Abstract
When in the study of argumentation we are talking about ‘reasonableness,’ we are discussing the philosophical rationale for adopting a certain theoretical approach to argumentation. Such a rationale may, in our view, be supposed to have two complementary dimensions. First, there is the dimension of ‘problem validity,’ a criterion having to do with the effectiveness of an approach, which has become the single touchstone in the logical perspective on argumentation. Second, there is the dimension of ‘intersubjective validity,’ also referred to as ‘conventional validity,’ a criterion that pertains to the acceptability of an approach to real arguers and features in the rhetorical perspective on argumentation. In modern and postmodern philosophies of argumentation the balance between problem validity and intersubjective validity has been lost. As a consequence, the scale has either tipped toward the logical perspective or toward the rhetorical perspective. In this paper, we propose how the balance can be redressed.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to realize that it depends also on the definition of the problem whether or not a certain approach is effective in solving the problem. In our conception, argumentation is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion and the most effective approach to argumentation is the one that serves this purpose best.
- 2.
Taking Albert’s (1985) warning against any form of “revelation model” of the truth to heart, we believe it necessary to keep all justificationism inherent in the geometrical and anthropological conceptions of reasonableness at a firm distance.
- 3.
A great many philosophers make a fundamental distinction between factual judgements and value judgments and are of the opinion that the latter cannot be subjected to a reasonable discussion, because they are based only on subjective preferences. We fear that restricting the bounds of reason to discussions on factual judgments would give a free hand to those, in politics or elsewhere, who do not really care about reasonableness. We agree with Albert (1985) that any topic on which a regulated discussion can be carried out can be dealt with reasonably.
- 4.
According to our principle of externalization, only those challenges need to be dealt with by the protagonist that are somehow advanced in the discussion, whether explicitly, implicitly or indirectly.
- 5.
There are some restrictions, however. Maintaining the burden of proof does not make sense if earlier the protagonist has defended his standpoint already successfully against the same antagonist starting from the same point of departure. It is also a waste of time to start a critical discussion if no joint point of departure can be established.
- 6.
Barth and Krabbe (1982) take a similar approach.
- 7.
Although adopting a presumption clearly prejudges an issue, such an adoption may in Ullman-Margalit’s view be seen as rational in a twofold sense: in any particular instance the presumption is open to rebuttal, and the bias it promotes is independently justifiable. In pragma-dialectical terms, the former would mean that a starting point can be revoked; this, however, is only allowed when it can be shown by offering counter-evidence that this starting point is, after all, not acceptable. The latter would mean that institutional or other contextual support must be available.
- 8.
In his system for dealing with (mixed) disputes, Hamblin (1970, 274) also replaces the concept of burden of proof by the “somewhat simpler concept of initiative”.
- 9.
They have, in fact, the same function as the formal dialectical ‘concessions,’ but in a critical discussion ‘concessions’ are made by both parties.
- 10.
- 11.
The fact that minimization of disagreement, rather than maximization of agreement, is aimed for is, as a matter of fact, a good illustration of how critical rationalist insight and utilitarian pragmatic insight conjoin. A system of argumentation rules which encourages discussants to pronounce their doubts and to work out how far the disagreements ensuing from such expressions of doubt can be resolved, is in our view preferable to a system of argumentation rules which seeks to ensure agreement.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Houtlosser, P. (2015). A Procedural View of Critical Reasonableness. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_12
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