Abstract
Trust is defined as a truster’s belief in some properties. At the beginning they are to reach a goal and then they are refined in trust in some trustee’s property from which the truster can infer that his goal will be reached. This property may be the trustee’s ability to bring it about that the goal is reached which can itself be derived from the trustee’s intention to reach this goal. Then, we show that this intention may be adopted by the trustee depending on three kinds of social relationships: compliance of norms, mutual commitment with another agent or willingness to act without any compensation.
This analytical decomposition is formalized in a modal logic with a conditional connective. However, the technical details that could prevent an intuitive reading are omitted.
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Notes
- 1.
The meaning of the operator “to bring it about that ϕ” can be found in Pörn (1977).
- 2.
We do not pretend that these three possibilities are exhaustive but we think that they cover most of the situations.
- 3.
The notations have been changed in order to make easier the comparison with the presented approach.
- 4.
We have simplified the formal definition. In the complete definition there is an additional condition which has been introduced in order to avoid some paradoxes due to material implication.
References
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Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Andrew J.I. Jones for his valuable comments and for his help in the writing of the paper.
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Annex
Annex
The axiomatics, in addition to the axiomatics of classical propositional calculus, is defined as follows.
The modal operators Bel i and □ obey the axiomatics of a normal modal logic of system K.
For the conditional operator we have the following axiom schemas and inference rules:
- (EQUIV):
-
If \(\vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \phi '\) and \(\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \psi '\), then \(\vdash (\phi \Rightarrow \psi ) \rightarrow (\phi ' \Rightarrow \psi ')\)
- (TRANS):
-
\((\phi _{1} \Rightarrow \phi _{2}) \wedge (\phi _{2} \Rightarrow \phi _{3}) \rightarrow (\phi _{1} \Rightarrow \phi _{3})\)
- (DIST):
-
\((\phi _{1} \Rightarrow \phi _{2}) \rightarrow (\phi _{1} \rightarrow \phi _{2})\)
Property RS2.
We have: (R2) \(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi )\) and (S2) \(Bel_{i}(Attempt_{j}\phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\) entail (R1) \(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\).
Proof.
From the properties of a system K, from (R2) and (S2) we have:
-
(1)
\(Bel_{i}((\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{j}\phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi ))\)
From (TRANS), we have:
-
(2)
\((\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{j}\phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi ) \rightarrow (\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\)
From Necessitation applied to Bel i and (2) we have:
-
(3)
\(Bel_{i}((\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{j}\phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi ) \rightarrow (\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi ))\)
From K and (1) and (3) we have:
- (R1):
-
\(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\)
Property RS23.
We have: (R3) \(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Int_{j}\phi )\),
(S3) \(Bel_{i}(Int_{j}\phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi )\) and (S2) \(Bel_{i}(Attempt_{j}\phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\) entail (R1) \(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\).
Proof.
With the same kind of proof as for Property RS2, from (R3) and (S3) we have:
-
(1)
\(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{j}\phi )\)
With the same kind of proof, from (1) and (S2) we have:
- (R1):
-
\(Bel_{i}(\neg \phi \wedge Goal_{i}\lozenge \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \phi )\).
Property MN2.
We have the logical theorem: \(Bel_{i}((Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\).
Proof.
From (DIST) and Able definition we have:
-
(1)
\((Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow (Attempt_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
Therefore, we have:
-
(2)
\((Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
Since Bel i obeys a system K from (2) we have:
Property MN3.
We have the logical theorem: \(Bel_{i}((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Int_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\).
Proof.
From Determined and Able definitions, \((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi )\) is an abbreviation for:
-
(1)
\((Int_{x}\neg \phi \Rightarrow Attempt_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Attempt_{x}\neg \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
From (TRANS), (1) entails:
-
(2)
\((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow (Int_{x}\neg \phi \Rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
From (2) and (DIST) we have:
-
(3)
\((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow (Int_{x}\neg \phi \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
And from classical logic (3) entails:
-
(4)
\((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Int_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi\)
Since Bel i obeys a system K, from (4) we have:
-
(5)
\(Bel_{i}((Determined_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Able_{x}\neg \phi ) \wedge (Int_{x}\neg \phi ) \rightarrow \lozenge \neg \phi )\)
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Demolombe, R. (2015). Analytical Decomposition of Trust in Terms of Mental and Social Attitudes. In: Herzig, A., Lorini, E. (eds) The Cognitive Foundations of Group Attitudes and Social Interaction. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21732-1_3
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