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International Conference on Information Security

ISC 2015: Information Security pp 3–20Cite as

Black-Box Separations on Fiat-Shamir-Type Signatures in the Non-Programmable Random Oracle Model

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9290))

Abstract

In recent years, Fischlin and Fleischhacker showed the impossibility of proving the security of specific types of FS-type signatures, the signatures constructed by the Fiat-Shamir transformation, via a single-instance reduction in the non-programmable random oracle model (NPROM, for short).

In this paper, we pose a question whether or not the impossibility of proving the security of any FS-type signature can be shown in the NPROM. For this question, we show that each FS-type signature cannot be proven to be secure via a key-preserving reduction in the NPROM from the security against the impersonation of the underlying identification scheme under the passive attack, as long as the identification scheme is secure against the impersonation under the active attack.

We also show the security incompatibility between the discrete logarithm assumption and the security of the Schnorr signature via a single-instance key-preserving reduction, whereas Fischlin and Fleischhacker showed that such an incompatibility cannot be proven via a non-key-preserving reduction.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. A part of this work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K16001.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information Media, Hokkaido Information University, Nishi-Nopporo 59-2, Ebetsu, Hokkaido, 069-8585, Japan

    Masayuki Fukumitsu

  2. Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, 41 Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi, 980–8576, Japan

    Shingo Hasegawa

Authors
  1. Masayuki Fukumitsu
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  2. Shingo Hasegawa
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Correspondence to Masayuki Fukumitsu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  2. Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom

    Chris J. Mitchell

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Fukumitsu, M., Hasegawa, S. (2015). Black-Box Separations on Fiat-Shamir-Type Signatures in the Non-Programmable Random Oracle Model. In: Lopez, J., Mitchell, C. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9290. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23318-5_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23318-5_1

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