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Conductive Argumentation, Degrees of Confidence, and the Communication of Uncertainty

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Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory

Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 28))

Abstract

We argue in this paper that there is an epistemic obligation to communicate the appropriate degree of confidence when asserting conclusions in conductive argumentation. This runs contrary to the position of those theorists who contend that once the conclusion to a conductive argument is drawn, it is simply asserted in an unqualified manner. We argue, on the contrary, that, in many contexts, we do qualify our conclusions and further, that we have an epistemic responsibility to do so. As an illustration, we discuss the case of the Italian scientists tried for failing to convey to the public appropriate warnings of the risks of the earthquake in L’Aquila.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Surprisingly given his thesis, Adler does acknowledge that “there are loads of arguments that end with qualified conclusions, including, ‘plausible’ or, more equivocally, ‘the best explanation is’” (p. 7). But the rest of his argumentation leads us to believe that he would reconcile this apparent contradiction by asserting that such arguments are not cogent, i.e., they are not arguments which can be put forward for acceptance.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Monica Bhattacharjee for her contribution to the preparation of this paper.

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Correspondence to Sharon Bailin .

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© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Bailin, S., Battersby, M. (2015). Conductive Argumentation, Degrees of Confidence, and the Communication of Uncertainty. In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory. Argumentation Library, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21103-9_5

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