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Comparative Analysis of Leakage Tools on Scalable Case Studies

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Model Checking Software (SPIN 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9232))

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Abstract

Quantitative security techniques have been proven effective to measure the security of systems against various types of attackers. However, such techniques are often tested against small-scale academic examples.

In this paper we analyze two scalable, real life privacy case studies: the privacy of the energy consumption data of the users of a smart grid network and the secrecy of the voters’ voting preferences with different types of voting protocols.

We contribute a new trace analysis algorithm for leakage calculation in QUAIL. We analyze both case studies with three state-of-the-art information leakage computation tools: LeakWatch, Moped-QLeak, and our tool QUAIL equipped with the new algorithm. We highlight the relative advantages and drawbacks of the tools and compare their usability and effectiveness in analyzing the case studies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    http://fortiss.org.

  2. 2.

    The files used for our experiments are available at https://project.inria.fr/quail/casestudies/.

  3. 3.

    livinglab.fortiss.org.

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Correspondence to Fabrizio Biondi or Jean Quilbeuf .

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Biondi, F., Legay, A., Quilbeuf, J. (2015). Comparative Analysis of Leakage Tools on Scalable Case Studies. In: Fischer, B., Geldenhuys, J. (eds) Model Checking Software. SPIN 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9232. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23404-5_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23404-5_17

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