Abstract
Strategic users in a wireless network cannot be assumed to follow the network algorithms blindly. Moreover, some of these users aim to use their knowledge about network algorithms to maliciously gain more resources and also to create interference to other users. We consider a general model of Multiple Access Channel (MAC) without successive interference cancellation (SIC) under Quality of Service (QoS) requirement of each user where malicious behavior exists. We model the heterogeneous behavior of users, which ranges from altruistic to selfish and then to malicious, within the analytical framework of game theory. To ensure the QoS requirements with efficient resource allocation, the noncooperative game in normal form is formulated and the Nash Equilibrium (NE) power allocation is derived in closed form. The effects of malicious behavior in network resource allocation mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are studied. We consider firstly the problem of net utility maximization and then individual user QoS requirement satisfaction. We show that the well-known Vicrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism loses its efficiency property in the presence of malicious users, which motivates the need to quantify the effect of malicious behavior. Then, the Price of Malice of the VCG mechanism and of some other network mechanisms are derived. Differentiated pricing as a method to counter adversarial behaviors is discussed. Next, we consider power allocation in wireless networks subject to QoS requirements of the users. Given the designed individual prices, the best response (BR) power converges to the unique NE power allocation rapidly, where the QoS requirement of each transmitter is satisfied. The impact of the malicious behavior on other users with QoS requirements is analyzed and the punishment prices are designed. We show that in the proposed noncooperative power allocation game, the user misbehavior is predicted, detected and prevented. As a result, all rate requirements in the capacity region of the general MAC are achieved at the NE point. Next we consider a scenario, in which a mechanism designer and legitimate users gather probabilistic information about the presence of malicious users by observing the network over a long time period and modify their actions accordingly. We analyze Bayesian mechanisms, both pricing schemes and auctions, and obtain the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) points. The BNE points provide conditions indicating when the uncertainty about their nature (type) is better for regular users. Finally, we extend Bayesian pricing mechanisms to wireless networks subject to QoS requirements of the users.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Alpcan T, Başar T (2005) A utility-based congestion control scheme for internet-style networks with delay. IEEE Trans Networking 13(6):1261–1274
Alpcan T, Basar T (2010) Network security: a decision and game theoretic approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Alpcan T, Boche H, Honig M, Poor HV (2013) Mechanisms and games for dynamic spectrum allocation. Cambridge University Press
Babaioff M, Kleinberg R, Papadimitriou CH (2007) Congestion games with malicious players. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on electronic commerce. San Diego, California, pp 103–112
Başar T, Olsder GJ (1999) Dynamic noncooperative game theory, 2nd edn. SIAM, Philadelphia
Bhattacharya S, Khanafer A, Başar T (2011) Power allocation in team jamming games in wireless ad hoc networks. In: Proceedings of the 5th international ICST conference on performance evaluation methodologies and tools, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), ICST, Brussels, Belgium, Belgium, VALUETOOLS ’11, pp 515–524
Boche H, Schubert M (2008) A calculus for log-convex interference functions. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 54(12):5469–5490
Boche H, Schubert M (2008) Concave and convex interference functions-general characterizations and applications. IEEE Trans Signal Process 56(10):4951–4965
Boche H, Schubert M (2008) The structure of general interference functions and applications. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 54(11):4980–4990
Boche H, Schubert M (2009) Nash bargaining and proportional fairness for wireless systems. IEEE/ACM Trans Networking 17(5):1453–1466
Boche H, Schubert M (2010) A unifying approach to interference modeling for wireless networks. IEEE Trans Signal Process 58(6):3282–3297
Boche H, Wiczanowski M, Stanczak S (2004) Characterization of optimal resource allocation in cellular networks. In: IEEE 5th workshop on Signal processing advances in wireless communications, pp 454–458
Boche H, Naik S, Alpcan T (2011) Characterization of convex and concave resource allocation problems in interference coupled wireless systems. IEEE Trans Signal Process 59(5):2382–2394
Boche H, Naik S, Jorswieck EA (2013) Detecting misbehavior in distributed wireless interference networks. Wireless Netw 19(5):799–810
Chorppath AK, Alpcan T (2011) Learning user preferences in mechanism design. In: Proceedings of 50th IEEE conference on decision and control and european control conference, Orlando, Florida
Chorppath AK, Bhashyam S, Sundaresan R (2011) A convex optimization framework for almost budget balanced allocation of a divisible good. IEEE Trans Autom Sci Eng 8(3):520–531
Chorppath AK, T Alpcan, Boche H (2011) Pricing mechanisms for multi-carrier wireless systems. In: Proceedings of IEEE international dynamic spectrum access networks (DySPAN) symposium, Aachen, Germany
Chorppath AK, Alpcan T, Boche H (2014) Bayesian mechanisms for wireless network security. In: IEEE international conference on communications (ICC), Sydney, Australia
Chorppath AK, Alpcan T, Boche H (2015) Adversarial behavior in network games. Dyn Games Appl 1(1):26–64
Chorppath AK, Shen F, Alpcan T, Jorswieck E, Boche H (2015) Bayesian mechanisms and learning for wireless networks security with qos requirements. In: IEEE international conference on communications (ICC), London, UK
Garg D, Narahari Y, Gujar S (2008) Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial part 1—key concepts and classical results. Sadhana 33(3):83–130
Huang J, Berry R, Honig M (2006) Auction-based spectrum sharing. ACM Mobile Netw Appl J 24(5):405–418
Johari R, Mannor S, Tsitsiklis J (2005) Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply. IEEE Trans Autom Control 50(11):1712–1724
Koutsoupias E, Papadimitriou C (1999) Worst-case equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 16th annual symposium on theoretical aspects of computer science, Lecture Notes in computer science, pp 404–413
Krishna V (2010) Auction theory, 2nd edn. Academic Press
Maheswaran RT, Basar T (2004) Social welfare of selfish agents: motivating efficiency for divisible resources. In: 43rd IEEE conference on decision and control (CDC), Paradise Island, Bahamas, pp 1550–1555
Micali S, Valiant P (2008) Revenue in truly combinatorial auctions and adversarial mechanism design. Technical report, MIT-Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/41872
Moscibroda T, Schmid S, Wattenhofer R (2006) When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game. In: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on principles of distributed computing, Denver, Colorado
Netzer N (2012) An externality-robust auction. Working Paper
Rosen JB (1965) Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games. Econometrica 33(3):520–534
Roughgarden T (2002) The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. In: Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM symposium on the theory of computing
Sagduyu Y, Berry R, Ephremides A (2009) MAC games for distributed wireless network security with incomplete information of selfish and malicious user types. In: International conference on game theory for networks. GameNets ’09. , pp 130–139
Schubert M, Boche H (2004) Solution of the multiuser downlink beamforming problem with individual sinr constraints. IEEE Trans Veh Technol 53(1):18–28
Schubert M, Boche H (2006) QoS-based resource allocation and transceiver optimization. Now Publishers Inc
Schubert M, Boche H (2007) A generic approach to qos-based transceiver optimization. IEEE Trans Commun 55(8):1557–1566
Shen F, Jorswieck E (2012) User-centric Compensation framework with universal pricing for hybrid femtocell networks. In: IEEE international conference on wireless communications and signal processing-WCSP, pp 1–6
Shen F, Jorswieck EA (2012) Universal cheat-proof pricing for multiple access channels without SIC under QoS requirements. In: International conference on communications-ICC, IEEE, pp 3895–3899
Shen F, Jorswieck E (2014) Universal non-linear cheat-proof pricing framework for wireless multiple access channels. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun 13(3):1436–1448
Shen Z, Papasakellariou A, Montojo J, Gerstenberger D, Xu F (2012) Overview of 3g pp lte-advanced carrier aggregation for 4g wireless communications. IEEE Commun Mag 50(2):122–130
Shen F, Zhang M, Jorswieck E (2013) User-centric energy aware compensation framework for hybrid macro-femtocell networks. In: 2013 IEEE global communications conference (GLOBECOM), pp 3089–3094
Shen F, Jorswieck E, Chorppath AK, Boche H (2014) Pricing for distributed resource allocation in MAC without SIC under QoS requirements with malicious users. In: WNC, modeling and optimization in mobile, Ad Hoc, and wireless networks (WiOpt’14), Hammamet, Tunisia
Shen F, Jorswieck E, Chorppath AK, Boche H (2014) Pricing for distributed resource allocation in MAC under QoS requirements with malicious users. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun (submitted)
Shen F, Li D, Lin PH, Jorswieck E (2015) Auction based spectrum sharing for hybrid access in macro-femtocell networks under QoS requirements. In: IEEE international conference on communications-ICC (June)
Srikant R (2004) The Mathematics of internet congestion control. Systems and Control: foundations and applications, Birkhauser, Boston, MA
Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16(1):8–37
Yates R (1995) A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 13(7):1341–1347
Acknowledgments
The work summarized in this chapter was mainly funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the priority program 1397 “Communications in Interference Limited Networks (COIN)” under grants DFG BO 1734/24-3 and JO 801/5-3.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Shen, F., Chorppath, A.K., Jorswieck, E., Boche, H. (2016). Resource Allocation and Pricing in Non-cooperative Interference Networks with Malicious Users. In: Utschick, W. (eds) Communications in Interference Limited Networks. Signals and Communication Technology. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22440-4_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22440-4_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-22439-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-22440-4
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)