Abstract
The subject we are dealing with in this paper—fallacies in argumentative exchanges—is a crucial topic in the study of argumentation. In our opinion, the way in which the fallacies are treated can even be seen as the “acid test” for any normative theory of argumentation.
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Appendix: Pragma-Dialectical Rules for Critical Discussion and Fallacies
Appendix: Pragma-Dialectical Rules for Critical Discussion and Fallacies
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1.
Freedom rule
Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.
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2.
Burden-of-proof rule
A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
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3.
Standpoint rule
A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
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4.
Relevance rule
A party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation related to that standpoint.
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5.
Unexpressed premise rule
A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit.
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6.
Starting point rule
No party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.
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7.
Argument scheme rule
A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied.
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8.
Validity rule
The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or must be capable of being made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
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9.
Closure rule
A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts.
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10.
Usage rule
Parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible.
From: F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (2002). Argumentation. Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Houtlosser, P. (2015). Rhetoric in a Dialectical Framework: Fallacies as Derailments of Strategic Manoeuvring. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_20
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