Abstract
In Max Planck’s first lecture delivered at Columbia University in 1909, he explained how physical science was historically organized anthropomorphically—that is, according to man’s particular senses. Thus we had the sciences of optics (what the eye can perceive), acoustics (what the ear can hear) and heat (what the skin can feel). With new apparatus and measurement techniques, however, physical science has become less concerned with subjective sensory experience and more concerned with objective quantification. For example, radio antennae and bolometers have enabled scientists to measure the properties of electromagnetic radiation that lies far outside of the spectrum of visible light. Moreover, the laws of thermodynamics—and especially Clausius’ second law—has inspired a reorganization of physical science into just two classes of phenomena: those which are reversible and those which are irreversible. Unfortunately, according to Planck, this new classification scheme still has the (undesirable) mark of anthropomorphism. For the definition of irreversibility— and the associated concept of entropy—still relies on the skill of an experimenter in devising an efficient heat engine for the purpose of accomplishing useful work. In other words, the purely thermodynamic definition of entropy is based on the inclinations and limitations of man. Is there a better definition of entropy—one which is more objective? This is the question to which Planck now turns in his third lecture…
Nature prefers the more probable states to the less probable, because in nature processes take place in the direction of greater probability.
—Max Planck
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
To those physicists who, in spite of all this, regard the hypothesis of elementary disorder as gratuitous or as incorrect, I wish to refer the simple fact that in every calculation of a coefficient of friction, of diffusion, or of heat conduction, from molecular considerations, the notion of elementary disorder is employed, whether tacitly or otherwise, and that it is therefore essentially more correct to stipulate this condition instead of ignoring or concealing it. But he who regards the hypothesis of elementary disorder as self-evident, should be reminded that, in accordance with a law of H. Poincaré, the precise investigation concerning the foundation of which would here lead us too far, the assumption of this hypothesis for all time is unwarranted for a closed space with absolutely smooth walls,—an important conclusion, against which can only be urged the fact that absolutely smooth walls do not exist in nature.
- 2.
- 3.
For a discussion of this concept, see Kenneth Denbigh’s 1981 article entitled “How subjective is entropy” in Leff, H. S., and A. F. Rex (Eds.), Maxwell’s Demon: Entropy, Information, Computing, Princeton Series in Physics, Princeton University Press, 1990.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kuehn, K. (2016). Entropy, Probability and Atomism. In: A Student's Guide Through the Great Physics Texts. Undergraduate Lecture Notes in Physics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21828-1_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21828-1_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-21827-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-21828-1
eBook Packages: Physics and AstronomyPhysics and Astronomy (R0)