Abstract
What is the relationship between logic and argumentation theory? The answer to this question depends, of course, to a large extent on the way in which logic and argumentation theory are conceived and defined. Opting for different concepts of logic and argumentation theory could result in the view that there is no relationship at all, that logic and argumentation theory are the same, that logic is part of argumentation theory, that argumentation theory is part of logic, or that some more complex variant of either of these possibilities prevails. Acknowledging that other choices can be made, I start my attempt to answer the question about the relationship between logic and argumentation theory with a general indication of my understanding of logic and argumentation theory.
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- 1.
Van Benthem (2009, p. 19) observes that “modern logic just studies some products of […] acts, such as inference forms, or static instantaneous knowledge and beliefs of agents. It does not study those acts themselves, even though only the latter create the products, and make sense of them”.
- 2.
See, in particular, Johnson (2000).
- 3.
It may also be the case that for other reasons it is immediately apparent which premise has been left unexpressed. The communicative activity type in which the argumentation takes place, for instance, might provide the solution. Then logic does not play a part in the reconstruction process.
- 4.
For the rules of communication, which integrate Gricean maxims and speech act conditions, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 49–55).
- 5.
The heuristic starting point of the pragma-dialectical procedure for making unexpressed premises explicit consists in reconstructing the reasoning underlying the argumentation as a logically valid argument, whose conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true. In practice, it is not always fully clear whether the argument should indeed be validated. The speaker may, after all, have argued in an invalid way. Unless there are good reasons for not doing so, it is for reason’s sake nevertheless pragma-dialectical policy to follow the procedure.
- 6.
I am not certain that it is up to argumentation theorists to give a specific and definitive answer to the general question of exactly what kind of logical validity criterion is to be preferred.
- 7.
For these empirical sources, see van Eemeren (2010, pp. 16–19), who distinguishes between the text, the micro, meso, macro and textual contexts, logical and pragmatic inferences, and general and specific background information.
- 8.
For a summary of the general procedure to determine the pragmatic optimum, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 64–68, pp. 142–144).
- 9.
A Constructive Dilemma neither has two premises nor can it be easily reconstructed as an argument with two premises.
- 10.
Each of our rules for critical discussion makes it possible to satisfy a necessary condition for the resolution of a difference of opinion. As a whole, the rules are conducive to the resolution of a difference of opinion by means of argumentative discussions.
- 11.
In certain cases, as in argumentation by analogy, the soundness of the reasoning involved in the argumentation does not play a prominent part in the process of convincing the antagonist, so that logic is not pertinent to the assessment of the use of the argument scheme employed.
- 12.
See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 92–102).
- 13.
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van Eemeren, F.H. (2015). The Role of Logic in Analyzing and Evaluating Argumentation. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_35
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