Abstract
This chapter makes two foundational claims about psychological phenomena and uses these to articulate three conclusions. The claims are in short that psychological phenomena, at least in their developed human manifestations, should be seen as (1) doings that are (2) conversational. This approach is traced to Aristotle and reflected in Arendt’s work of the distinction between life as zoe (biological life) and bios (mental life). I argue that we need to conclude that, as a study of mental life, a causal vocabulary is inappropriate in psychology; the normativity of psychology is embedded in cultural practices; and finally that psychology is and ought to be a normative science.
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Brinkmann, S. (2016). Psychology as a Normative Science. In: Valsiner, J., Marsico, G., Chaudhary, N., Sato, T., Dazzani, V. (eds) Psychology as the Science of Human Being. Annals of Theoretical Psychology, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21094-0_1
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