Abstract
The core of the 2007–2008 financial market crisis has been the discovery that many securities were actually far riskier than people originally thought they were. The American financial crisis is a typical case of extended malpractice by hundreds of professionals in banks and rating agencies who created and certified as almost risk-free securities assets that were actually highly risky as the events after 2007 overwhelmingly showed. Subprime mortgage securitization models relied on assumptions and historical data that turned out to be incorrect and therefore made incorrect valuations. Because of the asymmetric information between the lender and the investor, rating agencies came on scene to provide the latter with accurate risk evaluation. However, the problem was that rating agencies are paid by the issuer not by the investor. This raised a conflict of interest, as was clearly exposed by the high credit ratings given to actually highly risky assets. The role of credit rating agencies, banks, and regulators is analyzed.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for example, Schwarcz (2011, 4).
- 2.
This led Krugman (2009, 170) to call it “the nonbank banking crisis.”
- 3.
On the repo market see also Chap. 4.
- 4.
In fact, after manufacturing some security, some banks used to sell the highest-risk tranches and retain some of the super senior position. This only proves that they thought that only the junior tranches were highly risky.
- 5.
In fact, this is what Robertson (2011) proposes to do in the future.
- 6.
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Beker, V.A. (2016). The American Financial Crisis. In: Modern Financial Crises. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 42. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20991-3_3
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