Abstract
Different ways of thinking about presence can have significant consequences for one’s thinking about temporal experience. Temporal presence can be conceived of as either absolute or relative. Relative presence is analogous to spatial presence, whereas absolute presence is not. For each of these concepts of presence, there is a theory of time which holds that this is how presence really is (and that the other concept of presence is merely derivative in some way). For the A-theory, temporal presence is absolute; it is a special moment in time, a time defined by events in what has been called the A-series. For the B-theory, temporal presence is relative; it is itself defined relative to moments in time, a time defined by events in the B-series. Many A-theorists (presentists) go further to claim that the present is the only real moment in time; the past and future are unreal. One can have different sets of problems depending on whether one thinks in terms of absolute presence or relative presence. For example, there is the concept of the “specious” present—a duration many theorists claim that we perceptually experience. It is argued in this paper that the specious present has problems given absolute presence, which it does not have given relative presence. Many of the problems are avoided by having an extended present. However, A-theory, the standard theory of time which advocates absolute presence, cannot have an extended present. Further, the best solution for absolute presence which is extended, durational presentism, involves denying the standard theories in the philosophy of time.
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Notes
- 1.
For convenience, throughout this paper I will usually refer to perceptual experience as just “experience.” It could, however, also mean other kinds of experience, such as memory-experience or experiences had in acts of imagining or anticipating. The issues involving experienced change here do not apply to those other kinds of experiences. For example, those other experiences are not of present change, e.g. memory experience (which is of the past) or anticipation (which is of the future).
- 2.
The other concepts concern time-lag and the actual duration of what is perceptually experienced (neither of which need be apparent to the perceiver (Power 2012).
- 3.
The existence of temporal parts and stages are heavily debated in one area of the philosophy of time—the constitution and mereology of persisting and changing things (e.g. people, hats, avocados). It is argued by some theorists (endurantists) that such things do not have stages or temporal parts; other theorists (perdurantists) argue that such things do—and still others that things are only those parts (exdurantists or stage theorists).
We can ignore all that and refer to the concept of a stage or temporal part without controversy in this paper. The idea of a stage or temporal part of a change is generally uncontroversial for events and changes themselves. For example, both Mellor (1998) and Lowe (2003) are opponents of temporal parts for objects (Lowe is even an A-theorist). Both accept them for events. (For good introductions to persistence theories generally, see Sider 2001; for the views of Mellor and Lowe, see Mellor 1998; Lowe 2003, respectively).
- 4.
For more comments on the specious present of this nature, as well as arguments defending it which are similar but not identical to those this paper, see Power (2012).
- 5.
This is not just a case of temporal properties being metaphorically described using terms which literally refer to spatial properties, i.e. the idea of a “Time is Space” metaphor, as defended by Lakoff and Johnston 1980. Nor is it that time and space are, really, the same thing—space-time, as is the view in contemporary physics (e.g. Sider 2001).
- 6.
For convenience, I will frequently refer to properties and relations together as just properties. However, unless otherwise stated, what is discussed here can be taken to refer to both properties and relations.
- 7.
Note that this definition of “absolute” also implies something absolute is independent from itself. That sounds both contradictory and right: Contradictory if it means that absolute P can be the case even if P cannot. Right if it means that absolute P can be the case without needing to be so relative to P. I assume the latter meaning is trivial—an absolute electron charge need not have that charge relative to itself (indeed, I don’t even know what relativity of such a property as charge would even mean here, never mind whether or not it is possible).
- 8.
One might wonder what it means for something to be real or not. A discussion on that precise question would pull this paper too far away from its subject. Further, the debates about time only work by assuming a shared concept of reality amongst the opposing sides. E.g. the presentism/eternalism debate turns on how things and events are real in time. McTaggart’s argument is an argument about the nature of reality.
For this paper, I suggest the following approach to questions about reality as such. Unless your concept of reality depends on a concept of time (in which cases you take a side in the debates discussed in this paper), then “reality” is whatever you understand by the term. In my case, I hold the following about real things:
-
Real things are independent of ideas of them (and propositions about them). E.g. (a) If unicorns are real, then there are unicorns even if there are no ideas of unicorns (just as, if electrons are real, there are electrons even if there are no ideas of electrons). (b) If past things are real, then past things exist independently of any propositions there might be about past things. If unicorns or past things (or electrons) are not real, then there are only ideas and propositions about them (for past things, this is the presentist view).
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Real things can be coherently described: It is necessary to hold this because McTaggart’s arguments against the reality of time and change do so by arguing that time and change cannot be coherently described. The responses to that argument mainly try to defend the view that time and change can be coherently described.
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- 9.
Newton did think there was a way to define absolute motion and rest—but this is one aspect of Newton’s work which is no longer current in physics (Lange 2002).
- 10.
These uses of “presence” might involve metaphorical or indirect references to “presence” in this discussion, e.g. the supernatural “presence” refers to the sense of something being at a location in a context in which one is unable to further specify what is there (as, e.g. “entity” is often used in science fiction movies).
- 11.
It should be noted that our world as described in contemporary astronomy is neither a geocentric world nor Copernicus’ alternative of a heliocentric world. Both of those presuppose one unique centre to the universe; contemporary astronomy does not; centres are defined by gravitationally determined locations, e.g. the centre of Earth-moon system, the solar system, the Milky Way, the local cluster of galaxies.
Perhaps one might usefully conceive of these two concepts of centres in terms of absolute and relative centres (but I do not have space to consider that here).
- 12.
- 13.
Given the context of the entire quote, by “objective” Gale can be taken to mean a non-indexical, non-relative (and so absolute) present. See earlier in this paper for why I do not use this terminology.
- 14.
If one would rather avoid reference to “moments” here, one can substitute events. What is important, however, is whatever we refer to here—events or moments—that they are temporally ordered.
- 15.
So far as I can tell, Kelly’s reference to direct perceptual contact is a usage particular to him. “Contact” might suggest a kind of touching of the things perceived. If that is what’s meant, then it does seem strange to say that we “touch” the past. Yet, it also strange to say that we touch, for example, planes that we are seeing lifting off from a runway, or many other kinds of seen change. That is one of Kelly’s examples so I assume “contact” here is not to be taken to be a kind of touching.
- 16.
In the analytic tradition, at least. I do not claim anything about other philosophical traditions—or even link the concepts employed here—which are predominantly analytic—to those other traditions.
- 17.
This is evident in a recent Philpapers survey, in which amongst philosophers familiar with the debate, B-theory was more accepted than A-theory . For summaries and discussion of this survey, see Chalmers and Bourget (2013). Specific discussion and summaries on A-theory/B-theory are scattered throughout the commentary and tables.
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Acknowledgments
My thanks to two anonymous referees for their very thorough and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to Valtteri Arstila for additional thoughts and comments. This paper is based on two talks given at the source of this volume, a 2013 conference on presence at the University of Turku. My further thanks for the insights of participants at the workshop. Finally, of course, I am grateful for the invitation to present at the workshop (as well as the funding provided by the TIMELY research network to do this).
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Power, S.E. (2016). Relative and Absolute Temporal Presence. In: Mölder, B., Arstila, V., Øhrstrøm, P. (eds) Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22195-3_5
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