Abstract
As discussed in Sect. 3.1, preparedness has been measured in the crisis cases by asking whether Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were in place before the crisis. Analysis of how risk is perceived, and whether risk taking or risk avoidance could to some degree be blamed for the crisis has not been specifically evaluated in the crisis cases. Risk can be mitigated, but, as a practical matter, it cannot be eliminated. Risk can be avoided by not taking any action involving risk, but such an approach would preclude any possible reward or progress. For instance, the decision not to use a promising new technology due to possible risk reflects such avoidance. Despite best efforts, not all risk can be mitigated; enlightened policy makers thus develop SOPs dictating how to respond to the consequences if the risk (or threat) results in a crisis. In other words, the policy makers (decision makers) embrace preparedness as well as mitigation. By that definition, the SOP variable can perfectly represent the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension that, according to Mary Sully de Luque and Mansour Javidan (2004) seeks orderliness, consistency, and formalized procedures. Thus, uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk avoidance. On the contrary, by making plans to avoid uncertainty, risk can be accommodated (lived with). Uncertainty Avoidance therefore more accurately reflects the decision maker’s need (and/or ability) to control or minimize uncertainty, rather than his/her unwillingness to take a risk. In this study, the influence of culture on policy makers' belief in the value of such preparedness measures is analyzed. In fact, the SOPs variable can be used to explore how future oriented the risk reduction efforts were. As previously stated, House et al. (1999), define Future Orientations as the degree to which collectivity encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors like planning and delaying gratification. A distinction is made between planning based on past orientation, i.e., based on experiences from past crises, or future orientation, i.e., based on conceivable potential crises. However, this distinction was not made when people were asked whether the accepted norm should be to plan for the future or to accept the status quo (Ashkanasy et al. 2004: 282). This question does not address how plans should be made. Uncertainty Avoidance seeks formalized procedures that can be in the form of SOPs. The quest for consistency, however, puts more emphasis on planning based on past experiences. Hence it can be argued that the SOPs variable can reflect both the need for control to minimize uncertainty and the willingness to plan for the future.
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- 1.
The extent of decision makers’ involvement in the risk reduction efforts for the specific crisis studied is not reflected in the data. Thus, it is invalid to use the measurement of the efforts as a reflection of the decision makers’ responses. On the other hand, it is a valid—and an important analysis—to look at the way in which the GGCT perspectives would approach the risk reduction theme and test whether the analysis reveals an expected behavioral pattern that can be tied to it.
- 2.
In those cases where no relationship between variables was found, tables of the results of statistical analysis are not presented in this study.
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Bernhardsdóttir, Á.E. (2015). Risk Reduction. In: Crisis-Related Decision-Making and the Influence of Culture on the Behavior of Decision Makers. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20714-8_4
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