Abstract
Criticisms of the value-free ideal often proceed on the basis of underdetermination theses, arguing that empirical evidence and cognitive values are not (always) sufficient to determine theory choice, wherefore other values came to bear on such choices. A common strategy against such criticisms can be found in what I call the agnosticism-argument. It claims that, first, not all theory assessment is permanently underdetermined. Second, in cases where theory assessment is currently underdetermined, the epistemically correct reaction is to stay agnostic until further evidence is given: Theory assessment should be postponed rather than made dependent on non-cognitive values. I will question this second point and argue that agnosticism is not a successful defence of the value-free ideal against the problem of (transient) underdetermination. The agnosticism-argument fails because not all epistemically relevant decisions can possibly be postponed or determined by further evidence. Ultimately, this proves fatal for the ideal of value-freedom itself, since even a complete adherence to its prescriptions can lead to value-laden results.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Similar points have been made frequently against the argument from inductive risks, which holds that in cases where errors would have foreseeable consequences if applied in practice, value-judgments on the severity of these consequences affect or ought to affect the assessment of the respective theories (cf. Rudner 1953; Douglas 2000). It is often encountered by a differentiation between belief and action, i.e. the acceptance of a hypothesis and the decision to act upon it (cf. e.g. Jeffrey 1956; Levi 1960; Mitchell 2004; Betz 2013). Defenders of VFI usually argue that scientists should just acknowledge the existing uncertainties (and communicate them to policy-makers). In cases where the need to act prohibits postponing policy-decisions until more evidence is given, such decisions need to be made based on a weighting of the different risks. Thus, things can get messy – but that is a problem of the application of science, not a systematic reason against the epistemic ideal of value-freedom. One way of responding to these arguments is similar to the one I will spell out below: Not only decisions concerning the assessment of developed theories regarding given empirical data are relevant here; instead, this development and therefore the respective theories as well as the generated data are already affected by numerous methodological decisions (e.g., the determination of significance levels) which are underdetermined by the evidence as well (cf. Douglas 2000; Wilholt 2009). In a nutshell, the decisive steps occur before we even get to the problem of acceptance or rejection.
- 3.
AA might then be said to enable value-freedom concerning beliefs, even if acceptance is value-laden.
- 4.
For a discussion of whether this dependence of cognitive values on specific research goals leads to a situation of incommensurability of research done in different contexts and with different aims, cf. Bueter (2010).
- 5.
This point has been made first by Ohkrulik (1994), who argues that the selection of the best a number of sexist theories according to cognitive values does not make the best candidate value-free. Instead, its comparative status just stems from a lack of non-sexist alternatives.
- 6.
Cf. also Bueter (2015) for a more detailed discussion as well as an illustration of the argument from blind spots by a case study on women’s health research.
References
Betz, G. (2013). In defence of the value-free ideal. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 3, 207–220.
Biddle, J. (2013). State of the field: Transient underdetermination and values in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44, 124–133.
Bueter, A. (2010). Social objectivity and the problem of local epistemologies. Analyse and Kritik, 32, 213–230.
Bueter, A. (2015). The irreducibility of value-freedom to theory assessment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 49, 18–26.
Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 67, 559–579.
Elliott, K. C., & McKaughan, D. J. (2009). How values in discovery and pursuit alter theory appraisal. Philosophy of Science, 76(Proceedings), 598–611.
Elliott, K. C., & McKaughan, D. J. (2014). Nonepistemic values and the multiple goals of science. Philosophy of Science, 81, 1–21.
Elliott, K. C., & Willmes, D. (2013). Cognitive attitudes and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 80(Proceedings), 807–817.
Giere, R. N. (2003). A new program for philosophy of science? Philosophy of Science, 70, 15–21.
Haack, S. (1996). Science as social? – yes and no. In L. Hankinson Nelson & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science (pp. 79–83). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Harding, S. (1992). After the neutrality ideal: Science, politics, and “strong objectivity”. Social Research, 59, 567–587.
Howard, D. (2009). Better red than dead – Putting an end to the social irrelevance of postwar philosophy of science. Science and Education, 18, 199–220.
Jeffrey, R. C. (1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science, 23, 237–246.
Kitcher, P. (2001). Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kourany, J. A. (2003a). A philosophy of science for the twenty-first century. Philosophy of Science, 70, 1–14.
Kourany, J. A. (2003b). Reply to Giere. Philosophy of Science, 70, 22–26.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In T. S. Kuhn (Ed.), The essential tension (pp. 320–339). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Laudan, L. (2004). The epistemic, the cognitive, and the social. In P. Machamer & G. Wolters (Eds.), Science, values, and objectivity (pp. 14–23). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Levi, I. (1960). Must the scientist make value judgments? The Journal of Philosophy, 57, 345–357.
Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Longino, H. E. (1996). Cognitive and non-cognitive values in science: Rethinking the dichotomy. In L. H. Nelson & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science (pp. 39–58). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
McMullin, E. (1983). Values in science. In PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (Part II: Symposia, pp. 3–28). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, S. (2004). The prescribed and proscribed values in science policy. In P. Machamer & G. Wolters (Eds.), Science, values, and objectivity (pp. 245–255). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Ohkrulik, K. (1994). Gender and the biological sciences. In M. Curd, & J. A. Cover (Eds.), (1998), Philosophy of science: The central issues (pp. 192–208). New York: Norton.
Rooney, P. (1992). On values in science: Is the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction useful? In PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992 (Part 1: Contributed Papers, pp. 13–22). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20, 1–6.
Wilholt, T. (2009). Bias and values in scientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40, 92–101.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bueter, A. (2015). Against the Agnosticism-Argument for Value-Freedom. In: Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (eds) Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-23014-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-23015-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)