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Scientific Representation, Denotation, and Fictional Entities

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Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki

Part of the book series: European Studies in Philosophy of Science ((ESPS,volume 1))

Abstract

I critically review RIG Hughes’ Denotation-Demonstration-Interpretation account of scientific representation, focusing in particular on the representation of fictional entities in science. I find the original account lacking, but argue that it can be extended in suitable ways. In particular I argue that an extension of this account that weakens the denotation and interpretation conditions can accommodate fictions. This extension also reveals the essential deflationary nature of scientific representation, by bringing into relief the functional roles of denotation and interpretation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an elaboration of the distinction between deflationary and substantive accounts, see Suárez (2010) and, particularly Suárez (2015) of which the above is an abbreviated version.

  2. 2.

    For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Suárez (2015).

  3. 3.

    Goodman (1976); see also Elgin (1996, 2009).

  4. 4.

    For instance see Chang and Kleiser (1990, p. 20ff).

  5. 5.

    See e.g. Van Fraassen (2008), Chap. 6.

  6. 6.

    For more case studies see the various essays contained in Suárez (2009); Woods (2010). For a discussion of Maxwell’s (1961/2) model, see e.g. Nersessian (2008).

  7. 7.

    Note that the asymmetry does of course not entail that denotative function is in the end also a success term. Denotative function is a more general term that covers cases of successful denotation and cases of unsuccessful denotation alike. Hence it is not per se a success term, even though of one of its subclasses certainly is so.

  8. 8.

    See Elgin (2009, p. 78) for a similar distinction as applied to what she refers to as ‘P-representations’ as opposed to ‘representations-of-P’. The latter are defined by their relation to a particular kind of things, while the former are, by contrast, defined entirely in terms of features of symbol systems – so belonging in that class is entirely determined by compliance with the norms of use within a practice.

References

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Acknowledgements

This article draws extensively on the discussion of related topics in Suárez (2015), particularly Sects. 3 and 4. I am grateful for comments and suggestions to audiences at the BSPS 2013 conference at Exeter, and the EPSA13 conference in Helsinki. Particular thanks to my co-symposiaists at EPSA13, Sorin Bangu, Tarja Knuuttila, Andrea Loettgers as well as two anonymous referees. Financial support is acknowledged from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (project FFI2014-57064-P), and from the European Commission (under the Marie Curie programme PEF-GA-2012-329430). Figures 1 and 3 are reprinted from Hughes (1997) with permission from University of Chicago Press.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London University, Senate House, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HU, UK

    Mauricio Suárez

  2. Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, 28040, Spain

    Mauricio Suárez

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  1. Mauricio Suárez
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Correspondence to Mauricio Suárez .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Uskali Mäki

  2. DCLPS, Heinrich-Heine University Duesseldorf , Duesseldorf, Germany

    Ioannis Votsis

  3. Pierre Mendés-France University, Grenoble, France

    Stéphanie Ruphy

  4. DCLPS, Heinrich-Heine University Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf, Germany

    Gerhard Schurz

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Suárez, M. (2015). Scientific Representation, Denotation, and Fictional Entities. In: Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (eds) Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_25

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