Abstract
In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 17–18).
- 2.
According to our pragma-dialectical model, a critical discussion passes through four discussion stages: (1) the confrontation stage, during which the dispute is externalized; (2) the opening stage, during which agreements are reached concerning the manner in which the dispute and the discussion are to be conducted; (3) the argumentation stage, during which argumentation is advanced and reacted to; and (4) the concluding stage, during which it is established how the discussion is concluded (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 85–87).
- 3.
The model specifies which activities the participants in a critical discussion have to perform at the four stages in order to contribute to the resolution of a dispute. In our pragmatic approach, the rules of the model indicate what sorts of speech acts in the four stages of a critical discussion can serve the purpose of resolving a dispute, and prescribe when the discussants are entitled, or indeed obliged, to perform a particular speech act.
- 4.
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 151–175).
- 5.
In ordinary speech the use of the term fallacy is not consistently confined to a specific theoretical conception of a rational discussion. Often it is taken to mean no more than an invalid and deceptive argument, or even simply a false assertion. Here the term is used both more precisely and more broadly. More precisely, in the sense that it is systematically linked to a dialectical approach to argumentation, more broadly because it relates to all aspects of the discussion and not merely the truth value of assertions or the validity of arguments.
- 6.
In everyday language fallacies are rather strongly associated with deliberate attempts to mislead. Impute a fallacy to someone and you almost automatically appear to be passing a moral judgement on his behaviour. In our conception there is no question of any such moralistic condemnation.
- 7.
A more elaborated version of the rules including an explanation in more detail is presented in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987).
- 8.
Cf. Barth and Martens (1977, 79).
- 9.
Cf. van Eemeren and Kruiger (1986).
- 10.
The Communication Principle, as we call it, corresponds to Grice’s Co-operative Principle. To be precise, the requirement mentioned follows from his Maxim of Manner which says: ‘Be perspicuous. Avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity), and be orderly’ (1975, 46).
- 11.
- 12.
Of course, a speaker can always be mistaken about the listener’s background knowledge or the degree to which context and situation speak for themselves, and the listener can make a wrong association between context and situation and the speaker’s words, and thus attribute an unintended meaning to what the speaker says. In other words, attempting to arrive at optimal formulations and interpretations is not a sufficient condition for bringing about understanding between speaker and listener, but it is, however, a necessary condition for it.
- 13.
Naess refers to the level of understanding as the ‘depth of intended meaning’ or the ‘depth of understanding’ (1966, 34–36). According to him this depends on the context in which a sentence is used. The importance of the role of the context in interpreting utterances is also stressed in Crawshay-Williams 1957. Both Naess’s and Crawshay-William’s ideas about language use in discussions are discussed in van Eemeren et al. (1987, 116–118, 122–131).
- 14.
A usage declarative is a speech act the purpose of which is to achieve the illocutionary effect of understanding the speaker’s speech act. Examples of- usage declaratives are: definitions, precizations, amplifications, explications, and explicitizations (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 109–110).
- 15.
The rationale of this strategy is explained in van Eemeren (1986b). Of course, the advice in doubtful cases to employ this strategy can itself create new areas of doubt, as is the case, for example, with advertising texts, election speeches and quarreling in public. The alternative is to assume from the start all reasonableness is absent, which would appear to be even less desirable than a possible faux pas in deciding that something is a fallacy when in fact it is not. As long as we bear in mind the conditional character of fallacy analysis and remember not to attribute any absolute value to it, this risk ought not to cause too much trouble.
- 16.
A critical survey of the pre- and post-Hamblinean Standard Treatment is presented in Grootendorst (1986). The idea of fallacies as violations of rules for rational argumentation (in our theoretical conception argumentation aimed at the resolution of a dispute) is suggested in Barth and Martens (1977, 96). Another method for analysing fallacies is to take them as arguments which cannot be generated by a finite set of production rules for generating rational arguments (Barth and Martens 1977, 96). This second alternative is also proposed in Barth and Krabbe (1982, 90).
- 17.
That is why it is sensible to distinguish between violations of Rule VIII, which are fallacies in the narrow sense, and fallacies in the broad sense, which violate one of the other rules of discussion.
- 18.
In a joint project with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs we are trying to develop a theory of conversational argument, combining a dialectical approach with insights taken from conversation analysis. A first outline is sketched in van Eemeren (1986b). See for the conversational work already done by Jackson and Jacobs, for example, 1982 and 1983.
- 19.
Lots of work has to be done with respect to, for example, the argumentum ad consequentiam, the fallacies of composition and division, hasty generalization, post hoc ergo propter hoc, and petitio principii. Excellent contributions from a logical point of view have been made by Woods and Walton. cf., e.g., their 1982 and 1987, and Walton (1984, 1985).
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van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R. (2015). Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_29
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