedures of the Committee on Fisheries’, Basic texts of the FAO (2013 edn) rule III.
146.
Ibid; ‘General Rules of the Organization’ (n 144) rule XVII.
147.
FAO, ‘Committee on Fisheries (COFI) – Fisheries and Aquaculture Department’ (n 144).
148.
Ibid.
149.
Committee on Fisheries – Sub-Committee on Fish Trade, ‘Provisional Agenda and Time Table of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (Hyderabad, 20–24 February 2012)’ COFI:FT/XIII/2012/1 (2012); Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (n 117) article 11.
150.
Committee on Fisheries – Sub-Committee on Fish Trade, ‘Update on CITES related activities’ presented at the Thirteenth Session of the Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (Hyderabad, 20–24 February 2012) COFI:FT/XIII/2012/8 (2012).
151.
Constitution of the FAO (n 139) article IV(3).
152.
Ibid. article XIV(1)(2).
153.
See infra Chapter 3 B. I. 3 a).
154.
Churchill and Lowe (n 30) 302.
155.
D. A. Balton, ‘The Compliance Agreement’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 34–35; G. Moore, ‘The FAO Compliance Agreement’ in M. H. Nordquist and G. Moore (eds), Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Kluwer Law International 2000) 78. On general comments on flags of convenience, see for example Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press 2012) 157–159.
156.
‘FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas: Compliance Agreement’ (Compliance Agreement) 1993, 2221 United Nations Treaty Series 91 article III.
157.
Ibid. articles IV-VI.
158.
Ibid. article II(2).
159.
Harrison (n 44) 209.
160.
FAO, ‘Parties to the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’ http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/012s-e.pdf accessed 4 July 2015.
161.
Harrison (n 44) 212.
162.
E. J. Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §33.
163.
‘Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ (Port State Measures Agreement) 2009 article 7.
164.
Ibid. article 8.
165.
Ibid. article 9.
166.
Ibid. articles 12, 15, 18, 20.
167.
Ibid. article 18(1)(b).
168.
Ibid. article 22.
169.
S. Flothmann and others, ‘Closing Loopholes: Getting Illegal Fishing Under Control’ (2010) 328 Science 1235, 1236.
170.
Port State Measures Agreement (n 163) article 24; FAO, Groundbreaking treaty on illegal fishing approved: Port state measures broaden the fight against IUU fishing (25 November 2009, Rome) http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/37627/icode/ accessed 4 July 2015.
171.
For example the FAO, ‘International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas’ (Rome 2009); FAO, ‘Technical Guidelines on Aquaculture Certification’ (Rome 2011).
172.
J. Friedrich, ‘Legal Challenges of Nonbinding Instruments: The Case of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1539, 1550.
173.
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (n 117) article 1.1.
174.
Ibid. article 1.3.
175.
W. R. Edeson, ‘Current Legal Developments – Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN: The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: An Introduction’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 233, 233–234; Friedrich (n 172) 1561.
176.
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (n 117) article 1.3.
177.
Ibid. article 1.2.
178.
Friedrich (n 172) 1547–1548.
179.
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (n 117) article 6.1.
180.
Ibid. articles 6.4, 7.3.1.
181.
Ibid. articles 6.5, 7.5.
182.
Ibid. articles 6.12, 6.15, 7.1.3.
183.
Ibid. article 7.2.2(d).
184.
Ibid. article 8.1–8.3.
185.
Ibid. article 9.
186.
Ibid. article 11.
187.
Ibid. article 2(d); FAO, International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks) 2001 §10.
188.
Ibid. §13. It must be noted that the adoption and implementation of national plans of actions have been slow, incomplete and with debated efficiency (Australia, ‘CoP12 Doc. 41.1 – Conservation and management of sharks’ (3–15 November 2002) 3–4 §13; M. Lack and G. Sant, ‘The Future of Sharks: A Review of Action and Inaction’ (TRAFFIC January 2011) 16), but are progressing (J. Fischer and others, ‘Review of the Implementation of the International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular 1076 (Rome 2012)).
189.
IPOA-Sharks (n 187) §16.
190.
Ibid. §11.
191.
Ibid. §18, 21.
192.
Ibid. §22.
193.
Ibid. §14.
194.
Ibid. §26.
195.
IPOA-IUU (n 117) §3.1–3.3.
196.
W. Edeson, ‘The International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: The Legal Context of a Non-Legally Binding Instrument’ (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 603, 623.
197.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 48–49.
198.
IPOA-IUU (n 117) part IV.
199.
Edeson (n 196) 605; IPOA-IUU (n 117) §18–19, 52–76.
200.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 123.
201.
Harrison (n 44) 234.
202.
A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 125.
203.
Ibid. 126.
204.
Harrison (n 44) 234–235.
205.
For example, the IPOA-Sharks has not had for consequence a widespread adoption of national plans of action (see supra footnote 188) and, even when such plan was developed, it can suffer from major inconsistencies with the international requirements (on the Canadian example, see B. Davis and B. Worm, ‘The International Plan of Action for Sharks: How does national implementation measure up?’ (2013) 38 Marine Policy 312).
206.
For a full typology, see A. K. Sydnes, ‘Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Diversity Matters’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development and International Law 349, 353–356; and for a general presentation, see E. Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Maps and Charts Detailing RFMO Coverage and Implementation’ (2005) 20 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 571.
207.
CCAMLR, CCSBT, GFCM, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NEAFC, WCPFC.
208.
SEAFO, SIOFA, SPRFMO.
209.
Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 3; Sydnes (n 206) 354.
210.
For an overview of the major RFMOs which will be referred to, see tables in Annexes 1 and 2 as well as illustrative maps on the FAO website (‘Regional Fishery Bodies Map Viewer’ http://www.fao.org/figis/geoserver/factsheets/rfbs.html accessed 6 July 2015).
211.
For a general presentation of NEAFC, see Bjorndal (n 130).
212.
International organizations are defined as “forms of cooperation (1) founded on an international agreement; (2) having at least one organ with a will of its own; and (3) established under international law” (H. G. Schermers and N. Blokker, International institutional law: Unity within diversity (5^th edn Nijhoff 2011) §33); see also the similar definition in International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries’ 2011 article 2(a).
As for international personality, it is said that “[h]aving international legal personality for an international organization means possessing rights, duties, powers and liabilities etc. as distinct from its members or its creators on the international plane and in international law” (C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organization (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2^nd edn Cambridge University Press 2005) 78).
213.
RFMOs the legal personality of which is explicitly declared include: CCAMLR (‘Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources’ (CCAMLR Convention) 1980, 1329 United Nations Treaty Series 47 article VIII); CCSBT (‘Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna’ (CCSBT Convention) 1993, 1819 United Nations Treaty Series 360 article 6(9)); IATTC (‘Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica’ (Antigua Convention) 2003 article VI(3)); NAFO (‘Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries’ (NAFO Convention) 1978, 1135 United Nations Treaty Series 369 article II(3)); NEAFC (‘Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries’ (NEAFC Convention) 1980, 1285 United Nations Treaty Series 129 (revised 2006, ‘New Convention’ http://www.neafc.org/system/files/Text-of-NEAFC-Convention-04.pdf accessed 4 July 2015) article 3(2)); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 5(3)); SPRFMO (‘Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean’ (SPRFMO Convention) 2009 article 6(3)); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 9(6)). See also Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 2; J. Beer-Gabel and V. Lestang, Les Commissions de Pêche et leur Droit: La Conservation et la Gestion des Ressources Marines Vivantes (Bruylant 2003) 59.
The implied powers doctrine provides that an international organization may benefit from a wider range of competences than expressly provided for in its founding treaty, if such additional powers are “essential to the performance of its duties” (Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949 174, 182). On this, see for example J. Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 59–66; Sands, Klein and Bowett (n 143) 475–476; G. Ulfstein, ‘Treaty Bodies’ in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 880–881. On the international legal personality of international organizations, see for example M. Bettati, ‘Création et personnalité juridique des organisations internationales’ in R.-J. Dupuy (ed), Manuel sur les organisations internationales – A Handbook on International Organizations (2^nd edn Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 48–59; T. Gazzini, ‘Personality of international organizations’ in J. Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar 2011) 33–55.
214.
These founded under the Constitution of the FAO (n 139) article VI are of an advisory nature, while those founded under its article XIV can have management functions (Barston (n 118) 343–344).
215.
Beer-Gabel and Lestang (n 213) 53.
216.
Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 9, for example NAFO and NEAFC which were re-established respectively in 1978 and 1980.
217.
Harrison (n 44) 226.
218.
The conditions differ from one RFMO to the next. Unqualified openness of the RFMO to new entrants: CCSBT (CCSBT Convention (n 213) article 18); ICCAT (‘International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas’ (ICCAT Convention) 1966, 673 United Nations Treaty Series 63 article XIV); unqualified for members of the FAO in IOTC (‘Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission’ (IOTC Agreement) 1993, 1927 United Nations Treaty Series 329 articles IV and XVII); NAFO (NAFO Convention (n 213) article XXII(4)); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 26); SIOFA (‘Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement’ (SIOFA Agreement) 2006 article 23); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) article 37).
Some of these RFMOs nevertheless require an interest and/or fishing activities in the region: CCSBT, IATTC, IOTC, SEAFO, SIOFA, SPRFMO, and WCPFC. As for CCAMLR, it also includes states that have a real interest in research in the region CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article XXIX(1).
Vote and/or acceptance of existing members: two-third majority in GFCM (‘Agreement for the establishment of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean’ (GFCM Agreement) 1949, 126 United Nations Treaty Series 237 article XIII); various options including a consensus based one in IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article XXX); three-quarter majority in NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 20(4)). Invitation by the contracting parties deciding by consensus: WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 35(2)).
219.
Consensus: CCAMLR for substantive matters (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article XII(1)); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article IX); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 17(3)); SIOFA for substantive matters (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 8(1)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) article 16); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 20(1)). Also to be noted is the CCSBT procedure of adoption by unanimity (CCSBT Convention (n 213) article 7).
Majority vote: GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article II(2)); ICCAT (ICCAT Convention (n 218) article VIII(1)(b)); IOTC (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article VI(2)); NAFO (NAFO Convention (n 213) article V(2)); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 3(9)).
220.
CCAMLR (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) articles IX(1)(f) and (4)); CCSBT (CCSBT Convention (n 213) article 8(3)); GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article III); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article VII); ICCAT (ICCAT Convention (n 218) article VIII(1)); IOTC (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article V(1) and (2)(c)); NAFO (NAFO Convention (n 213) article XI); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) articles 4(2), 5–6); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) articles 3(a), 6); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) articles 4(a), 6(1)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) articles 3(1)(a), 8); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 5(a)(b)).
221.
CCAMLR (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article IX(6)(c)); GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article V(3)); ICCAT (ICCAT Convention (n 218) article VIII(3)); IOTC (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article IX(5)); NAFO (NAFO Convention (n 213) article XII(1)); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 12(2)); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 23(1)(c)-(g)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) article 17(2)).
222.
J. P. Croxall and S. Nicol, ‘Management of Southern Ocean fisheries: global forces and future sustainability’ (2004) 16 Antarctic Science 569, 569.
223.
CCAMLR Convention (n 213) articles II(3)(c), IX(2)(i); CCAMLR, ‘CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program’ http://www.ccamlr.org/en/science/ccamlr-ecosystem-monitoring-program-cemp accessed 4 July 2015; CCAMLR, ‘CCAMLR’s Management of the Antarctic’ (Hobart, Australia 2001) http://archive.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/am/man-ant/e-management.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 5–6; D. Freestone, ‘Problems of High Seas Governance’ in D. Vidas and P. J. Schei (eds), The World Ocean in Globalisation: Climate Change, Sustainable Fisheries, Biodiversity, Shipping, Regional Issues (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 124–125; K.-H. Kock, ‘Understanding CCAMLR’s Approach to Management’ (2000) www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/am-all.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 7–10, 24–27.
224.
CCAMLR, ‘About CCAMLR’ http://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/about-ccamlr accessed 4 July 2015.
225.
CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article II(3); G. Parkes, ‘Precautionary fisheries management: the CCAMLR approach’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 83, 83.
226.
A. Fabra and V. Gascón, ‘The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Ecosystem Approach’ (2008) 23 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 567, 572; S. M. Garcia, ‘The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: on the Way to Implementation’ in M. H. Nordquist and others (eds), Law, Science & Ocean Management (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 214; GFCM (Lugten (n 118) 38); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article VII(1)(f)); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 4(2)(c)); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 3(c)(d)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) articles 2, 3(2), 20); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 5(d)).
227.
WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 5(d)); on the ecosystem approach, see infra Chapter 4 B. III. 1. b).
228.
CCAMLR, ‘CCAMLR’s Management of the Antarctic’ (n 223) 6. CCAMLR is known for its precautionary approach (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article II) although the reference is not explicit.
229.
GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article III(2) and its biological reference points, as presented in S. Marr, The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 157–158); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article IV); IOTC (Resolution 12/01 On the implementation of the precautionary principle 2012 (IOTC)); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 4(2)(b). Since 1997 the precautionary principle was introduced in the advice provided by ICES, see Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes (n 120) 111); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 7); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 4(c)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) articles 2, 3(2), 20, 22); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 6). As to within NAFO, the precautionary approach is made use of but is not found in the Convention or Scheme (NAFO, ‘Precautionary Approach’ http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/precautionary.html accessed 4 July 2015); NAFO rather uses buffer zones as presented in Marr (n 229) 154 and exemplified in Kock (n 223) 27–28. CCBST also makes reference to it (CCSBT, ‘Total Allowable Catch’ http://www.ccsbt.org/site/total_allowable_catch.php accessed 4 July 2015).
230.
On the precautionary approach, see infra Chapter 4 B. II. 2.
231.
CCAMLR (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article II); CCSBT (CCSBT Convention (n 213) article 3); GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) preamble, article III); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) preamble, article II); ICCAT (ICCAT Convention (n 218) preamble, article IV(2)(b)); IOTC (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article V(1)); NAFO (NAFO Convention (n 213) preamble, article II(1)); NEAFC (NEAFC Convention (n 213) preamble, article 2); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 2); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 2); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) article 2); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 2); Beer-Gabel and Lestang (n 213) 50.
232.
Beer-Gabel and Lestang (n 213) 100–102.
233.
GFCM (Recommendation on the mesh size of trawl nets exploiting demersal resources 2007, Rec. GFCM/31/2007/3; Resolution on the 40 mm square mesh size in codend of trawl nets exploiting demersal resources 2007, Res. GFCM/31/2007/3; Recommendation on a minimum Mesh Size in the codend of demersal trawls nets 2009 Rec. GFCM/33/2009/2); IATTC (Resolution prohibiting fishing on data buoys 2011, Resolution C-11-03); IOTC (Resolution 12/12 To prohibit the use of large-scale driftnets on the high seas in the IOTC area 2012); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014, NAFO/FC Doc. 14/1 article 13); NEAFC (Minimum mesh size when fishing for capelin 1984, Recommendation 1; Minimum mesh size when fishing for blue whiting 1986, Recommendation 2; and Recommendation to Temporarily Prohibit the Use of Gillnets, Entangling Nets and Trammel Nets in the NEAFC Regulatory Area 2006, Recommendation III); CCAMLR (Conservation Measures Category 22 – Gear Regulation); SEAFO (Recommendation 1/2010 on Banning of gillnets 2010); SPRFMO (Conservation and Management Measure for Gillnets in the SPRFMO Convention Area 2013, CMM 1.02); WCPFC (Conservation and Management Measure to Prohibit the use of Large Scale Driftnets on the High Seas in the Convention Area 2008, CMM 2008-24; and Conservation and Management Measure Prohibiting Fishing on Data Buoys 2009, CMM 2009-05).
234.
CCAMLR (Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR conservation measures 2008, Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR conservation measures 2009); CCSBT (Resolution on amendment of the Resolution on “Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU) and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels over 24 meters Authorized to Fish for Southern Bluefin Tuna” 2008; Resolution on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities For Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) 2013); GFCM (Recommendation concerning the establishment of a GFCM record of vessels over 15 metres authorized to operate in the GFCM area amending the Recommendation GFCM/2005/2 2009, Rec. GFCM/33/2009/6; Recommendation on the establishment of a list of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU fishing in the GFCM Area, amending Recommendation GFCM/2006/4 2009, Rec. GFCM/33/2009/8); IATTC (Resolution to establish a list of vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 2005; Resolution (amended) on the establishment of a list of longline fishing vessels over 24 meters authorized to operate in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 2011, Resolution C-11-05); ICCAT (Concerning the Establishment of an ICCAT Record of Vessels 20 m or greater Authorized to Operate in the Convention Area 2011, Recommendation 11–12; various lists established per species; Recommendation by ICCAT Further Amending Recommendation 09–10 Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried out Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the ICCAT Convention Area 2011); IOTC (Resolution 13/02 Concerning the IOTC record of vessels authorised to operate in the IOTC area of competence 2013; Resolution 11/03 On establishing a list of vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the IOTC area of competence 2011); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) articles 53–54); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) article 44); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement 2013 article 28); SPRFMO (Establishment of the Commission record of Vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area 2014, CMM 2.05; Establishing a List of Vessels presumed to have carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing activities in the SPRFMO Convention Area 2013); WCPFC (Conservation and Management Measure to establish a List of Vessels presumed to have carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing activities in the WCPO 2010; Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorization to Fish 2013, CMM 2013-10).
235.
CCAMLR (General measure for the closure of all fisheries 2007, Conservation Measure 31-02); GFCM (Recommendation on the establishment of a closed season for the dolphin fish fisheries based on fishing aggregation devices (FADs) 2006, Rec. GFCM/2006/2; Recommendation concerning the recommendation by ICCAT amending recommendation [08-05] to establish a multiannual recovery plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean 2010, Rec. GFCM/34/2010/4(b)); IATTC (Multiannual program for the conservation of tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean during 2014–2016 2013, Resolution C-13-01); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean 2013, Recommendation 13-07 §21–25); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) article 5(5)); NEAFC (Recommendation to adopt regulatory measures for the protection of blue ling in the NEAFC regulatory area (ICES Division XIV) from 2013 to 2016, Recommendation 5: 2013).
236.
CCAMLR (General measure for the closure of all fisheries (n 235); Limitation of By-Catch in New and Exploratory Fisheries in the 2013/14 Season 2013, Conservation Measure 33-03; Limitation of By-Catch in Statistical Division 58.5.2 in the 2013/14 Season 2013, Conservation Measure 33-02); GFCM (Recommendation on reducing incidental by-catch of seabirds in fisheries in the GFCM Competence Area 2011, Rec. GFCM/35/2011/3; Recommendation on the incidental by-catch of sea turtles in fisheries in the GFCM Competence Area 2011, Rec. GFCM/35/2011/4); IATTC (Consolidated Resolution on bycatch 2006, Resolution C-04-05 (Rev 2)); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT on reducing incidental by-catch of seabirds in longline fisheries 2007, Recommendation 07-07; Recommendation by ICCAT on the by-catch of sea turtles in ICCAT fisheries 2010, Recommendation 10-09; Supplemental recommendation by ICCAT on reducing incidental by-catch of seabirds in longline fisheries 2011, Recommendation 11-09); IOTC (Resolution 12/06 On reducing the incidental bycatch of seabirds in longline fisheries 2012); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) article 6); SEAFO (Conservation Measure 25/12 on Reducing Incidental By-catch of Seabirds in the SEAFO Convention Area 2012); SPRFMO (Minimising bycatch of seabirds in the SPRFMO Convention Area 2014, CMM 2.04); WCPFC (Resolution on the Incidental Catch of Seabirds 2005, Resolution 2005-01; Conservation and Management Measure to Address the Impact of Purse Seine Activity on Cetaceans 2012, Conservation and Management Measure on the protection of whale sharks from purse seine operations 2012, CMM 2012-04; Conservation and Management Measure for Mitigating Impacts of Fishing on Seabirds 2012).
237.
CCAMLR (Bottom fishing in the Convention Area 2012, Conservation Measure 22-06); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) articles 15–24); NEAFC (Consolidated text of all NEAFC recommendations on regulating bottom fishing 2011); SEAFO (Conservation Measure 26/13 on Bottom Fishing Activities in the SEAFO Convention Area 2013); SPRFMO (Management of Bottom fishing in the SPRFMO Convention Area 2014, CMM 2.03).
238.
GFCM (Resolution on Guidelines on the management of fishing capacity in the GFCM area 2013, Res. GFCM/37/2013/2; Recommendation on the management of fishing capacity 2010, Rec. GFCM/34/2010/2); IATTC (Resolution on the capacity of the tuna fleet operating in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (revised) 2002); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Limitation of Fishing Capacity on Northern Albacore 1998, Recommendation 98-8); IOTC (Resolution 12/11 On the implementation of a limitation of fishing capacity of contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties 2012); WCPFC (Resolution on Reduction of Overcapacity 2005, Resolution 2005-02).
239.
CDS: ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT Amending Recommendation 09–11 on an ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Catch Documentation Program 2011, Recommendation 11–20); CCAMLR (Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. 2013, Conservation Measure 10-05; on the CCAMLR CDS development, see D. J. Agnew, ‘The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR catch documentation scheme’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 361); CCSBT (Resolution on the Implementation of a CCSBT Catch Documentation Scheme 2013). On the IOTC, ICCAT, IATTC and CCSBT early documentation schemes, usually TDS see M. Lack, ‘Catching On?: Trade-related Measures as a Fisheries Management Tool’ (TRAFFIC International 2007) 7–8; R. Rayfuse, ‘Building sustainable high seas fisheries through certification processes: issues and perspectives’ (2009) 35 Océanis 93, 97. In general, see S. Clarke, ‘Best Practice Study of Fish Catch Documentation Schemes’ (23 August 2010) http://www.m2cms.com.au/uploaded/5/Final%20CDS%20Report%20-August%2023.pdf accessed 4 July 2015; C. A. Roheim and J. G. Sutinen, ‘Trade and Market-Related Instruments to Promote Sustainable Fishing Practices’ International Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper 3 (Geneva 2006) 2–7.
240.
Clarke, ‘Best Practice Study of Fish Catch Documentation Schemes’ (n 239) 1–2; Rayfuse, ‘Building sustainable high seas fisheries through certification processes: issues and perspectives’ (n 239) 98; Lack, ‘Catching On?’ (n 239) 8–9.
241.
C.-C. Schmidt, ‘Addressing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Paper prepared for the International Fisheries Compliance 2004 Conference, 29–30 September 2004, Brussels’ (2004) http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/fisheries/34029751.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 7.
242.
Lack, ‘Catching On?’ (n 239) 11.
243.
M. Lack, ‘Continuing CCAMLR’s Fight Against IUU Fishing for Toothfish’ (WWF Australia and TRAFFIC International 2008) 25.
244.
Roheim and Sutinen (n 239) 4.
245.
Lack and Sant (n 188) 11; on the measures adopted by RFMOs for sharks, see Annex 2.
246.
S. van Osch, ‘Save our Sharks: Using International Fisheries Law Within Regional Fisheries Management Organizations to Improve Shark Conservation’ (2011–2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 383, 409–417.
247.
M. R. Simpson, C. M. Miri and C. Busby, ‘Assessment of Thorny Skate (Amblyraja radiata Donovan, 1808) in NAFO Divisions 3LNO and Subdivision 3Ps’ SCR Doc. 08/43 (June 2008) http://archive.nafo.int/open/sc/2008/scr08-043.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 1; Shark Alliance, World’s only international ray fishing quota reduced: Northwest Atlantic thorny skate limit will soon be lower, yet still excessive (2009) http://www.sharkalliance.org/content.asp?did=33850 accessed 4 July 2015.
248.
Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Farming 2006, Recommendation 06–07.
249.
Recommendation by ICCAT Amending Recommendation 09–11 on an ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Catch Documentation Program, Recommendation 11–20 (n 239).
250.
Recommendation by GFCM on reporting of aquaculture data and information, amending Recommendation GFCM/33/2009/4 2011, Recommendation GFCM/35/2011/6; J. K. Murphy, ‘FAO’s general fisheries commission for the Mediterranean: a new role, a new role model’ (2007) 12 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 391, 404–405.
251.
CCSBT, ‘CCSBT Record of Authorised Farms’ http://www.ccsbt.org/site/authorised_farms.php accessed 4 July 2015.
252.
NASCO, ‘Aquaculture, Introductions, Transfers & Transgenics’ http://www.nasco.int/aquaculture.html accessed 4 July 2015.
253.
Monaco, ‘CoP15 Prop. 19 – Proposal to include Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus (Linnaeus, 1758)) on Appendix I of CITES in accordance with Article II 1 of the Convention’ (13–25 March 2010) 17 §7.2.
254.
Ibid. 17 §7.2 (reference omitted).
255.
Ibid. 19 §8.3.1.
256.
Ibid.
257.
Parkes (n 225) 88; see for example provisions and measures in CCAMLR (Licensing and inspection obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to their flag vessels operating in the Convention Area 2013); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article XX); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233)); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91)); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) part V); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 11).
258.
CCAMLR (Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) 2013, Conservation Measure 10-04); CCSBT (Resolution on establishing the CCSBT Vessel Monitoring System 2008); GFCM (Recommendation concerning minimum standards for the establishment of a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) in the GFCM area 2009, Rec. GFCM/33/2009/7); IATTC (Resolution on the establishment of a vessel monitoring system (VMS) 2004, Resolution C-04-06); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT concerning minimum standards for the establishment of a vessel monitoring system in the ICCAT convention area 2003, Recommendation 2003–14); IOTC (Resolution 06/03 On establishing a vessel monitoring system programme 2006); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) article 29); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) article 11); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement (n 234) article 13); SPRFMO (Establishment of the Vessel Monitoring System in the SPRFMO Convention Area 2014, CMM 2.06); WCPFC (Commission vessel monitoring system 2007, CMM 2007-02).
259.
Measures based on port state control originated in the 1980s in relation to shipping; the ones in the field of fisheries are modelled on those earlier rules. See for example D. Anderson, ‘Port States and Environmental Protection’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development – Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford University Press 1999); A. Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (Edward Elgar 2011) 455–456; R. Lagoni, ‘Ports’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §21–27, 39–40; T. A. Mensah, ‘Marine Pollution from Ships, Prevention of and Responses to’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §32–37; Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction’ (n 162) on fisheries, see particularly §33; J. Swan, ‘Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: International and Regional Developments’ (2006–2007) 7 Sustainable Development Law and Policy Review 38, 38.
260.
CCAMLR (Port inspections of fishing vessels carrying Antarctic marine living resources 2013, Conservation Measure 10-03); GFCM (Recommendation on a regional scheme on port state measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the GFCM area 2008, Rec. GFCM/2008/1); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT for an ICCAT Scheme for Minimum Standards for Inspection in Port 2012, Recommendation 12-07); IOTC (Resolution 10/11 On port state measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 2010); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) chapters VII-VIII); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) chapter V); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement (n 234) articles 22–23); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 12).
261.
GFCM (Recommendation on a regional scheme on port state measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the GFCM area (n 260)); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT for an ICCAT Scheme for Minimum Standards for Inspection in Port (n 260)); IOTC (Resolution 10/11 On port state measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (n 260)); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) article 43(1)); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) article 21); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement (n 234) article 20).
262.
CCAMLR (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article XXIV); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (n 235) part V); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) chapter VI); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) chapter IV); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement (n 234) chapter IV); WCPFC (WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedures 2006, CMM 2006–08).
263.
CCSBT (Resolution on Establishing a Program for Transshipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels 2008); IATTC (Amendment to resolution C-11-09 on establishing a program for transhipments by large-scale fishing vessels 2012, Resolution C-12-07); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT on a Programme for Transhipment 2012, Recommendation 12-06; Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (n 235) §90-92); IOTC (Resolution 11/04 On a regional observer scheme 2011); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) article 30); WCPFC (Conservation and Management Measure on Regulation of Transhipment 2009, CMM 2009-06).
264.
IATTC (Amendment to resolution C-11-09 on establishing a program for transhipments by large-scale fishing vessels (n 263)); ICCAT (Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (n 235) §65); IOTC (Resolution 12/05 On establishing a programme for transhipment by large-scale fishing vessels 2012); SEAFO (System of observation, inspection, compliance and enforcement (n 234) article 14).
265.
See supra Chapter 3 A. II. 3. b).
266.
Beer-Gabel and Lestang (n 213) 140–146.
267.
CCAMLR (Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR conservation measures (n 234)); IOTC (Resolution 01/03 Establishing a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party vessels with Resolutions established by IOTC 2001; Resolution 05/03 Relating to the establishment of an IOTC programme of inspection in port 2005); NAFO (Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2014 (n 233) chapter VIII); NEAFC (NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (n 91) articles 37, 40, 44, 45); Y. Tanaka, ‘The Changing Approaches to Conservation of Marine Living Resources in International Law’ (2011) 71 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 291, 325–328; R. Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High-seas Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 174–180, 190–191, 220–222, 253–256, 278–282.
268.
A. J. Bederman, ‘CCAMLR in crisis: a case study of marine management in the southern oceans’ in H. N. Scheiber (ed), Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000) 190; Tanaka, ‘The Changing Approaches to Conservation of Marine Living Resources in International Law’ (n 267) 324–328.
269.
On the question of the UNFSA’s status, see supra Chapter 3 A. II. 3. b).
270.
Hayashi, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-Members’ (n 108) 760–761.
271.
However, ICCAT and NAFO do not have such provisions, and NEAFC’s new founding treaty only states that recommendations shall be made by the Commission “establishing procedures for the settlement of disputes” (NEAFC Convention (n 213) article 18 bis (not yet in force)).
272.
GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article XVII); IATTC (Antigua Convention (n 213) article XXV); IOTC for the first stage (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article XXIII); SEAFO for the first stage (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 24(3)).
273.
SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 24(4)); SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 20(1)); SPRFMO (SPRFMO Convention (n 213) article 34(2)); WCPFC (WCPFC Convention (n 120) article 31).
274.
CCAMLR (CCAMLR Convention (n 213) article XXV(2)); CCSBT (CCSBT Convention (n 213) article 16(2)); IOTC (IOTC Agreement (n 218) article XXIII). Note however GFCM (GFCM Agreement (n 218) article XVII) which does not refer to the need for both parties to agree.
275.
Tuna-org, ‘IUU Vessel Lists’ http://www.tuna-org.org/vesselneg.htm accessed 4 July 2015; NAFO, ‘Links to other RFMOs’ http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/fishery/iuu/rfmo-links.html accessed 4 July 2015.
276.
For example, CCAMLR attends many meetings (CCAMLR, ‘Cooperation with others’ https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/cooperation-others accessed 4 July 2015).
277.
Tuna-org, ‘Chair’s report of the third joint meeting of the tuna regional fisheries management organizations (Kobe III)’ (12 July 2011) http://www.tuna-org.org/Documents/TRFMO3/REP-KOBE3-ENG.pdf accessed 5 July 2015.
278.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 39–40; APFIC, GFCM, IOTC, RECOFI and CACFish under article XIV; CECAF, CIFAA, WECAFC, COPESCAALC, SWIOFC and EIFAAC under article VI.
279.
ICCAT (ICCAT Convention (n 218) articles XIII(2), XIV(2), XVI); SEAFO (SEAFO Convention (n 120) article 25(2)); and SIOFA (SIOFA Agreement (n 218) article 25).
280.
CCAMLR, IATTC, NAFO, NEAFC, WCPFC.
281.
FAO, ‘Report of the First Meeting of Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network’ FAO Fisheries Report 837 (Rome 2007); FAO, ‘FAO Report of the Second Meeting of Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report 908 (Rome 2009); FAO, ‘Statement of the third meeting of the regional fishery body secretariats network’ (Rome 8 February 2011).
282.
Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 259) 450; Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 40; California Environmental Associates, ‘Charting a Course to Sustainable Fisheries’ (16 January 2012) http://www.chartingacourse.org/downloads/ accessed 4 July 2015, 23–24.
283.
For example, in the NEAFC area, out of five stocks, only one was considered, in 2009, to be exploited sustainably (Bjorndal (n 130) 696; for slightly different figures but with a similar conclusion see A. Longhurst, Mismanagement of Marine Fisheries (Cambridge University Press 2010) 178–180). S. Cullis-Suzuli and D. Pauly demonstrate that, in average, RFMOs perform poorly both in terms of best practices ‘on paper’ and in reality (‘Failing the high seas: A global evaluation of regional fisheries management organizations’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1036). Here are other examples of what has been called ‘mismanagement’ within ICCAT: banning of fishing during the spawning season had been advised but rejected and, in 2007, the SCRS advised not to set quotas at more than 15,000 tons, but ICCAT members within the deciding body overlooked this advice by setting the TACs at 22,000 tons for 2008. As a result, the estimated catches, including IUU, reached 61,000 tons in 2007, i.e. four times the advice of ICCAT’s scientific body (Monaco, ‘CoP15 Prop. 19 – Proposal to include Atlantic Bluefin Tuna’ (n 253) 16 §6.4, 18–19 §8.1; Greenpeace, ‘CITES – Last Chance for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna’ (2010) http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/cites-last-chance-for-bluefin/ accessed 4 July 2015, 2).
284.
Governance issues are discussed in more detail infra Chapter 4 A. On issues facing RFMOs, see for example J. Swan, ‘Regional Fishery Bodies and Governance: Issues, Actions and Future Directions’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular 959 (Rome 2000).
285.
As international organizations, they are bound not only by their founding treaty but also by CIL (Sands, Klein and Bowett (n 143) 461–463). On this, see infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 2. c).
286.
Committee on Fisheries, ‘Report of the Twenty-sixth Session of the Committee on Fisheries (Rome, 7–11 March 2005)’ FAO Fisheries Report 780 (Rome 2005) 18 §111–112; Committee on Fisheries, ‘Report of the Twenty-seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries (Rome, 5–9 March 2007)’ FAO Fisheries Report 830 (Rome 2007) 14 §86; Committee on Fisheries, ‘Strengthening regional fisheries management organizations and their performances including the outcome of the 2007 RFMOs meeting’ (n 119) 6–7 §29–35.
287.
In its Resolutions, the UNGA urges states parties to RFMOs to undertake performance reviews “initiated either by the organization or arrangement itself or with external partners, including in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, using transparent criteria based on the provisions of the Agreement and other relevant instruments” (UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 2006 – Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, 6 March 2007, A/RES/61/105 §73; UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2010, A/RES/65/38 (n 47) §107).
288.
Tuna-org, ‘Informal framework for sharing information from tuna Regional Fishery Management Organizations’ http://www.tuna-org.org/ accessed 4 July 2015; Bjorndal (n 130) 694–695; M. Ceo and others, ‘Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, summaries, synthesis and best practices, Volume I: CCAMLR, CCSBT, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO, NEAFC’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular 1072 (Rome 2012); Lugten (n 118) 6–7. See infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 2. c) cc).
289.
See infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 1.
290.
IOTC Resolution 10/09 Concerning the functions of the Compliance Committee 2010.
291.
GFCM Recommendation concerning the identification of the non-compliance 2010, Rec. GFCM/34/2010/3.
292.
See infra Chapter 4 A. II.
293.
M. Giordano, ‘The Internationalization of Wildlife and Efforts Towards its Management: A Conceptual Framework and the Historic Record’ (2001–2002) 14 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 607, 612.
294.
‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’ (CITES) 1973, 993 United Nations Treaty Series 243 article I(c).
295.
CITES, ‘The CITES species’ (2013) http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/species.php accessed 4 July 2015.
296.
R. Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (Earthscan 2002) 42–43.
297.
The latest amendment proposals by the European Union on one hand (Denmark (on behalf of the EU), ‘CoP16 Doc. 4.2 (Rev. 1) – Proposal to improve transparency of voting during meetings of the Conference of the Parties’ (3–14 March 2013)) and by Mexico and Chile on the other hand (Chile and Mexico, ‘CoP16 Doc. 4.3 (Rev. 1) – Proposed amendment to Rule 25 on Methods of Voting use of secret ballots’ (3–14 March 2013)), which suggested to increase the number of parties necessary to support a secret ballot (respectively to a simple majority and to one third), were rejected at CoP16 (International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin – Summary of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species’ (18 March 2013) http://www.iisd.ca/vol21/enb2183e.html accessed 4 July 2015).
298.
CITES (n 294) article XV(3); D. König, ‘Tacit Consent/Opting Out Procedures’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §10.
299.
Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) – Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II (Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) – Lauderdale criteria) 1994.
300.
The legal nature of CoP Resolutions is further discussed infra Chapter 3 C. I. 2. f).
301.
Resolution Conf. 1.2 – Criteria for the Deletion of Species and Other Taxa from Appendices I and II (Bern criteria) 1976 (repealed).
302.
S. Young, ‘Contemporary Issues of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate Over Sustainable Use’ (2003) 14 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 167, 178.
303.
Ibid. 188.
304.
S. Dansky, ‘The CITES “Objective” Listing Criteria: Are They Objective Enough to Protect the African Elephant?’ (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 961, 975.
305.
D. S. Favre, International Trade in Endangered Species: A Guide to CITES (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 311.
306.
T. Gehring and E. Ruffing, ‘When Arguments Prevail Over Power: The CITES Procedure for the Listing of Endangered Species’ (2008) 8 Global Environmental Politics 123, 130–138.
307.
Ibid. 124, 130–131, 133–135, 145.
308.
CITES (n 294) article III(2)-(3).
309.
Ibid. article III(3)(b), (4)(b) (5)(b). These criteria will not be discussed here or for other Appendices, as fish are mostly traded dead.
310.
Whether an export or a re-export permit is to be issued remains to be clarified, see infra Chapter 5 C. I. 2. b) cc).
311.
CITES (n 294) article III(5).
312.
J. Grogan and P. Barreto, ‘Big-Leaf Mahogany on CITES Appendix II: Big Challenge, Big Opportunity’ (2005) 19 Conservation Biology 973, 974.
313.
CITES (n 294) article III(2)(b).
314.
A. Willock, ‘Administrative and Monitoring Implications of listing and down-listing of commercially-exploited aquatic species, including the implications of Annex 4 of Resolution Conf. 9.24’ Background paper to CITES Workshop on Introduction from the Sea Issues, 30 November – 2 December 2005, Geneva (Switzerland) http://www.cites.org/eng/news/meetings/ifs-05/IFS05-TRAFFIC-paper.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 8. It does not appear clear to all parties whether the NDF for species listed under the look-alike criterion refers to the survival of the endangered species or the survival of the look-alike species (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 506–507).
315.
See Resolution Conf. 8.6 (Rev) – Role of the Scientific Authority, 1992 (repealed), which suggested elements to take into account when verifying the NDF. See also Resolution Conf. 10.3 – Designation and role of the Scientific Authorities 1997, which develops the role of the Scientific Authorities. On examples of NDF provided by CITES, see CITES (Chairs of Animals and Plants Committees), ‘AC26/PC20 Doc. 8.4 – Draft guidance on the making of non-detriment findings’ (22 March 2012); CITES, ‘Resources for implementation: Sustainability’ http://cites.org/eng/prog/shark/sustainability.php accessed 4 July 2015. For an independent research advising on methods to be further developed for NDF, see M. J. Smith and others, ‘Assessing the impacts of international trade on CITES-listed species: Current practices and opportunities for scientific research’ (2011) 144 Biological Conservation 82.
316.
A. Stroud, ‘Essay: A Review of the Role of the CITES Secretariat in the Implementation of the Non-Detriment Finding Requirement’ (2005–2006) 30 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 661.
317.
CITES, ‘CoP11 Inf. 11.3 – Scientific Authorities’ Checklist to assist in making Non-detriment Findings for Appendix II Exports’ (10–20 April 2000).
318.
Resolution Conf. 16.7 – Non-detriment findings 2013.
319.
Resolution Conf. 5.10 (Rev. CoP15) – Definition of ‘primarily commercial purposes’ 1985.
320.
CITES ‘The CITES species’ (2013) (n 295).
321.
CITES (n 294) article II(2)(a).
322.
Ibid. article II(2)(b). Look-alike species inclusion was originally only planned in relation to Appendix II species but was broadened to deal with Appendix I species in the Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) – Lauderdale criteria (n 299) annex 2b; Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 259) 97.
323.
CITES (n 294) article IV(2)(a)-(b).
324.
Ibid. article IV(2)(c).
325.
Ibid. article IV(6)(a).
326.
E. Franckx, ‘Applications of the term ‘Introduction from the sea’ http://www.cites.org/eng/news/meetings/ifs-05/term_IFS.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 2 (reference omitted).
327.
Resolution Conf. 9.25 (Rev. CoP16) – Inclusion of species in Appendix III 1994.
328.
CITES (n 294) article V(2)(a).
329.
Ibid. article V(2)(b).
330.
For an interesting study of the use of CITES Appendix III for marine species, see A. Willock, M. Burgener and A. Sancho, ‘First Choice or Fall Back? An Examination of Issues Relating to the Application of Appendix III of CITES to Marine Species’ (TRAFFIC 2004).
331.
CITES (n 294) article VII; Resolution Conf. 9.7 (Rev. CoP15) – Transit and transhipment 1994; Resolution Conf. 12.3 (Rev. CoP16) – Permits and certificates 2002; Resolution Conf. 13.6 (Rev. CoP16) – Implementation of Article VII, paragraph 2, concerning ‘pre-Convention’ specimens 2004; Resolution Conf. 13.7 (Rev. CoP16) – Control of trade in personal and household effects 2004.
332.
CITES (n 294) article VII(5); Resolution Conf. 10.16 (Rev) – Specimens of animal species bred in captivity 1997.
333.
CITES (n 294) article XXIII.
334.
Ibid. article X.
335.
Resolutions and Decisions are the types of documents adopted at CoPs; the former are meant to provide advice on the long-term, while the latter are shorter lived and provide for direct specific actions to be undertaken by a committee or the Secretariat (CITES, ‘Decisions of the Conference of the Parties’ http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/intro.php accessed 4 July 2015). Of the other documents presented at CoP meetings, the discussion documents are either abbreviated ‘Doc.’ for documents or ‘Prop.’ for proposals. Information documents, which are assigned the letters ‘Inf.’ are there for information purposes only (‘Document numbering’ CITES World – Official Newsletter of the Parties (July 2004) 6).
336.
According to CITES (n 294) article XVII, it is possible to amend the Convention if a third of the parties requests in writing an extraordinary meeting of the CoP to consider such amendment and if two-thirds at least vote in favor of the said amendment, which will then enter into force 60 days after two-thirds of the parties have deposited an instrument of acceptance to it.
337.
Of the two amendments adopted in almost 40 years, one entered into force in 1987, eight years after its adoption – the Bonn Amendment, which broadened the competence of the CoP – (Bonn amendment to the text of the Convention, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/bonn.php accessed 4 July 2015), while the other – Gaborone Amendment, which aimed at allowing accession of regional economic integration organizations – finally entered into force on 29 November 2013, 30 years after its adoption and following the deposition of Costa Rica’s instrument of acceptance (Gaborone amendment to the text of the Convention, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/gaborone.php accessed 4 July 2015).
338.
CITES (n 294) article XI(3)(e).
339.
R. R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 623, 628–630.
340.
CITES Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties, as amended at the 16^th meeting, Bangkok, 2013 rules 21.1, 21.2 and 26.1.
341.
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 690; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 488; Mahiou, Le droit international ou la dialectique de la rigueur et de la flexibilité (n 107) 349; D. Shelton (‘Soft law’ in D. Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge 2009) 69) presents a definition of soft law being “any written international instrument, other than a treaty, containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.” However, Churchill and Ulfstein ((n 339) 642) seem to consider that only sets of guidelines are soft law documents in the CITES framework.
342.
Schermers and Blokker (n 212) §1217–1243, 1254; J. Werksman, ‘The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties’ in J. Werksman (ed), Greening International Institutions (Earthscan 1996) 63–64.
343.
R. W. G. Jenkins, ‘An Overview of the Fundamental Principles of CITES as a Mechanism for Regulating Trade in Listed Species’ http://www.cites.org/eng/news/meetings/ifs-05/IFS05-principle.pdf accessed 4 July 2015, 2.
344.
P. H. Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 251, 255. On this question, see for example J. Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 1–52; L. K. Camenzuli, ‘The Development of International Law and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ Conference of the Parties and Its Validity’ (2007) http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/cel10_camenzuli.pdf accessed 4 July 2015; J. Sommer, ‘Environmental Law-Making by International Organizations’ (1996) 56 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 628, 631–638; A. Wiersema, ‘The New International Law-makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 231, 232–87.
345.
Mahiou, Le droit international ou la dialectique de la rigueur et de la flexibilité (n 107) 352; Wiersema, ‘The New International Law-makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (n 344) 251.
346.
Ulfstein, ‘Treaty Bodies’ (n 213) 884, as in VCLT (n 106) article 31(3)(b).
347.
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 31 March 2014, ICJ 24 §46.
348.
VCLT (n 106) article 31(3)(a); P. H. Sand, ‘Endangered Species, International Protection’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §10; Churchill and Ulfstein (n 339) 641.
349.
M. Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of Sources in International Law’ (1974–1975) 47 British Yearbook of International Law 273, 277–278.
350.
N. D. White, ‘Separate but Connected: Inter-Governmental Organizations and International Law’ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 175, 183 (reference omitted).
351.
The terminology chosen is a crucial factor in determining the nature of an instrument as highlighted in the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 July 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994 112, 120–121 §23–25; see also Wiersema, ‘The New International Law-makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (n 344) 253–255.
352.
See for example the ICJ’s view on how to consider UNGA Resolutions’ normative value: “it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 226, 254 §70). On a very critical view of international organizations’ resolutions being considered somehow binding, see for example P. Weil, ‘Towards relative normativity in international law?’ (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law 413, 415–417.
353.
Resolution Conf. 4.6 (Rev. CoP16) – Submission of draft resolutions and other documents for meetings of the Conference of the Parties 1983.
354.
Sand refers to the fact that the French argument in the Bolivia Furskin Case (ECJ, Case C-182/89 Commission v France (Bolivian Furskin Case) 4344) that Resolutions are recommendations ‘without legal effect’ was rejected. A contrario, he argues that they have practical effects (Sand, ‘Endangered Species, International Protection’ (n 348) §10).
355.
C. Fuchs, ‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Conservation Efforts Undermine the Legality Principle’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1565, 1575–1576 (reference omitted), P. H. Sand, ‘Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 29, 35. This is for example not totally accepted by V. Röben (‘Conference (Meeting) of States Parties’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §23) who states that this “would still fall short of imposing new substantive obligations”.
356.
Resolution Conf. 14.3 – CITES compliance procedures 2007 annex §30 and footnote 1.
357.
Ibid. annex §1 (italics added) states that it “describes existing procedures in order to facilitate consistent and effective handling of compliance matters relating to obligations under the Convention, taking into account relevant Resolutions and Decisions”. Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (n 344) 256. The criteria used as benchmarks for compliance were developed respectively in Resolution Conf. 8.4 (Rev. CoP15) – National laws for implementation of the Convention 1992 and Resolution Conf. 11.17 (Rev. CoP16) – National reports 2000.
358.
CITES (n 294) article IX(1).
359.
Ibid. article VIII(6)–(7)(a).
360.
Ibid. article VIII (7)(b).
361.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 520; see Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 134–147.
362.
CITES Secretariat, ‘CoP12 Doc.22.1 – Report on national reports required under Article VIII, paragraph 7, of the Convention – Annual Reports’ (3–15 November 2002) 1–2 §5, noting that levels of on-time submission ranges between 35 % and 60 % since the entry into force of the Convention. Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 521–522; Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 259) 425; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 62–67, 147–152.
363.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 68; Sand, ‘Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment’ (n 355) 49–50.
364.
Fuchs (n 355) 1585; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 227–230.
365.
J. E. Scanlon, ‘CITES at Its Best: CoP16 as a ‘Watershed Moment’ for the World’s Wildlife’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 222, 223–225.
366.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 75–76.
367.
Resolution Conf. 12.8 (Rev. CoP13) – Review of Significant Trade in specimens of Appendix-II species 2002 operative part; see Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 519; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) chapter 7.
368.
S. Aguilar, ‘Regulatory Tools for the Management of Fish and Timber Species through CITES’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 281, 284–285; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 522–525.
369.
Resolution Conf. 12.8 (Rev. CoP13) – Review of Significant Trade in specimens of Appendix-II species (n 367).
370.
R. W. G. Jenkins, ‘The Significant Trade Process: Making Appendix II Work’ in J. Hutton and B. Dickson (eds), Endangered Species-Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and Future of CITES (Earthscan 2000) 48.
371.
R. Reeve, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)’ in G. Ulfstein (ed), Making treaties work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (Cambridge University Press 2007) 136; G. Ulfstein, ‘Dispute resolution, compliance control and enforcement in international environmental law’ in G. Ulfstein (ed), Making treaties work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (Cambridge University Press 2007) 125.
372.
V. Koester concluded that a compliance committee was not necessary nor would necessarily be beneficial (‘Compliance Committees within MEAs and the Desirability and Feasibility of Establishing Special Compliance Bodies under CITES’ 20 May 2004, SC54 Inf. 3 (CITES 2006)).
373.
Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 259) 439–441; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) chapters 5–7; Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (n 344) 251–262.
374.
CITES (n 294) article XIV(1).
375.
Even though the mechanism is not referred to as such in Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP16) – Compliance and enforcement 2000, it is quite regularly used against both parties and non-parties (Fuchs (n 355) 1587; Reeve, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)’ (n 371) 149–152; Sand, ‘Endangered Species, International Protection’ (n 348) §18). Aguilar considers that trade sanctions on the recommendation of the Standing Committee or the CoP are actually compulsory, as they implement article II(4) ((n 368) 285).
376.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 518–519.
377.
Reeve, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)’ (n 371) 149.
378.
Willock, ‘Administrative and Monitoring Implications of listing’ (n 314) 10.
379.
Resolution Conf. 11.17 (Rev. CoP16) – National reports (n 357).
380.
Reeve, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)’ (n 371) 140–141. The power of recommendation of the CoP is explicitly provided for in CITES (n 294) article XIII(3); on this, see M. Yeater and J. Vasquez, ‘Demystifying the Relationship Between CITES and the WTO’ (2001) 10 RECIEL 271, 275.
381.
CITES (n 294) article XVIII(2).
382.
W. Wijnstekers, The Evolution of CITES (9^th edn CIC – International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation 2011) 477.
383.
Reeve, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)’ (n 371) 158.
384.
Since 29 November 2013, regional economic integration organizations are also able to accede to the Convention, following the entry into force of the Gaborone amendment (CITES Secretariat, ‘Notification to the parties n° 2013/045 – Entry into force of the amendment to Article XXI of the text of the Convention (Gaborone, 30 April 1983)’ (4 October 2013)).
385.
See for example Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 484; D. Harland, Killing Game: International Law and the African Elephant (Praeger 1994) 12; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 6; Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (n 344) 252, 255. However, on the other hand, see for example the nuanced assessment in K. Baakman, Testing Times: The Effectiveness of Five International Biodiversity-Related Conventions (Wolf Legal Publishers 2011) 264–265. For more on the regime’s efficacy, see infra Chapter 5 D.
386.
B. Dickson, ‘CITES and the livelihoods of the poor’ (2008) 42 Oryx 548, 549; Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 259) 166–170; Sand, ‘Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment’ (n 355) 30–31.
387.
E. Couzens (‘CITES at Forty: Never Too Late to Make Lifestyle Changes’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 311, 311–323) expresses such concerns and suggests an innovative evolution of CITES, where blacklisting of endangered or threatened species is replaced by a whitelisting of species that can be traded.
388.
J. Copeland Nagle, ‘Why Chinese Wildlife Disappears as CITES Spreads?’ (1996–1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 435, 439–440; M. A. Du Plessis, ‘CITES and the Causes of Extinction’ in J. Hutton and B. Dickson (eds), Endangered Species-Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and Future of CITES (Earthscan 2000) 22; J. Hutton and B. Dickson, ‘Introduction’ in J. Hutton and B. Dickson (eds), Endangered Species-Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and Future of CITES (Earthscan 2000) xvi; M. Recharte Uscamaita and R. Bodmer, ‘Recovery of the Endangered giant otter Pteronura brasiliensis on the Yavarí-Mirín and Yavarí Rivers: a success story for CITES’ (2009) 44 Oryx 83, 86.
389.
Dickson, ‘CITES and the livelihoods of the poor’ (n 386) 549.
390.
Hutton and Dickson (n 388) xvi.
391.
According to the Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) – Lauderdale criteria (n 299) annex 5 extrinsic vulnerabilities include inter alia habitat loss, threats from alien species or rapid environmental change.
392.
M. Bowman, ‘A Tale of Two CITES: Divergent Perspectives upon the Effectiveness of the Wildlife Trade Convention’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 228, 235.
393.
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 690.
394.
Mahiou, Le droit international ou la dialectique de la rigueur et de la flexibilité (n 107) 349. However, states relying on the agreement would to have suffered a detriment or prejudice (North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (n 106) 26 §30; T. Cottier and J. P. Müller ‘Estoppel’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §6–7).
395.
Resolution Conf. 14.3 – CITES compliance procedures (n 356) annex §30 and footnote 1; Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (n 344) 256.
396.
Boyle and Chinkin (n 202) 216.
397.
Mahiou, Le droit international ou la dialectique de la rigueur et de la flexibilité (n 107) 350.
398.
Boyle and Chinkin (n 202) 214; Shelton (n 341) 75.
399.
K. Eldridge, ‘Whale For Sale?: New Developments in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’ (1994–1995) 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 549, 565.
400.
See for example Denmark (on behalf of the EU) ‘CoP16 Doc. 4.2 (Rev. 1) – Proposal to improve transparency of voting during meetings of the Conference of the Parties’ (n 297); Chile and Mexico ‘CoP16 Doc. 4.3 (Rev. 1) – Proposed amendment to Rule 25 on Methods of Voting use of secret ballots’ (n 297).
401.
A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (New Horizons in Environmental Law, Edward Elgar 2005) 432–433; E. J. Molenaar, ‘Marine Mammals: The Role of Ethics and Ecosystem Considerations’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 31, 40.
402.
See for example the NDF in the trade of bottlenose dolphins as shown in E. C. M. Parsons, N. A. Rose and T. M. Telecky, ‘The trade in live Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins from Solomon Islands: A CITES decision implementation case study’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 384.
403.
As required in CITES (n 294) article IX.
404.
Ibid. article VIII(1), (3) and (6), as presented in S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Grotius Publications Limited 1985) 264, with precisions added in square brackets.
405.
Hutton and Dickson (n 388) xvi.
406.
D. Brack (‘Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System’ in G. P. Sampson and W. B. Chambers (eds), Trade, Environment and the Millennium (United Nations University Press 2002) 334) refers to “an almost 100 percent success rate” and Sand (‘Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’ (n 344) 255) to “[t]he extraordinary effectiveness of the scheme”, but R. Reeve (‘Wildlife Trade, Sanctions and Compliance’ (2006) 82 International Affairs 881, 892–895) presents a more balanced evaluation.
407.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 61.
408.
‘Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals’ (CMS) 1979, 1651 United Nations Treaty Series 333 article I(1)(h).
409.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 62.
410.
CMS CoP, ‘Appendices I and II of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals’ (effective as of 8 February 2015) http://www.cms.int/manage/sites/default/files/document/Appendices_COP11_E_version5June2015.pdf accessed 4 July 2015.
411.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 538 n 13.
412.
R. Caddell, ‘International Law and the Protection of Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal of Twenty-Five Years of the Bonn Convention’ (2005) 16 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 113, 115–116.
413.
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 681.
414.
CMS, Resolution 5.3 – Interpretation of certain terms of the Convention, 1997 §1.
415.
Established according to CMS (n 408) article VIII(1).
416.
CMS, Resolution 5.3, Interpretation of certain terms of the Convention (n 568) §2, as presented in Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 541.
417.
CMS (n 408) article III(2).
418.
Ibid. article I(1)(e).
419.
Ibid. article III(4).
420.
Ibid. article III(5).
421.
Ibid.
422.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 537.
423.
CMS (n 408) article IV(3).
424.
Ibid. article V(2).
425.
Ibid. article IV(2); Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 681.
426.
‘Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats’ 1991, 1863 United Nations Treaty Series 101; ‘Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds’ 1995; ‘Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels’ 2001, 2258 United Nations Treaty Series 257; ‘Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats’ 2007, 2545 United Nations Treaty Series 55.
427.
CMS (n 408) article IV(4).
428.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 558, 560–562.
429.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks, ‘Signatories’ http://sharksmou.org/list-of-signatories accessed 6 July 2015.
430.
‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks’ (MoU on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks) 2010 preamble and section 3 (Fundamental Principles) §6–7; Lack and Sant (n 188) 15.
431.
Ibid. preamble and section 4 (Conservation Plan); Annex 3 to the MoU on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks: Conservation Plan 27 September 2012 http://cms.eaudeweb.ro/fr/document/conservation-plan accessed 4 July 2015, CMS/Sharks/Outcome 1.2 objectives A, B, E.
432.
MoU on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks (n 430) section 7 (Advisory Committee); Terms of References of the Advisory Committee 24 September 2012 http://www.cms.int/huemul/sites/default/files/document/Outcome_1_1_AC_ToR_E_0.pdf accessed 4 July 2015.
433.
Authorization of Cooperating Organizations to Sign the MoU 24 September 2012, CMS/Sharks/MOS1/Doc.6.2 http://sharksmou.org/MOS1 accessed 4 July 2015.
434.
N. Matz, ‘Chaos or Coherence? – Implementing and Enforcing the Conservation of Migratory Species through Various Legal Instruments’ (2005) 65 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 197, 207.
435.
See contradicting opinions on the question of the CMS’s role in the protection of habitats in Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 62; Matz, ‘Chaos or Coherence? – Implementing and Enforcing the Conservation of Migratory Species through Various Legal Instruments’ (n 434) 201–202.
436.
120 parties as of 1 May 2014 (‘Parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals’ (2014) http://www.cms.int/en/parties-range-states accessed 4 July 2015).
437.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 536, 544; several major range states such as Russia, China, Japan, Brazil or the USA are not parties to the CMS.
438.
Lyster (n 404) 16; see also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 684.
439.
Migratory Marine Species 2008, UNEP/CMS/Resolution 9.9 (CMS CoP) §4(b); By-Catch 2008, UNEP/CMS/Resolution 9.18 (CMS CoP) §9.
440.
Caddell, ‘International Law and the Protection of Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal of Twenty-Five Years of the Bonn Convention’ (n 412) 117.
441.
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 64) 684.
442.
Positive evidence that a species is endangered is needed for it to be listed in Appendix I (CMS (n 408) article III(2)).
443.
Ibid. article VIII(5).
444.
The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) was established in 1992 by pro-whaling states which were frustrated with the IWC (Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands). It was meant as an alternative to the IWC but has remained, so far, an advisory body only. Also, since states that wanted to resume whaling have done so within the IWC – by entering into reservations or undertaking scientific whaling –, NAMMCO’s role is not crucial (S. Andresen, ‘The International Whaling Regime: Order at the Turn of the Century’ in D. Vidas and W. Ostreng (eds), Order for the oceans at the turn of the century (Kluwer Law International 1999) 222–223). On NAMMCO, see D. D. Caron, ‘The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures’ (1995) 89 The American Journal of International Law 154, 163–166.
445.
‘International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’ (ICRW) 1946, 161 United Nations Treaty Series 72 preamble.
446.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 152–153. On preservationism and sustainable use, see infra Chapter 4 A. II. 4.
447.
S. Freeland and J. Drysdale, ‘Co-Operation or Chaos? – Article 65 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Future of the International Whaling Commission’ (2005) 2 Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 1, 3.
448.
W. C. Burns, ‘The International Whaling Commission and the Future of Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects’ (1997) 8 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 8, 35.
449.
M. Arbour and S. Lavallée, Droit international de l’environnement (Bruylant 2006) 406; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 164; Burns (n 448) 35–41; M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Divided we stand: the legal issues concerning the international whaling commission’ in H. P. Hestermeyer and others (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 832–833.
450.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 157: in 1982, of the 25 votes in favor of the moratorium, 15 were from members who had joined since 1979.
451.
Andresen (n 444) 218.
452.
Fitzmaurice, ‘Divided we stand: the legal issues concerning the international whaling commission’ (n 449) 833, 838.
453.
Andresen (n 444) 219; C. P. Carlarne, ‘Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies’ (2005–2006) 24 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 1, 7.
454.
C. Epstein, ‘The Making of Global Environmental Norms – Endangered Species Protection’ (2006) 6 Global Environmental Politics 32, 45.
455.
Freeland and Drysdale (n 447) 8–9.
456.
Eldridge (n 399) 553–554; S. Suhre, ‘Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling Commission’s Shift from a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation’ (1999–2000) 12 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 305, 313–314. Japan signed the Murazawa-Baldridge Pact in 1987 according to which it was allocated fishing rights in the American EEZ in exchange for withdrawing its reservation against the moratorium (K. Hirata, ‘Why Japan Supports Whaling’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 129, 132).
457.
Hirata (n 456) 132.
458.
The Schedule of the ICRW §10(e) (reference omitted) reads as “Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits.” On this, see Arbour and Lavallée (n 449) 405; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 166; Eldridge (n 399) 554; Suhre (n 456) 310–311.
459.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 166–167.
460.
On the Revised Management Procedure, see Burns (n 448) 53–73; on the Revised Management Scheme, see Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy (n 401) 357–385 chapter 12.
461.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 153–154, 167–168; Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (n 55) 108; J. Morishita, ‘Multiple analysis of the whaling issue: Understanding the dispute by a matrix’ (2006) 30 Marine Policy 802, 805.
462.
P. J. Clapham and others, ‘The whaling issue: Conservation, confusion, and casuistry’ (2007) 31 Marine Policy 314, 317–318.
463.
Suhre (n 456) 312–313.
464.
ICJ – Press Release, ‘Australia institutes proceedings against Japan for alleged breach of international obligations concerning whaling’ (2010) http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15953.pdf accessed 4 July 2015; D. K. Anton, ‘Dispute Concerning Japan’s JARPA II Program of “Scientific Whaling” (Australia v. Japan)’ (2010) http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/20/dispute-concerning-japan%E2%80%99s-jarpa-ii-program-%E2%80%9Cscientific-whaling%E2%80%9D accessed 4 July 2015. Morishita considers that the scientific program is source of useful data and is not ‘commercial whaling in disguise’ (‘Multiple analysis of the whaling issue: Understanding the dispute by a matrix’ (n 461) 804).
465.
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand intervening) (n 347) 71 §247; for more on this case, see infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 3. c) aa).
466.
‘Japan to launch reduced Pacific whale hunt next week’ BBC news (18 April 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27079462 accessed 6 July 2015.
467.
Carlarne (n 453) 35; Epstein (n 454) 47–48; Molenaar, ‘Marine Mammals: The Role of Ethics and Ecosystem Considerations’ (n 401) 40.
468.
ICRW (n 445) article III(2).
469.
Ibid. article V(1); Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 164–165; Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (n 55) 256.
470.
ICRW (n 445) article V(3).
471.
Ibid. article V(2).
472.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 152.
473.
IWC, ‘Whale Sanctuaries – Establishment of the International Whaling Commission’s sanctuaries’ http://iwc.int/sanctuaries accessed 4 July 2015. They are adopted on the basis of the ICRW (n 445) articles V(1)(c)-VI, as presented in Beer-Gabel and Lestang (n 213) 115–117. The creation of sanctuaries is however not without controversy (J. Braig, ‘Whaling’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §28).
474.
ICRW (n 445) article V(3).
475.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 163; D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing 2010) 309.
476.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 163.
477.
This has happened at several occasions, for example with Iceland, which left in 1992 – and rejoined ten years later – or Ecuador which withdrew in 1994 – and rejoined in 2007 (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 151 n 14).
478.
Schedule of the ICRW (n 458) §13. On aboriginal whaling, see for example J. Firestone and J. Lilley, ‘Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling and the Right to Practice and Revitalize Cultural Traditions and Customs’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 177; Fitzmaurice, ‘Divided we stand: the legal issues concerning the international whaling commission’ (n 449) 845–848; Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy (n 401) 194–246 chapter 8; H. N. Scheiber, ‘Historical Memory, Cultural Claims, and Environmental Ethics: The Jurisprudence of Whaling Regulation’ in H. N. Scheiber (ed), Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000) 142–146.
479.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 170.
480.
Carlarne (n 453) 11–12.
481.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 178; Hirata (n 456) 136; Suhre (n 456) 325–326. Against the validity of this view, see for example Scheiber (n 478) 164–166.
482.
ICRW (n 445) article VIII(1); P. H. Sand, ‘Japan’s ‘Research Whaling’ in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the Face of the Endangered Species Convention (CITES)’ (2008) 17 RECIEL 56, 57. On scientific whaling, see for example Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy (n 401) 109–147 chapter 5.
483.
Schedule of the ICRW (n 458) §30; IWC, Resolution 1995–9, Resolution on whaling under special permit 1995, (IWC Annual meeting of the Commission); Arbour and Lavallée (n 449) 402–403.
484.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 175; Braig (n 473) §21–25.
485.
IWC, Resolution 2007-1, Resolution on JARPA 2007; Fitzmaurice, ‘Divided we stand: the legal issues concerning the international whaling commission’ (n 449) 848–849; Sand, ‘Japan’s ‘Research Whaling’ in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the Face of the Endangered Species Convention (CITES)’ (n 482) 57–58.
486.
For more on the Whaling case, see infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 3. c) aa).
487.
Schedule of the ICRW (n 458) §21(a) and (c); A. Gillespie, ‘The Search for a New Compliance Mechanism Within the International Whaling Commission’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law 349, 350.
488.
Suhre (n 456) 316.
489.
CITES (n 294) article VIII.
490.
Respectively 22 USC §1978 and 16 USC §1821. On these, see for example G. S. Martin and J. W. Brennan, ‘Enforcing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments’ (1989) 17 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 293; D. M. Wilkinson, ‘The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective’ (1989) 17 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 271.
491.
Andresen (n 444) 224. Under the Pelly Amendment, the Secretary of Commerce (as well as the Secretary of the Interior in situations involving endangered or threatened species) can certify to the President that nationals of another country are “conducting fishing operations in a manner […] which diminish[es] the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program [...or] any international program for endangered or threatened species” (22 USC §1978(a)(1)(2)). In this case, the President can give the order to the Secretary of the Treasury “to prohibit […] the importation into the United States of any products from the offending country for any duration as the President determines appropriate” (22 USC §1978(a)(4)). As for the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, it functions in a similar manner, but without the discretion given to the President to require or not sanctions; in this case, as soon as a country is certified by the Secretary of Commerce as “diminish[ing] the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling” (16 USC §1821(e)(2)(A)), the Secretary of State must decrease this country's allocation of fishing rights in American waters (16 USC §1821(e)(2)(B)). The Secretary of Commerce has been granted quite a large discretion in its certification process, since the Supreme Court has decided that violations of IWC quotas would not necessarily trigger certification (Japanese Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society – 478 US 221, 241 (1986)). On this, see L. Jenkins, ‘Trade Sanctions: An Effective Enforcement Tool’ (1993) 2 RECIEL 362, 364–365; Suhre (n 456) 317–319.
492.
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 57) 184.
493.
Morishita, ‘Multiple analysis of the whaling issue: Understanding the dispute by a matrix’ (n 461) 803.
494.
Andresen (n 444) 227.
495.
Ibid. 215.
496.
Suhre (n 456) 315.
497.
A. Proelß, ‘Marine Mammals’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §17.
498.
Molenaar, ‘Marine Mammals: The Role of Ethics and Ecosystem Considerations’ (n 401) 37.
499.
‘Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ (WTO Agreement) 1994, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series 154 preamble; Tyler (n 40) 83.
500.
Statistics valid for 2000 (L. A. Chaves, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: WTO-consistent Trade related Measures to Address IUU Fishing: AUS:IUU/2000/16’ (Background paper for the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Organized by the Government of Australia in Cooperation with FAO, 2000) http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y3274E/y3274e0i.htm#bm18 accessed 4 July 2015, Executive Summary).
501.
On the core GATT obligations, see for example Calley (n 131) 210–219; B. J. Condon, Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law (Transnational Publishers 2006) chapter 3.
Other aspects of trade law, such as subsidies, are also relevant to fisheries governance but are not the focus of the present study (on this aspect, see for example E. A. Bilsky, ‘Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law’ (2008–2009) 30 Michigan Journal of International Law 599; C.-J. Chen, Fisheries Subsidies under International Law (Springer 2010); C. D. Stone, ‘Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?’ in K. P. Gallagher and J. Werksman (eds), The Earthscan Reader on International Trade and Sustainable Development (Earthscan 2002); O. R. Young, ‘Fragmentation or interaction: the WTO, fisheries subsidies, and international law’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 477). Also, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade could come into question, since states shall not implement unnecessary barriers to trade. However, protecting the environment is a legitimate goal to adopt technical barriers (on this aspect, see M. Ahmed, ‘Market Access and Trade Liberalisation in Fisheries’ ICTSD Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper 4 (Geneva 2006) 15–17; Calley (n 131) 220–221; R. G. Tarasofsky, ‘Regional Fisheries Organizations and the World Trade Organization: Compatibility or Conflict?’ (TRAFFIC International 2003) 9–10). Finally, sanitary and phytosanitary measures can be of relevance (on this aspect, see Ahmed (n 501) 14–15; Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 72–73; T. L. McDorman, ‘Fisheries Conservation and Management and International Trade Law’ in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International 1999) 508–510).
502.
‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (to be read together with GATT 1947) (GATT 1994) 1994, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series 187 article I(1).
503.
Ibid. article III(4).
504.
Condon (n 501) 53. On the debate, see for example N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder and others, Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence (Earthscan 2006) 203–205; Calley (n 131) 212–213.
505.
The Tuna/Dolphin cases (Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico v. United States), GATT Panel Report circulated not adopted, 3 September 1991, DS21/R – 39S/155, (1991) 30 ILM 1594; Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (European Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands v. United States), GATT Panel Report circulated not adopted, 16 June 1994, DS29/R, (1994) 33 ILM 839 – respectively Tuna Dolphin I and Tuna Dolphin II) were related to a ban by the USA on tuna imports in situations where dolphins were not sufficiently protected in the course of the tuna fishing activities.
506.
Tuna Dolphin I (n 505) §5.8–5.16; Bernasconi-Osterwalder and others (n 504) 30.
507.
Condon (n 501) 55.
508.
The Shrimp-Turtle cases (United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand v United States of America), WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Appellate Body Report Adopted, 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R and United States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia), WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Appellate Body Report Adopted, 22 October 2001, WT/DS58/AB/RW, which is an examination by the Appellate Body of Malaysia’s allegation that the USA did not comply with the ruling – respectively Shrimp Turtle case and Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Appellate Body) were related to a ban by the USA on shrimp imports coming from countries that did not, in their view, sufficiently protect turtles in the course of the shrimp catching activities. On these cases, see Bernasconi-Osterwalder and others (n 504) 233–235.
509.
The criteria to determine ‘likeness’ might indeed be changing as hinted by other case-law (Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Canada v. European Communities), WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Appellate Body Report Adopted, 12 March 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R §102); on this, see for example Condon (n 501) 58–59.
510.
GATT 1994 (n 502) article V.
511.
L. de La Fayette, ‘Access to Ports in International Law’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 19.
512.
GATT 1994 (n 502) article XI(1).
513.
Condon (n 501) 10.
514.
Calley (n 131) 214–215.
515.
Tarasofsky (n 501) 5–6.
516.
Recommendation by ICCAT regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan Resolution, 1996; K. W. Riddle, ‘Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation Contagious?’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law 265, 285–286; Schmidt (n 241) 7 about Belize; D. Warner-Kramer, ‘Control Begins at Home: Tackling Flags of Convenience and IUU Fishing’ (2004) 34 Golden Gate University Law Review 497, 514; ICTSD, ‘Fishing, International trade and Sustainable Development: Policy Discussion Paper’ Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development Studies (2006) http://www.ictsd.org/themes/environment/research/fisheries-international-trade-and-sustainable-development accessed 4 July 2015, 85. ICCAT delayed the imposition of a similar ban in relation to Panama, providing this country with approximately six months to rectify the situation, since Panama had pledged its willingness to do so – it was unsuccessful in this attempt (Chaves (n 500) §20).
517.
Yeater and Vasquez (n 380) 273.
518.
Tarasofsky (n 501) 2–3.
519.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 311–312.
520.
La Fayette, ‘Access to Ports in International Law’ (n 511) 20.
521.
GATT 1994 (n 502) article XX chapeau and (g).
522.
Tarasofsky (n 501) 1.
523.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 307.
524.
It is worthwhile noting that article XX is interpreted in an evolutionary way (Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §130).
Of particular interest are the Shrimp Turtle cases and Tuna Dolphin cases. Both the dolphin and turtle species were listed under CITES, but the issue was the unilateral implementation by the USA of rules linked to the by-catch of such species.
525.
Tuna Dolphin II (n 505) §5.12.
526.
R. Wolfrum, ‘Article XX GATT [Introduction]’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll and A. Seibert-Fohr (eds), WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 64; Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §123, 146–147.
527.
Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §130.
Whether a treaty ought to be interpreted with the critical date being the time of its adoption (ex tunc interpretation) or whether later developments should be taken into account (ex nunc interpretation) remains to be fully clarified. The former is based on the justification that it actually reflects the legislative intent of the drafters, while the latter recognizes that subsequent practice exists and affects legal relationships. Overall, the decision to choose one interpretative method over the other depends on the circumstances of the case and the text of the instrument itself (ILC, ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalized by M. Koskenniemi) 13 April 2006, A/CN.4/L.682, 240–243 §475–478).
This tension was already acknowledged in the doctrine of inter-temporal law, as defined by Judge Huber (Island of Palmas case (Netherlands/United States of America), Award, 4 April 1928, Permanent Court of Arbitration II R.I.A.A. 839, 845) since it encompassed both aspects of contemporaneity (with the drafting) and evolution. As for the ICJ, it presented arguments for an ex tunc interpretation in Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 August 1952, I.C.J. Reports 1952 176, 189, but also found support in the wording of the treaty for an ex nunc interpretation in its Legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971 16, 31 §53. On inter-temporal law and evolutionary interpretation of WTO provisions, see Condon (n 501) 37–41; P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: Between Memory and Prophecy’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University Press 2011) 128–130.
528.
Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §128, making reference to World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (usually referred to as the Brundtland Report) (Oxford University Press 1987) 13; on this, see N. Matz-Lück and R. Wolfrum, ‘Article XX lit. g GATT’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T Stoll and A. Seibert-Fohr (eds), WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 145–147.
529.
Tyler (n 40) 88 (reference omitted).
530.
Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §133.
531.
Matz-Lück and Wolfrum (n 528) 149.
532.
Condon (n 501) 143–144, 197–198; on more general questions of standing and judicial dispute settlement, see infra Chapter 4 A. IV. 3. c) ee).
533.
Canada — Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (United States v. Canada), GATT Panel Report adopted, 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/98 §4.6; Condon (n 501) 98–101; Tarasofsky (n 501) 11.
534.
Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish (n 31) 200 (references omitted); Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §135, 141–142.
535.
La Fayette, ‘Access to Ports in International Law’ (n 511) 21.
536.
GATT 1994 (n 502) article XX chapeau.
537.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 311.
538.
On the need to pursue equitable negotiations, see Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §166, 172; Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Appellate Body (n 508) §122.
539.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 311–312.
540.
United States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia), WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Panel Report, 15 June 2001, WT/DS58/RW §5.88 (Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Panel).
541.
Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Appellate Body (n 508) §124.
542.
Tarasofsky (n 501) vi. For RFMOs, it indeed appears that most trade restricting measures reflect the international consensus as found in the UNFSA, PSMA, CCRF, IPOA-IUU, but questions related to the RFMO’s inclusiveness and decision-making methods – i.e. adoption rules – would be probably discussed (Tarasofsky (n 501) 22–23; Condon (n 501) 194).
543.
Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Panel (n 540) 74 §5.43–81 §5.67; Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Appellate Body (n 508) §115–134.
544.
La Fayette, ‘Access to Ports in International Law’ (n 511) 20–21; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 311–312.
545.
Tyler (n 40) 82 (reference omitted).
546.
B. K. Sovacool, ‘A Game of Cat and Fish: How to Restore the Balance in Sustainable Fisheries Management’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development and International Law 97, 117 (reference omitted).
547.
Agnew (n 239) 369–370.
548.
Shrimp Turtle 21.5 Appellate Body (n 508) §134; Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 308–309.
549.
O. S. Stokke, ‘Trade Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay and Effective Governance in the Northeast Atlantic’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 339, 342; on the expected effects of a trade ban against Iceland because of its whaling activities, see T. L. McDorman, ‘Iceland, Whaling and the U.S. Pelly Amendment: The International Trade Law Context’ (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 453.
550.
Carlarne (n 453) 40.
551.
On this, see supra Chapter 3 B. II. 3.
552.
Stokke, ‘Trade Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay and Effective Governance in the Northeast Atlantic’ (n 549) 347.
553.
WTO, ‘The Doha mandate on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)’ http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm accessed 4 July 2015.
554.
For example on the one applied by IOTC, see Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High-seas Fisheries (n 267) 191. Also, the shifting of the burden of proof might be problematic (D. Bialek, ‘Sink or Swim: Measures Under International Law for the Conservation of the Patagonian Toothfish in the Southern Ocean’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law 105, 124–125). On a general presentation of the issues at stake in applying trade restrictions to non-contracting parties, in terms of international economic law, see D. König, ‘Flags of Convenience’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law www.mpepil.com §22–23.
555.
E. J. Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction: Towards Mandatory and Comprehensive Use’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea – Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2006) 207.
556.
ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 2001, articles 22, 52.
557.
Shrimp Turtle case (n 508) §164 (italics omitted).
558.
Tyler (n 40) 82.
559.
‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ 1994, 1869 United Nations Treaty Series 401 article 6; P.-T. Stoll and F. Schorkopf, WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 77–78.
560.
‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ (n 559) article 16.
561.
Ibid. article 17; Stoll and Schorkopf (n 559) 78–79.
562.
‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ (n 559) articles 21–22; Stoll and Schorkopf (n 559) 90–95; Stokke, ‘Trade Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay and Effective Governance in the Northeast Atlantic’ (n 549) 342.
563.
M. W. Gehring, ‘WTO law and sustainable development’ in D. Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge 2009) 377–378.
564.
Condon (n 501) 45.
565.
Ibid. 195; E. Franckx, ‘The Protection of Biodiversity and Fisheries Management: Issues Raised by the Relationship between CITES and LOSC’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea – Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press 2006) 229.
566.
Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species (n 296) 306.
567.
WTO Agreement (n 499) preamble; Gehring (n 563) 381–382.
568.
Chaves (n 500) §32–36.

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Solène Guggisberg

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Guggisberg, S. (2016). Chapter 3 Global and Regional Legal Regimes Dealing with Commercially-exploited Marine Species. In: The Use of CITES for Commercially-exploited Fish Species. Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23702-2_3

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