End-to-End Key Establishment with Physical Layer Key Generation and Specific Attacker Models

  • Stefan PfennigEmail author
  • Elke Franz
  • Sabrina Engelmann
  • Anne Wolf
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 358)


Physical layer key generation got much attention during the last time. However, the need of a common physical channel implies that only point-to-point keys can be generated. In this chapter, we investigate approaches how these point-to-point keys can be used for a secure establishment of end-to-end keys between two users who can only communicate over a multi-hop network. We start with a review of physical layer key generation taking different attacker models into account. Subsequently, we introduce general approaches for the end-to-end key establishment in the presence of various attackers who differ in their behavior and their area of control. We discuss four different path selection algorithms for the key establishment and evaluate their performance by means of simulations. The results show that the end-to-end key establishment can be protected by means of physical layer keys with a reasonable effort if suitable path selection is applied.


Channel Estimation Network Node Physical Layer Attack Model External Entity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This work is supported in part by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the Collaborative Research Center 912 “Highly Adaptive Energy-Efficient Computing” and by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of the Federal Republic of Germany (Förderkennzeichen 16 KIS 0009, Prophylaxe). The authors alone are responsible for the content of the chapter.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Pfennig
    • 1
    Email author
  • Elke Franz
    • 1
  • Sabrina Engelmann
    • 1
  • Anne Wolf
    • 1
  1. 1.Technische Universität DresdenDresdenGermany

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