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EU Becoming a Human Rights Law Organization: Starting from Nowhere with a ‘gouvernment des juges’

  • Chapter
The EU Accession to the ECHR

Abstract

This chapter examines human rights law development of the Union with reference to the Convention and Strasbourg regime of law at-large. The chapter evolves around the research question ‘How did the EU become a human rights law organization and the gradual development of its relationship with the ECHR system?’ Two perspectives of analysis are provided below: first, an EU-based perspective of human rights law development, focusing on the Convention and Strasbourg regime of law, and, second, a Strasbourg-based view of EU human rights development, and gradual recognition of the EU as a human rights liable entity and the means via which such relationship became construed. Overall, the chapter offers a much grounded outlook of the relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg regimes of law, one that is needed to start shedding light on the preconditions that EU accession to the ECHR will likely materialize on these two legal orders.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g.: Schimmelfennig (2006), p. 1247; See also: Landau (2008), p. 557; Franklin (2010–2011), p. 139; Škugor (2012), p. 106.

  2. 2.

    Cf.: Olsen (2009–2010), p. 59, who argues that EU grew up from an economic community to a constitutional system nowadays; EU accession to ECHR, one would argue, being one of these core layers of its constitutional consolidation not only in internal matters but also in external action.

  3. 3.

    See: Gragl (2013), p. 3/4, who notes that the initial European integration project focused on ‘economic integration and welfare of the Member States.’ The Luxembourg Court, on the other hand, exercises a broad jurisdiction on any field of law as opposed to the Strasbourg Court which is fundamental-right focused. This is a reason why Gragl, referring to Quinn, calls the EU and Council of Europe as ‘twins separated at birth’ (Ibid., p. 4).

  4. 4.

    Cf. with a new understanding on this: Court of Justice of EU, Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR 1-4323, para. 43, which states that: ‘the Court has already held that the freedom to provide services, as one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest…’; See also: Shelton (2003), pp. 110 et seq.

  5. 5.

    On the economic nature of EC, see: Defeis (2007–2008), p. 1; See also: Defeis (2000–2001), p. 302.

  6. 6.

    Jacobs (2007), p. 13.

  7. 7.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 1.

  8. 8.

    I refer here to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, whereas throughout the book the terms Luxembourg Court, EU Court, ECJ, and Court of Justice of EU are used interchangeably.

  9. 9.

    On the reasons for requesting the introduction of human rights in the EC law, see: Coppel and O’neill (1992).

  10. 10.

    Court of Justice of EU, Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Co., Kohlengroßhandlung vs. High Authority Of The European Coal And Steel Community, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judgment.

  11. 11.

    Court of Justice of EU, Case 16/59, Geitling Ruhrkolhlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft Mbh vs. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Judgment, Court of Justice of the European Communities.

  12. 12.

    See e.g.: Schimmelfennig (2006), p. 1252.

  13. 13.

    Court of Justice of EU, Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Co., Kohlengroßhandlung vs. High Authority Of The European Coal And Steel Community, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judgment, note 10, p. 26.

  14. 14.

    Court of Justice of EU, Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Co., Kohlengroßhandlung vs. High Authority Of The European Coal And Steel Community, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judgment, note 10, p. 26.

  15. 15.

    Opinion of Advocate-General Lagrange, in Case 1/58 Stork & Co., p. 38.

  16. 16.

    Court of Justice of EU, Sgarlata v Commission, Case 40/64 [1965] ECR 215.

  17. 17.

    Weiler (1986), p. 1114.

  18. 18.

    Williams (2004), p. 139.

  19. 19.

    And this was mainly a result of pressures from national constitutional courts. See e.g.: Eckes (2013), p. 257.

  20. 20.

    Scheuner (1975), p. 173/4.

  21. 21.

    Court of Justice of EU, Van Gend en Loos v. the Netherlands, Case 26/62, Judgment, CJEC, p. 2; See also a very wealthy analysis on the main conceptual outcome of this, at: Weiler (1981), pp. 275 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Timmermans (2001), pp. 2 et seq.

  23. 23.

    It went even further in: Court of Justice of EU, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament, Case 294/83 [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23, by acknowledging the basic municipal constitutional nature of the treaty, which plays then an essential role in the interpretation of human rights law as well; See also: Court of Justice of EU, Weber v European Parliament, Case C-314/91 [1993] ECR I-1093, para. 8.

  24. 24.

    As to this issue, AG Karl Roemer argued: ‘The Community has its own institutions, independent of the Member States, endowed with the power to take administrative measures and to make rules of law which directly make rights in favour of and impose duties on Member States as well as their authorities and citizens’ (Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Karl Roemer in Case 26/62, delivered on 12 December 1962, p. 20.).

  25. 25.

    See e.g.: Miiller (2007), p. 34; See also: Defeis (2000–2001), p. 310; See also the predecessor of Stauder, Van Eick case. See: Court of Justice of EU, Van Eick v Commission, Case 35/67 [1968] ECR 329.

  26. 26.

    Court of Justice of EU, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69 [1969] ECR 419, request for preliminary ruling, p. 422; See: Schimmelfennig (2006), p. 1248; Shelton (2003), p. 111.

  27. 27.

    See also: Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 597.

  28. 28.

    Court of Justice of EU, Van Eick v Commission, Case 35/67 [1968] ECR 329.

  29. 29.

    Cf.: Besselink and Reestman (2008), p. 199.

  30. 30.

    See e.g.: Wetzel (2003), p. 2836.

  31. 31.

    Court of Justice of EU, Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbh v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970, ECR 1125, p. 1134; See also: Lawson (2005), p. 28, calling this the self-restrained mood on human rights; See also: Landau (2008), p. 557/8; Sera (1996), pp. 160 et seq; Škugor (2012), p. 111.

  32. 32.

    See, for instance: Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti, Case 149/77, Delivered On 30 May 1978, p. 1385.

  33. 33.

    See generally: Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 597.

  34. 34.

    Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Dutheillet De Lamothe in Case 11/70. Delivered On 2 December 1970, p. 1146.

  35. 35.

    Some member states’ constitutional courts had challenged the Community law application with the question of its national human rights’ compliance. As an example for Germany, see: Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 18, 1967, 22 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerchts [BVerfGE] 223 (1967) (F.R.G).

  36. 36.

    Although the Court referred to the human rights law in Internationale Handelgesellschaft, it nevertheless found no human right violation in that individual case. This seriously upset the German Federal Constitutional Court, which revenged to Luxembourg by issuing Solange I; On Solange I, see also the interaction between the German court and ECJ which forced the latter to better tackle the issue of rights in order to save the primacy of the EU law, at: Franklin (2010–2011), p. 145.

  37. 37.

    Besselink (2013), p. 304.

  38. 38.

    BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I-Beschluß (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel); See also: Škugor (2012), p. 112; Besselink (2013), p. 302/3.

  39. 39.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze, Case 183/73.

  40. 40.

    Court of Justice of EU, Nold KG v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491, judgment.

  41. 41.

    Nold KG v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491, judgment, note 40, p. 507 (paragraph 13); See also: Schimmelfennig (2006), p. 1248.

  42. 42.

    See generally: Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 598.

  43. 43.

    Nold KG v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491, judgment, note 40, p. 507 (paragraph 13).

  44. 44.

    On the international treaties’ route opened with Nold case, see also: Franklin (2010–2011), p. 152.

  45. 45.

    See e.g.: Wetzel (2003), p. 2838.

  46. 46.

    See also in this regard AG Trabucchi’s argument, asserting that: ‘As emerges from the case law of this Court, the fundamental rights generally recognized by the Member States form an integral part of our Community system, which, by drawing inspiration from the common traditions of the Member States, guarantees respect for these rights within the limits of the powers conferred on the Community and in accordance with the objectives assigned to it.’ (Opinion of Advocate-General Trabucchi Delivered On 28 March 1974, P. 513, in Case. 4/73, Nold KG).

  47. 47.

    E.g.: Landau (2008), p. 558.

  48. 48.

    Court of Justice of EU, Roland Rutili v. The Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, Reference for Preliminary Ruling; Defeis (2000–2001), p. 311; See also how the Court started to treat ECHR as inspiration for the growing human rights law: Lenaerts and de Smijter (2001), p. 90/1.

  49. 49.

    Court of Justice of EU, Roland Rutili, Case 36/75, Reference for Preliminary Ruling, p. 1232, para. 32; See also: Jacque (2011), p. 999.

  50. 50.

    Joint Declaration, 27. 4. 77 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 103/1, p. 1.

  51. 51.

    Court of Justice of EU, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, Judgment of the Court of 13 December 1979, [1979] ECR 3727; See also: Landau (2008), p. 558; Sera (1996), p. 164; Jacque (2011), p. 999.

  52. 52.

    Opinion of Mr Advocate General Capotorti in Case 44/79 Hauer, Delivered On 8 November 1979, p. 3760.

  53. 53.

    Court of Justice of EU, ERT Case, C-260/89, Reference for Preliminary Ruling, Court of Justice, p. 2964.

  54. 54.

    Court of Justice of EU, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-4685, para. 31.

  55. 55.

    Court of Justice of EU, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-4685, note 54, para. 31.

  56. 56.

    Court of Justice of EU, Kremzow, Case 299/95, preliminary ruling, 1997.

  57. 57.

    See e.g.: Defeis (2000–2001), p. 315/6.

  58. 58.

    Court of Justice of EU, ERT Case, C-260/89, Reference for Preliminary Ruling, Court of Justice, note 53, p. 2964.

  59. 59.

    Court of Justice of EU, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-4685, note 54, para. 31.

  60. 60.

    Court of Justice of EU, Kremzow, Case 299/95, preliminary ruling, 1997, note 56, p. 2645 (para. 16).

  61. 61.

    Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Case. 299/95, delivered on 6 February 1997, p. 2635.

  62. 62.

    BverfGE, Solange II – Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft decision of 22 October 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339, case number: 2 BvR 197/83, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift; See also: Škugor (2012), p. 112.

  63. 63.

    Landau (2008), p. 561.

  64. 64.

    E.g.: de Búrca (2011), p. 650; See also: Landau (2008), p. 557; In making a comparison between the past and now, Gragl argues that nowadays the Luxembourg Court seems less worried in referring to the case-law of the Strasbourg Court. In this regard, Gragl has found out that the Luxembourg Court now uses more often the standard formula of ‘as interpreted’ by ECtHR when interpreting certain rights under EU law (Gragl 2013, p. 54).

  65. 65.

    Weiler (1986), p. 1115. Cf. Wetzel (2003), p. 2823, who argues that this approach of the EU Court was a preventive measure from member states’ courts refusing the primacy of Community law with the reason that it did not comply with national constitutional human rights’ standards; On the latter, see also: Von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 495.

  66. 66.

    Which is both praised and sometimes criticized. See: Balfour (2007), pp. 185 et seq; On the latter, see also: Phelps (2006), p. 276.

  67. 67.

    Court of Justice of EU, Opinion 2/94[1996] ECR I-1759, para. 33; See also: Balfour (2007), p. 190; On the special significance of ECHR, see also: Franklin (2010–2011), p. 152; On specific cases, see e.g.: Court of Justice of EU, Booker Aquacultur Ltd. v. The Scottish Ministers, Joined Cases C-20/00 & C-64/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7411, para. 65; On modes of deference to ECtHR, see also these two cases: Court of Justice of EU, Bauer Verlag, C-368/95 [1997] ECR I-3689, para. 26, and Court of Justice of EU, Grant v South West Trains, C-249/96 [1998] ECR I-621, para. 34; Accord: Gragl argues that the Luxembourg Court has used ECHR as a very significant interpretative tool, adding that Luxembourg has never shown more deference to any other international tribunal than the Strasbourg Court (referring to literature from Douglas-Scott as well). See: Gragl (2013), p. 54.

  68. 68.

    See e.g.: Court of Justice of EU, Baumbast, Case C-413/99 [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 72; See also: Court of Justice of EU, Tielorassi v. Pliroforissis, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, para. 41; Jacque (2011), p. 1000; On such judicial dialogue from the part of Luxembourg Court with the Strasbourg Court and Convention system at-large, see: O’Meara (2011), p. 1815; Cf. Callewaert (2014), p. 32/3, who argues that this practically meant that the Convention was treated by the EU Court as legally applicable.

  69. 69.

    Court of Justice of EU, Orkem v Commission, Case 374/87 [1989] ECR 3283.

  70. 70.

    Court of Justice of EU, Parliament v Council, Case C-540/03 [2006] ECR I-5769.

  71. 71.

    E.g.: Schimmelfennig (2006), p. 1262.

  72. 72.

    See e.g.: Coppel and O’neill (1992), pp. 669 et seq; See also a general debate on this reluctance, at: Weiler and Lockhart (1995a, b).

  73. 73.

    Single European Act, Official Journal of European Communities. N L 169/2, d. 29.06.1987, p. 2.

  74. 74.

    Maastricht Treaty, Title I, Article F, para. 2, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ C 191 of 29.07.1992; See also: Miiller (2007), p. 34; Landau (2008), p. 558.

  75. 75.

    Amsterdam Treaty, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ C 340 of 10.11.1997; See also: Landau (2008), p. 560; Defeis (2000–2001), p. 302; Škugor (2012), p. 107.

  76. 76.

    On how the Luxembourg Court drew on ECHR as a comparative law reference, see: Lenaerts (2003), pp. 878 et seq; See also: Court of Justice of EU, Spain v. UK and Northern Ireland, Case 145/04, Judgment of 12 September 2006, ECR, 2006, p. 1, specifically paras. 60 and 90.

  77. 77.

    In relation to ECHR, see e.g.: Martinico (2012), p. 402.

  78. 78.

    Martin (2004), pp. 272 et seq.

  79. 79.

    Franck (1988), p. 705.

  80. 80.

    See a very in-depth critique of the EU’s constitutional philosophy foundation, at: De Hert (2005), pp. 215–253.

  81. 81.

    See, for instance: ‘Chapter 11: Human rights in the EU’, at Craig and de Búrca (2007), p. 15.

  82. 82.

    E.g.: de Búrca (2011), p. 649.

  83. 83.

    Von Bogdandy (2000), p. 1338.

  84. 84.

    Krüger (2002–2003), p. 93.

  85. 85.

    de Vries (2013), p. 78.

  86. 86.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 15.

  87. 87.

    ECtHR (European Commission of Human Rights), N° 235/56, Dec. 10.6.1958, Yearbook 2 p. 256 (300); See also: Škugor (2012), p. 114.

  88. 88.

    Breuer (2013), p. 1.

  89. 89.

    See also a discussion on this concept, at: Eckes (2013), p. 260.

  90. 90.

    ECtHR, Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail v. the European Communities, Application no. 8030/77 (D. 10.07.1978); See also: See: Gragl (2013), p. 65; Cf.: The Human Rights Committee—in H. v. d.P. v. Netherlands—has ruled that ‘it can only receive and consider communications in respect of claims that come under the jurisdiction of a State party to the Covenant. The author’s grievances, however, concern the recruitment policies of an international organisation, which cannot, in any way, be construed as coming within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands or of any other State party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights […].’ (Human Rights Committee, H. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 217/1986, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 70 (1990)). This stands quite in contrast to the practice of Strasbourg Court, which somehow recognizes its jurisdiction on EU, although the latter is not a party to the Convention.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Toth (1997), p. 499, who argues that as both courts have different aims—one to protect the ECHR and the other to protect Community law—their conflicting interpretations are rather normal; On this tension-free mood of Strasbourg Court, see also: Olsen (2009–2010), p. 64.

  92. 92.

    ECtHR, M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 13258/87, Dec. 9 February 1990.

  93. 93.

    The origin deriving from the Solange II (Solange II – Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft decision of 22 October 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339, case number: 2 BvR 197/83, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift); See also the same explanation on Bosphorus, at: Miiller (2007), p. 37; On Solange II of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see also: Franklin (2010–2011), p. 146 (‘[…] BverfG clearly felt that a clash between EC and German national law over fundamental rights issues would be less likely to occur. That did not mean, however, that it would abandon its jurisdiction to review EC legislation in light of the German constitution entirely – it merely rendered such jurisdiction dormant to the extent that the Community continued to prove itself capable of providing a level of protection for fundamental rights substantially similar to that provided for under the German constitution in the future.’).

  94. 94.

    See also: Quirico (2010), p. 41; Gragl (2013), p. 66.

  95. 95.

    ECtHR, Cantoni v. France, Application No. 17862/91, decision of 15/11/1996 (Grand Chamber).

  96. 96.

    The same was established in Connolli, at: Gragl (2011), p. 70.

  97. 97.

    See the Chap. 10.

  98. 98.

    ECtHR, Matthews v. United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94, Decision of 18 February 1999 (Judgement, Grand Chamber).

  99. 99.

    The Strasbourg Court—in Mathews—basically applied the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velasquez Rodrıguez v. Honduras concept, where it had ruled that: ‘An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State […] can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.’ (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodrıguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Ser. C No. 4, para. 172) [emphasis added]; It was not essentially the issue whether the attribution of responsibility should have been primarily placed upon the EU, but rather whether the EU Member States had taken the necessary steps to remove such violation from the EU Treaties for which they were liable before the Convention.

  100. 100.

    d’Aspremont (2007), p. 101.

  101. 101.

    See also: Lock (2012), p. 163; On the way the Strasbourg Court used to hold Member States responsible for EC violations, see also: Klabbers (2009), p. 164; Kuiyper and Paasivirta (2004), p. 131.

  102. 102.

    O’Meara (2011), p. 1816.

  103. 103.

    International Court of Justice, (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, 19 (28 May 1951), p. 21.

  104. 104.

    ECtHR (plen.), Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, No. 161, para. 86 [emphasis added].

  105. 105.

    Draft Articles On The Law Of Treaties Between States And International Organizations Or Between International Organizations With Commentaries 1982. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its thirty-fourth session, in 1982, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (at para. 63). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1982, vol. II, Part Two, p. 20.

  106. 106.

    See Chap. 10.

  107. 107.

    ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Application No. 45036/95 (Judgment of 30 June 2005); Cf.: Gragl (2013), p. 71, who argues that the product devised by the Court in Bosphorus tries to balance the principles of states’ sovereignty and autonomy to conclude international agreements, on the one hand, with the human rights obligations flowing from the Convention system, on the other hand.

  108. 108.

    E.g.: Lock (2010), p. 779; See also: Quirico (2010), p. 42; Lavranos (2008), p. 604; Phelps (2006), p. 271/2; Craig (2013), p. 1136; Cf.: de Rivery and Chassaing (2013), p. 4, who argues that the doctrine of equivalent protection is established and will remain applicable only for as long as EU does not accede to ECHR; Cf.: Gragl basically argues that under the present system an applicant must make an in-depth investigation to find out whether in his/her case the system of protection under the EU law is equivalent to that of the ECHR—the Bosphorus presumption—which is basically a very complex task to be addressed with certain unknown factors (see: Gragl 2013, p. 140). This being the case, it is logically argued that the present Bosphorus formula makes it not possible for applicants to make use of the ECHR system.

  109. 109.

    See e.g.: Phelps (2006), p. 272; Lock (2012), p. 164; See also: Eckes (2013), p. 261; Gragl (2013), p. 72; Hoffmeister (2006), pp. 447 et seq; See also: Besselink (2013), p. 309; See also: O’Meara (2011), p. 1817; Cf.: Ryngaert (2011), p. 1014 (‘[…]under the Bosphorus standard, Member States appear to be required to screen the IO’s human rights performance continuously.’) [emphasis added].

  110. 110.

    Accord.: ECtHR, Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union, Application No. 73274/01, (Section V), December 9, 2008; See also: Lock (2010), p. 779; Besselink (2013), p. 308; See e.g.: Tulkens (2013), p. 4, who refers to Strasbourg’s Michaud v. France case to demonstrate how Strasbourg may choose to depart from the doctrine of equivalent protection if the act of the member state has involved state discretion in implementing EU law.

  111. 111.

    ECtHR, Michaud v. France, Application No. 12323/11, 6 December 2012.

  112. 112.

    ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011.

  113. 113.

    Peers (2006), p. 452 (‘The compromise position permits a conditional, rather than an unlimited, review of member states’ actions within the scope of Community law’); See also: Gragl (2013), p. 73, who argues that through the Bosphorus approach, the Strasbourg Court has kept itself outside a potential ‘power game’ with the EU Court, therefore recognizing and deferring to the flexibility required for international cooperation and the right of the ECHR contracting parties to enter into international legal obligations on basis of their own choice. This, according to Gragl, ‘led to the notion that Strasbourg was especially open-minded and tolerant towards international law and Union law.’ (also referring to Haratsch).

  114. 114.

    Preliminarily ruled in: ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, pp. 27–28, para. 75; Cf.: Sohn (1995), who argues basically that UN-originated instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lack a constitutional status within the context of hierarchy of law, which I argue the ECHR enjoys in Europe.

  115. 115.

    O’Meara (2011), p. 1817.

  116. 116.

    Neuman (2008), p. 115.

  117. 117.

    Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodrıguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Ser. C No. 4, para. 167 [emphasis added].

  118. 118.

    Contra: Tulkens (2013), p. 3, who argues that ‘[…] any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection.’. Tulkens, however, seems to refer to a notional picture rather than to the strict reading of the Bosphorus approach.

  119. 119.

    On Judge Ress, see: White (2010), p. 440; Cf.: Ladenburger (2012), p. 45 (Available at: www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88), which shows the EU Member States debates disagreeing on making Bosphorus standard textually part of the DAA; See also: Besselink (2013), p. 311/2, who argues that the big reason why Bosphorus should be abandoned after accession is because accession is being undertaken to reach exactly the opposite of this doctrine: namely, to allow parties reach the Strasbourg Court and attack before it EU-originated violations.

  120. 120.

    Merrill (1993), p. 218.

  121. 121.

    See e.g.: De Londras and Kingston (2010), p. 401; Cf. Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 260, who observe: ‘One has the feeling almost of a “nonaggression pact” between the two European courts, whereby the Court of Justice will slavishly follow the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, whereas the latter will intervene only in cases of the most grotesque dysfunction.’.

  122. 122.

    See also, e.g.: Olsen (2009–2010), p. 70/1.

  123. 123.

    Lavranos (2008), p. 606.

  124. 124.

    In this regard, Gragl argues that CFTD, M & Co, Cantoni, Mathews and Bosphorus would have had a different conclusion if EU was a contracting party to the Convention (see: Gragl 2013, p. 140). Gragl’s point is valid as regards the jurisdictional position of the Strasbourg Court upon these cases, although this may not be said so indisputably with regard to the substantive conclusions on these cases.

  125. 125.

    AIRE Centre et al. (2013), p. 1.

  126. 126.

    On the need for accession rather than the scenario wherein EU becomes obliged under ECHR based on the functional succession of its Member States, see: Odermatt (2014), p. 12; Cf. Heringa and Verhey (2011), p. 31, who argues that: ‘The optimal approach would certainly have been an accession by the EU to the Council of Europe and the ECHR.’

  127. 127.

    Gragl rightly notes that the Charter refers to several layers of fundamental rights law: EU, member states’ constitutional laws and international law (ECHR). To this extent, Gragl proposes that Art. 52 and Art. 53 ChFR take this situation into consideration, and lay down rules to settle disputes that may arise in the management of this interaction. See: Gragl (2013), p. 58.

  128. 128.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 34.

  129. 129.

    European Council Decision on the Drawing Up of a Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union, Annex II, para. 1.

  130. 130.

    E.g. Court of Justice of EU, Unibet v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05 [2007] ECR I-2271.

  131. 131.

    See also: Arold Lorenz et al. (2013), pp. 244 et seq, who cites a wealthy scholarship that basically argues that with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter and the Convention do not seem to turn into two mutually exclusive instruments. Instead, she argues, the EU Court pays a recognized respect for the Strasbourg Court, whereas, with the horizontal clauses which the Charter possesses, the Charter’s relationship with the Convention will not be one of competition but rather one of mutual harmony.

  132. 132.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 36; See also: Gragl (2013), p. 58/9.

  133. 133.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 36.

  134. 134.

    Court of Justice of EU, N.S. and Others, C-411/10 and C-493/10, 21 December 2011, para. 119.

  135. 135.

    Court of Justice of EU, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, 26 February 2013, paras 19 et seq; Gragl rightly notes that a similar broad test of the ‘scope’ of Member States fundamental rights obligations when implementing EU law is the ERT case (C-260/89). See on this: Gragl (2013), p. 55.

  136. 136.

    Court of Justice of EU, Iida, Case C-40/11 [2012] ECR, para. 79.

  137. 137.

    Court of Justice of EU, Annibaldi, Case C-309/96 [1997] ECR I-7493, paras 21–23.

  138. 138.

    Court of Justice of EU, Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione, Case C-206/13, Judgement of the Court of 6 March 2014, para. 25.

  139. 139.

    Court of Justice of EU, Maurin, Case C-144/95 [1996] ECR I-2909, paras 11/12.

  140. 140.

    Court of Justice of EU, Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione, Case C-206/13, Judgement of the Court of 6 March 2014, note 138, para. 28.

  141. 141.

    Court of Justice of EU, Iida, Case C-40/11 [2012] ECR, op cit. note 136, para. 80.

  142. 142.

    Court of Justice of EU, Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione, Case C-206/13, Judgement of the Court of 6 March 2014, note 138, para. 31.

  143. 143.

    Contra.: Gragl argues that by extending the basis of the application of fundamental rights limitations on Member States when they apply EU law, the Luxembourg Court actively expanded the areas of EU law over national law, therefore simultaneously ‘increasing the EU competences at the expense of those of the Member States’. See: Gragl (2013), p. 55/6.

  144. 144.

    Timmermans (2014), p. 338/9.

  145. 145.

    Gragl argues that the last word of Art. 52 (3) ChFR, establishing that EU law may provide more extensive protection, marks the mechanism to preserve the EU law autonomy. Art. 52 ChFR, according to Gragl, is a ‘dynamic norm of reference’ to the Strasbourg’s case-law. See: Gragl (2013), p. 59. I disagree on this argument with Gragl, as the above provision seems to oblige systemically the Luxembourg Court to the Convention’s standards rather than request it to refer to it for ‘cross-referencing’ purposes. This line of subordination to the Strasbourg Court’s case-law may lead also to interference to EU law autonomy, as the latter would take precedence over the Luxembourg’s fundamental rights exclusive jurisdiction.

  146. 146.

    Drawing on this obligation, Gragl (referring to Costa and Skouris) names this interaction ‘parallel interpretation’. See: Gragl (2013), p. 58.

  147. 147.

    Court of Justice of EU, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich, Case C-109/01 [2003] ECR I-9607.

  148. 148.

    Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-120/10, European Air Transport SA v. Collège d’Environnement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, delivered on 17 February 2011, para. 79.

  149. 149.

    Court of Justice of EU, Otis, Case C-199/11 [2012], para. 47; See also: Court of Justice of EU, Chalkor v Commission, Case C-386/10 P [2011] ECR I-13085, para. 51.

  150. 150.

    Court of Justice of EU, Dereci, C-256/11, 15 November 2011, para. 70; Accord: This is also supported by the Official Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, regarding this specific provision, assert: ‘The meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of the European Union.’ (Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, pp. 17–35. Explanation on Article 52—Scope and interpretation of rights and principles).

  151. 151.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 40.

  152. 152.

    de Rivery and Chassaing (2013), p. 3; Cf.: Gragl in this regard points to the fact that the Luxembourg Court has regularly used the standards developed under the ECHR system as ‘interpretive tool’ to enlighten the meaning of certain fundamental rights in the EU law. (Gragl 2013, p. 54).

  153. 153.

    ECtHR, Tyrer v UK, No 5856/72, 25 April 1978, para. 31 [emphasis added].

  154. 154.

    ECtHR, Micallef v. Malta, Application no. 17056/06, Grand Chamber, Judgment, Strasbourg, 15 October 2009, para. 32 [emphasis added].

  155. 155.

    de Búrca (2013), p. 172.

  156. 156.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 11; Cf.: To this extent, Gragl rightly points that the EU Court never considered itself bound to the decisions of the Strasbourg Court from the perspective of international law. Some Strasbourg standards which the Luxembourg Court uses and refers to in its decisions—according to Gragl—are merely considered as binding from the perspective of EU-law internally. See: Gragl (2013), p. 54.

  157. 157.

    European Committee on Social Rights, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) v. France, Collective Complaint No. 14/2003. Decision on the merits, 8 September 2004, para. 28.

  158. 158.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 11.

  159. 159.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 11.

  160. 160.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 11.

  161. 161.

    Callewaert (2014), p. 12.

  162. 162.

    Besselink (2013), p. 303.

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    Fisnik Korenica

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Korenica, F. (2015). EU Becoming a Human Rights Law Organization: Starting from Nowhere with a ‘gouvernment des juges’. In: The EU Accession to the ECHR. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21759-8_2

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