Abstract
This chapter invites philosophers of science to engage with a number of conceptual issues that arise from attempts by governments and civil society to control the spread of chemical and biological weapons. It is written for an audience unfamiliar with this topic. The first part of the chapter outlines key aspects of the international control of chemical and biological weapons, focusing on the main treaties that outlaw these weapons. It then highlights some of the key practical and conceptual dilemmas in implementing these controls. These are the problems of definition, the problem of ‘dual-use’, the problem of distinguishing defensive from offensive research, the problem of verification, and the difficulty of analyzing chemical and biological warfare from a cultural perspective. Also this second part contains a discussion of some of the author’s own research on the history of chemical and biological warfare, and adds some brief reflections on how this work might inform some of the contemporary practical issues in the control of chemical and biological warfare.
The most obvious contribution that philosophers can (and do) make to the control of chemical and biological weapons is in the field of ethics; the author argues that other debates from philosophy of science, over terms such as tacit knowledge, ontology, underdetermination and feminist philosophy of science, have the potential to shed further light on the dilemmas facing the arms control community.
Brian Balmer is supported by AHRC grant AH/K003469/1
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- 1.
Some chemical and biological agents are particularly persistent in the environment, so also could in principle be used to contaminate land, equipment or buildings.
- 2.
When a treaty enters into force its provisions become legally binding on states parties to the convention.
- 3.
The CWC also lists 14 families of chemicals and 29 individual chemicals listed for control and grouped into three ‘schedules’ (1 being most toxic), with obligations to declare, restrictions on amounts possessed and produced per annum. Despite this list, states still have obligations to control all chemicals under the General Purpose Criterion, not just those listed.
- 4.
Although civilian science became a focus of concern following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the predominant theory at the time was that the perpetrator was someone from within a military research establishment.
- 5.
It is not difficult to find a range of divergent views on this topic. A good starting point is a short video made by Nature: http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/02/video-debating-h5n1-and-dual-use-research.html (accessed on 23/04/13). For a philosophical treatment of the issues raised see Evans (2013).
- 6.
TNA, WO 188/2721. Letter J McCaulay to RM Winter, Research Controller, Messrs ICI Ltd, Nobel House, Buckingham Gate (15 July 1953). Amiton was actually discovered by scientists working at Plant Protection Ltd, a subsidiary firm of ICI (see Mcleish and Balmer 2012).
- 7.
TNA, WO195/12549. Ministry of Supply. Chemical Defence Advisory Board. Minutes 24th Meeting of the Board (5 November 1953).
- 8.
Although a sceptic would point out that even a gasmask would be needed to protect an aggressor using chemical weapons from being affected by their own weapon, so even this item is not so straightforwardly defensive.
- 9.
Later investigations put the number lower (Guillemin 1999).
- 10.
The review meetings take place every 5 years in Geneva and are an opportunity to review the development of the BWC regime. Similar provisions are made in the CWC.
- 11.
TNA, FCO 66/1520 and FCO 66/1521.
- 12.
TNA FCO 28/4205 Draft attached to A, Reeve (Arms Control and Disarmament Department) (15 September 1980).
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Balmer, B. (2015). The Social Dimension of Technology: The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons. In: Gonzalez, W. (eds) New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 315. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21870-0_9
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