Abstract
This chapter applies conceptual pluralism to debates about phenomenal consciousness. My arguments “from horizontal pluralism” and “from ontological non-fundamentalism” suggest that the reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is an open empirical question. While standard arguments in philosophy of mind (e.g. Nagel’s bats, Jackson’s Mary, and Chalmers’ zombies) are supposed to illustrate a problematic “explanatory gap,” I argue that explanatory gaps are philosophically not more troubling than successful reductive explanations. Furthermore, I specify this strategy by comparing conceptual pluralism with current accounts of the “phenomenal concept strategy” (PCS). Conceptual pluralists and proponents of PCS share the idea that explanatory gaps are not due to differences between phenomenal and physical states but differences between phenomenal and physical concepts. However, proponents of PCS differ from conceptual pluralists by insisting on the physicalist commitment to the ontological priority of the physical. I argue that the commitment to physicalism undermines PCS and that a successful PCS needs to adopt a pluralist strategy.
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Notes
- 1.
This problem also extends to Sartenaer’s discussion of “causal emergence”. One the one hand, he defines this type of emergence as the antithesis of causal reduction and I am happy to endorse the idea that we do not have to understand mental causation in terms of a more fundamental account of physical causation. On the other hand, Sartenaer takes the thesis to be synonymous with the claim that “the whole exhibits genuinely new causal powers”. I’m not sure that I understand how this formulation can be compatible with Sartenaer’s rejection of “metaphysical distinctness” and it seems to me that we should take a deflationist position that rejects the idea of one fundamental way of talking about “causal powers”.
- 2.
As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this clearly depends on the involved notion of “explanation”. If we adopt the dominant notions of “reductive explanation” in philosophy of mind in the tradition of Chalmers, Kim, and Levine (cf. Sects. 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7), (a) seems to be credible working hypothesis. However, this is clearly not the only notion of “explanation” and certainly not the most relevant notion of explanation in scientific practice, either (cf. Faye 2014, Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8 for a helpful overview).
- 3.
Not everyone accepts this presentation and Block and Stalnaker (1999) provide a highly influential critique of the standard models of reduction and reductive explanation of water (cf. Polger 2008; Bogardus 2013). However, I will grant reductivists these examples at least for the sake of the argument.
- 4.
In fact, some outspoken epistemic pluralists like Eronen (2011) and Hüttemann (2003) also self-identify as physicalists. It is important to note that debates about the compatibility of pluralism and physicalism crucially depend on the involved notion of “physicalism”. While I presuppose in the current discussion that physicalism requires a substantive account of ontological priority, more liberal definitions of “physicalism” are clearly possible (see also Sect. 9.2).
- 5.
- 6.
Tye (2010) now rejects PCS and argues that there are no phenomenal concepts.
- 7.
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Ludwig, D. (2015). Consciousness. In: A Pluralist Theory of the Mind. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_8
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